Brandon Applegate writes:
Hi,
> Anyone have any insight on how one can look up an OUI (yes I know about
> oui.txt, but I’m asking about a live query site).
https://www.wireshark.org/tools/oui-lookup.html ?
Jens
--
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 6:32 AM, Brandon Applegate wrote:
> They’ve made some changes recently - I had a perl script that would do the
> lookup and scrape live - it was great. It broke a week or so ago.
>
> This seems to be the page to search for OUI:
>
>
They’ve made some changes recently - I had a perl script that would do the
lookup and scrape live - it was great. It broke a week or so ago.
This seems to be the page to search for OUI:
https://regauth.standards.ieee.org/standards-ra-web/pub/view.html
hi jean-f
On 12/08/15 at 11:46pm, Jean-Francois Mezei wrote:
> Since the OP mentioned a "ransom" demand (aka: extortion), should law
> enforcement be contacted in such cases ?
simply saying "these bozo's are attempting to extort $100 from me"
with their email demands probably will not get the
On Mon, Dec 07, 2015 at 11:54:17AM -0600, Larry Sheldon wrote:
> I'll join the confusion--I thought the OP wanted to test for power
> availability at the distant site by seeing if a modem there would answer
> the phone there. That it HAD to be a modem in that case makes no sense
> to me.
>
>
Hi,
you might find useful to see Nat Morris's presentation on "Anycast on a
shoe string".
He lists several VPS providers that do BGP for his project.
Here is one link:
http://www.slideshare.net/natmorris/anycast-on-a-shoe-string
Regards,
Felipe
On 7 December 2015 at 12:40, Philippe Bonvin via
On 12/8/15 1:06 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
> they eat better food than we do
Not in my considerable experience. I always thought that was part of
the problem.
Eliot
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
PCH maintains routing archives here:
https://www.pch.net/resources/Raw_Routing_Data/
In aggregate, our AS3856 collects routes from 1307 distinct ASNs spread
across 82 IXPs.
> *From:* Kurt Kraut via NANOG >
> *Date:* December 8, 2015 at 08:24:31 PST
>
I believe that is what he meant, yeah. Figurative opening of the bank
account - showing them that you're willing to pay makes you a target
for future payments as well.
On Thu, 03 Dec 2015, Daniel Corbe wrote:
>
> > On Dec 3, 2015, at 10:26 AM, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> >
> > On
What: CAIDA BGP Hackathon, Call for Participation (CFP)
When: Feb 6-7, 2016
Where: the San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC) on the University of
California at San Diego (UCSD) campus.
Who: Parties interested in hacking on live BGP data.
Inquiries: bgp-hackathon-i...@caida.org
Important Deadline:
We received a similar ransom e-mail yesterday followed by a UDP flood
attack. Here is a sample of the attack traffic we received as well as a
copy of the ransom e-mail. Thought this might be useful to others who have
been targeted as well. I will have to talk with our upstream providers to
get a
hi joe
On 12/08/15 at 01:24am, Joe Morgan wrote:
> We received a similar ransom e-mail yesterday
:-)
dont pay real $$$ ... pretend that it was paid and watch for
them to come get the ransom ... never give your real banking info
ask them, where do you send the "$xx,000" mastercard gift card
>
>
> On 10 December 2015 at 01:48, alvin nanog > wrote:
>
>> what app do yu have that talks to port 1900 ?
>>
>
> UDP 1900 is a "Chargen" UDP reflection attack. The DNS and NTP packets are
> also from a reflection attack.
>
>
Sorry I was made aware that UDP 1900
On 8 Dec 2015, at 14:24, Joe Morgan wrote:
At the point in time we blackholed our ip we were seeing 20+Gbps.
These two presos discuss extortion DDoS and UDP reflection/amplification
attacks, specifically - it isn't necessary to resort to D/RTBH to deal
with these attacks:
On 10 December 2015 at 01:48, alvin nanog
wrote:
> what app do yu have that talks to port 1900 ?
>
UDP 1900 is a "Chargen" UDP reflection attack. The DNS and NTP packets are
also from a reflection attack.
We filter UDP 1900 at our border. Not to protect our
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 8:52 PM, Yucong Sun wrote:
> I recommend http://www.quadranet.com/ ! I have been a happy customer
> for almost two years,
>
> I have a single dedicated server over there, running full BGP feed
> with them, It's a fairly extensive setup with multiple
Just an update for those following. We have custom in house software that
watches the traffic flows from our edge routers and automatically
blackholes any ip getting targeted. The blackhole gets sent upstream which
is what we did to maintain the network for our customers during the first
attack.
On 10 Dec 2015, at 13:21, Joe Morgan wrote:
We have custom in house software that watches the traffic flows from
our edge routers and automatically blackholes any ip getting targeted.
Suggest you take a look at the presos I posted earlier and look into
S/RTBH, flowspec, some limited QoS, and
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