John,
While I agree that not many domestic (or EU) vendors will offer services
contrary to the law in this area, do you truly believe this won't simply
cause
companies that really want to make money in this market to move to places
where
the laws are less difficult? Afterall, I can get
At 8:04 AM -0700 6/21/04, Owen DeLong wrote:
John,
While I agree that not many domestic (or EU) vendors will offer services
contrary to the law in this area, do you truly believe this won't simply cause
companies that really want to make money in this market to move to places where
I think the only advantage to DOJ working this hard on LI capabilities
is that
it may raise public awareness of the issue, and, may help get better
cryptographic
technologies more widely deployed sooner. Other than that, I think it's
just a lose
all the way around.
I'm not advocating the
On Mon, 21 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
With respect to enforcement, I am sure there are ways to prevent
being caught involving amusing offshore logistics, but that will still
prevent the vast majority of US businesses from offering non-2281
compliant services.
Off-shore would be the NSA,
On Mon, 21 Jun 2004, Pete Schroebel wrote:
I think the only advantage to DOJ working this hard on LI capabilities
is that
it may raise public awareness of the issue, and, may help get better
cryptographic
technologies more widely deployed sooner. Other than that, I think it's
just
They, the DOJ is just trying to do it's job, as they are under the
microscope due to the fumbles that led to the compromises by an
obviously
inept predecessor. Now, they are tighten the screws on everything from
telecoms to bank accounts; to prevent another round of fumbled
I disagree, as there are listening stations in almost every language that
have been very useful; I've seen them, built them some over the years and
watched others start-up, . The DOJ needs to be able to do the same with the
voip/networks/internet and soon intranet.
and don't forget the
On Mon, 21 Jun 2004, Pete Schroebel wrote:
Smoke screen efforts are less helpful and are simple diversions from the
reality of the problem.
I disagree, as there are listening stations in almost every language that
have been very useful; I've seen them, built them some over the years
On Mon, 21 Jun 2004, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
yes, agreed. moving toward the next technology of snooping is a good thing
for DoJ.
You can request copies of the law enforcement needs documents at
http://www.askcalea.net/standards.html
Packet Surveillance Fundamental Needs Document (PSFND)
Deja vu.
This sounds amazingly similar to the thoughts running through
many minds back in April 1992 when Uncle Sugar thunk up the
Clipper debacle in an attempt to put the strong personal encryption
genie back into the bottle. ;-)
- ferg
ps. Happy Dad's day.
-- Henry Linneweh [EMAIL
At 12:30 AM -0400 on 6/20/04, John Curran wrote:
At 12:06 AM -0400 6/20/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
[snip]
It sounds good, if you assume there will always be a PSTN. But its
like defining the Internet in terms of connecting to the ARPANET.
Correct. It's a workable interim measure to continue
On Sun, 20 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
It's not just the US Goverment with interest in this matter.
Lawful Intercept has basis in both EU directives and laws
of many member states.
You are aware the US Government pays for consultants to assist
in the development of international and
Hi Sean.
Long time, no see, etc. ;-)
In response to your baited question, it should be readily
apparent -- this is a simple exercise in reasonable deduction.
LEA's want to have the same technical capability to wiretap
communications in technologies where they currently do not
posses the
At 11:11 PM -0400 6/20/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
Every type of electronic communications in the USA may, and probably
has been intercepted at one time or another, not just VoIP. Everything
outlined in the ETSI standards, and more, is available for purchase today
from vendors in the USA.
Its a
On Mon, 21 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
Looks pretty clear to me: assistance requirements (i.e. the requirement
to have LI capacity and mechanisms in place in advance) should apply to
all providers, and in particular, that VoIP providers who do not provide
direct PSTN access (e.g. FWD,
The particular hearing that set this all off is the Senate Commerce
Committee's review of S.2281 (VoIP Regulatory Freedom Act) that
took place on last Wednesday, and in general, the hearing has a
higher content to noise ratio than the resulting press coverage.
The agenda and statements of the
On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
S.2281 takes the middle of the road position in areas such as lawful
intercept, universal service fund, and E911. At a high-level, those
VoIP services which offer PSTN interconnection (and thereby look like
traditional phone service in terms of
At 12:06 AM -0400 6/20/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
S.2281 takes the middle of the road position in areas such as lawful
intercept, universal service fund, and E911. At a high-level, those
VoIP services which offer PSTN interconnection (and thereby look
if the pro-ported bad guys are so swift why would they
use anything packaged anyway?
They have engineers and scientific minds in their
ranks that understand devices, boards and the likes
and could simply create their own data centers and
simply use new protocols to communicate over the
public
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