On Thu, 19 Feb 2004 11:41:37 +0700, "Dr. Jeffrey Race" said:
> The identities of chronically mal-administered systems are well
> know.
>
> There are some practical implementation problems at the margin but
> for (I am guessing) 95% of the cases, it is trivially easy.
So we're left with the concl
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Alex Bligh wrote:
> they in turn chose to trust. Take BGP (by which I mean eBGP) as the case in
> point: [...] The trust relationship is
> important, [...]. BGP allows me (in commonly deployed form) to run
> a relatively
> secure protocol between peers, and deploy (almost) u
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 13:06:05 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>Any real solution is going to have to deal with the fact that properly
>administered systems are in the distinct minority.
You shut the mal-administered systems of from the internet until they
are no lnger a threat to the internet, ju
> >> I think that the "registration" oriented authentication mechanisms
(spf,
> >> rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
> >> hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
>
> GSH> I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
>
> Well, it
Guðbjörn,
>> I think that the "registration" oriented authentication mechanisms (spf,
>> rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
>> hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
GSH> I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
Well, it w
> I think that the "registration" oriented authentication mechanisms (spf,
> rmx, lmap, etc.) can be useful only when the authenticator is the
> hosting network provider, rather than a message author.
I think widespread use of SPF will gut the major sources of spam.
The problem with spam proxies
Dave Crocker wrote:
> Folks,
>
>
> TH> If you insist on restricting the service to a small set of 'approved'
> TH> applications, people will simply encapsulate what they really want to
> do in
> TH> the approved service and you will lose visibility.
>
> A small elaboration:
>
> You will make
Folks,
TH> If you insist on restricting the service to a small set of 'approved'
TH> applications, people will simply encapsulate what they really want to do in
TH> the approved service and you will lose visibility.
A small elaboration:
You will make life intolerable for the average user -- i
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 10:08:25 +1300, Don Gould <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> The RFC for mail was very well designed. If people simply stuck to the
> orginal RFC (~800 something) and managed more of their own small systems
> then this spam thing just wouldn't be the problem that it has become...
>
> * No authentication scheme
Bang on!
> People do, however, use it because there
>currently is no realistic widely deployed alternative available. Those
>that are currently available (e.g. SPF) are not widely deployed, and
>in any case are far from perfect. Whilst we have no hammer, people wil
Tony,
--On 17 February 2004 17:27 -0800 Tony Hain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Clearly I misinterpreted your comments; sorry for reading other parts of
the thread into your intent. The bottom line is the lack of a -scalable-
trust infrastructure. You are arguing here that the technically inclined
c
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Tony Hain wrote:
: Most of the responses to the anti-spam thread, and the comments to Itojun's
: IAB presentation in Miami about filtering, show that this community has been
: thoroughly infiltrated and is now as CLUELESS as the PSTN providers, and
: just as power hungry. The
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:
>
> On 17 Feb 2004, Robert E. Seastrom wrote:
>
> > Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >
> > > and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy "internet
> > > service" from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp rela
MAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 4:48 PM
> To: Tony Hain; 'Steven M. Bellovin'
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Alex Bligh
> Subject: RE: Clueless service restrictions (was RE: Anti-spam System Idea)
>
>
>
> --On 17 February 2004 16:19 -0800 Tony Hain <[EMA
--On 17 February 2004 16:19 -0800 Tony Hain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Where they specifically form a club and agree to preclude the basement
multi-homed site from participating through prefix length filters. This
is exactly like the thread comments about preventing consumers from
running indepe
Alex Bligh wrote:
> Steve,
>
> --On 17 February 2004 17:28 -0500 "Steven M. Bellovin"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > In almost all circumstances, authentication is useful for one of two
> > things: authorization or retribution. But who says you need
> > "authorization" to send email? Autho
On 17 Feb 2004, Robert E. Seastrom wrote:
> Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> > and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy "internet
> > service" from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp relay,
> > ... "walled garden" mentality from the get go.
>
> St
Steve,
--On 17 February 2004 17:28 -0500 "Steven M. Bellovin"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
In almost all circumstances, authentication is useful for one of two
things: authorization or retribution. But who says you need
"authorization" to send email? Authorized by whom? On what criteria?
Author
>>> and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy "internet
>>> service" from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp
>>> relay, ... "walled garden" mentality from the get go.
>> The ssh client for the Danger Sidekick is extremely popular, and I
>> don't think it would
In the immortal words of Robert E. Seastrom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
>
> Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> > and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy "internet
> > service" from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp
> > relay, ... "walled garden" mentality
Reasoning like this leads me to schemes that involve imposing cost. It
may be financial, it may be CPU cycles, it may be any of a number of
things. But it can't be identity based, except for recipient-based
whitelists, and they have their own disadvantages.
cost is good. the problem is c
On Tue, 17 Feb 2004 21:48:18 +
Alex Bligh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> a) Some forms of filtering, which do occasionally prevent the customer
>from using their target application, are in general good, as the
>operational (see, on topic) impact of *not* applying tends to be
>worse
Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> and, if you want to see a particularly broken example, buy "internet
> service" from t-mobile gprs in the states, port 22 blocked, no smtp
> relay, ... "walled garden" mentality from the get go.
Strangely enough, the only complaints I've heard about t-m
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Tony Hain" writes:
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
d
, Weijing; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Alex Bligh
Subject: RE: Clueless service restrictions (was RE: Anti-spam System Idea)
--On 17 February 2004 16:10 -0600 "Chen, Weijing"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sound like an any to any end to end signaling/control mechanism with
> authe
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Alex Bligh writes:
>b) The real problem here is that there are TWO problems which interact.
> It is a specific case of the following general problem:
> * A desire for any to any end to end connectivity using the
> protocol concerned => filter free internet
--On 17 February 2004 16:10 -0600 "Chen, Weijing"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Sound like an any to any end to end signaling/control mechanism with
authentication capabilities. Smell fishy (packet version of dial tone?)
Since when had dialtone got end-to-end signalling/control? My POTS line
does
: Alex Bligh
Subject: Re: Clueless service restrictions (was RE: Anti-spam System Idea)
The real problem here is that there are TWO problems which interact.
It is a specific case of the following general problem:
* A desire for any to any end to end connectivity using the
protocol concerned
--On 17 February 2004 12:17 -0800 Tony Hain <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[with apologies for rearrangement]
The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
would have prevented IM, web, sip applic
> In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Tony Hain"
writes:
> >The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary
> interactions where new
> >applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally
> controlled model
> >would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
> >deployed.
> The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
> applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
> would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
> deployed. If there are any operators out there who still understand the
> In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Tony Hain" writes:
> >
> >The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
> >applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
> >would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
> >deployed.
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Tony Hain" writes:
>
>
>The Internet has value because it allows arbitrary interactions where new
>applications can be developed and fostered. The centrally controlled model
>would have prevented IM, web, sip applications, etc. from ever being
>deployed. If there a
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