> - Original Message -
>>> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
>>> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
>>
>> Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to
>> pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and other
>> unfiltere
I’m not new here but the thread caught my eye, as I am one of the lower ASs
being mentioned. I guess there isn’t really anything one can do to prevent
these things other than listening to route servers, etc. I guess it’s all on
what the upstream decides to allow-in and re-advertise.
Jason
Ja
- Original Message -
> From: "Joe Provo"
> On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 12:53:07AM +0900, Paul S. wrote:
> > Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
> > outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
>
> Of course not because their neighbors are allowing
.-- My secret spy satellite informs me that at 2014-11-30 6:24 AM
Pierfrancesco Caci wrote:
>> "Simon" == Simon Leinen writes:
>
> Simon> Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
>
> Simon> 133439 5
> Simon> 197945 4
>
> my bet is on someone using the syntax "prepend asnX
On 11/30/2014 11:26 AM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
> On Mon, 01 Dec 2014 00:53:07 +0900, "Paul S." said:
>> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
>> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
>
> You're new here, aren't you? :)
Thank you, I needed t
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 12:53:07AM +0900, Paul S. wrote:
> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to
pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and othe
On Mon, 01 Dec 2014 00:53:07 +0900, "Paul S." said:
> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
You're new here, aren't you? :)
pgpeSOBr2fqm8.pgp
Description: PGP signature
I'm currently looking into AS3 in an attempt to figure out what's going on.
Always interested to hear what others have found out.
Cheers,
Harry
On Nov 30, 2014 8:57 AM, Simon Leinen wrote:
>
> cidr-report writes:
> > BGP Update Report
> > Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days)
> > Obse
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
On 11/30/2014 午後 11:24, Pierfrancesco Caci wrote:
"Simon" == Simon Leinen writes:
Simon> Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
Simon> 133439 5
S
> "Simon" == Simon Leinen writes:
Simon> Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
Simon> 133439 5
Simon> 197945 4
my bet is on someone using the syntax "prepend asnX timesY" on a router
that instead wants "prepend asnX asnX"
--
Pierfrancesco Caci, ik5pvx
cidr-report writes:
> BGP Update Report
> Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days)
> Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072
> TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
> Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name
[...]
> 11 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics,
11 matches
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