Well, it took less than a day for my last missive here to get the
hijacks associated with AS202746 (Nexus Webhosting) taken down.
I guess that somebody must have smacked Telia upside the head with
a clue-by-four at long last.
So, with that out of the way, let's see what else I can accomplish
this
Dear Ronald,
Thanks for your report, we'll investigate.
Kind regards,
Job
RIPE or one of dem dere responsible RIRs should hire him.
I got a sales call in a few weeks with NTT, let's see if Job is successful
and then I can be duly impressed and even more interested in their products.
This shit actually matters, sometimes.
/kc
On Thu, Aug 03, 2017 at 12:23:51PM +0200,
A few years back, Ronald named-and-shamed my work's new carrier for
facilitating a prefix hijacker on this very list. As luck would have it,
I had a fresh, crisp business card from our sales rep, so I passed the
(quite legitimate) grievance along, and a short time later, the hijacked
prefixes h
On Thu, Aug 03, 2017 at 02:52:43AM -0700, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> And of course, Mr. Stanciu's snowshoe spamming domains would not be
> maximally productive unless they each had SPF TXT records attached [...]
>
> https://pastebin.com/raw/BbK2YGe6
FYI, 85 of the 101 domains listed here a
Also AS57166 (single upstream AS29632 NetAssist) is likely hijacking
10 ASNs, and AS43659 (currently inactive). Both with mnt-by:
D2INVEST-MNT.
http://bgp.he.net/AS57166#_peers
DATASTAR-MNT created 14 autnum and 31 route dummy objects in RIPE, on
resources that looks abandoned (2 of them confirm
Oops, following up a bit late.
I was told yesterday that AS209 blocked their acceptance of
163.198.0.0/16 from AS35916 based on a number of complaints, which
unfortunately left a path via their peering with NTT (which I presume
they can't filter for $reasons). But then a short time later AS359
7 matches
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