Robert Story wrote:
The commitment to maintain service for 1 year after the new LACNIC
addresses are switched in to the root.hints from IANA does not mean that
this is a cutoff date and that we intend to turn off service on the
older addresses after a year. We currently have no plans to do so
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
*Countdown to NANOG 88*
*88th Community-Wide Meeting will Kick Off Monday!*
In four days, NANOG 88 will occur virtually + in person in Seattle, Wa.
Have you synced your calendar yet to the NANOG 88 agenda? There's still
time to register! Check out our keynote speaker, NANOG Socials, hotel
*Countdown to NANOG 88*
*88th Community-Wide Meeting will Kick Off Monday!*
In four days, NANOG 88 will occur virtually + in person in Seattle, Wa.
Have you synced your calendar yet to the NANOG 88 agenda? There's still
time to register! Check out our keynote speaker, NANOG Socials, hotel
On Wed 2023-06-07 15:34:12-0700 Matthew wrote:
> If the goal is increased robustness by having addresses present from a
> different RIR, wouldn't it make this whole tempest in a teapot moot
> if, instead of *reunubering*, you simply *added* a second set of IPs,
> but continued to answer queries on
Mark Andrews wrote:
It announces itself to an address which remains under the control of
USC/ISI the current and on going root server operator for b.root-servers.net.
So apart from leaking that the root hints have not been updated I don’t
see a big risk here. The address block, as has been
6 matches
Mail list logo
