RE: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-03-13 Thread Jamie Bowden
> From: Shrdlu [mailto:shr...@deaddrop.org] > On 3/12/2013 4:16 PM, Warren Bailey wrote: > > > Contractors with facility clearances? I would find it hard to believe > > dot gov would run secure circuits to a non secure facility. ;) > > The word "Contractor" is usually used to refer to anyone that

RE: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-03-13 Thread Jamie Bowden
> From: Mike A [mailto:mi...@mikea.ath.cx] > On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 04:41:42PM +, Warren Bailey wrote: > > Not to mention, the KG units are dot government only.. For obvious > reasons. > Erm ... yesandno. Lots of defense contractors have one end of a secured > circuit. Been there, installed-

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-03-12 Thread Shrdlu
On 3/12/2013 4:16 PM, Warren Bailey wrote: Contractors with facility clearances? I would find it hard to believe dot gov would run secure circuits to a non secure facility. ;) The word "Contractor" is usually used to refer to anyone that has a contract to do work with the government. Having sp

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-03-12 Thread Warren Bailey
To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat) On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 04:41:42PM +, Warren Bailey wrote: > Not to mention, the KG units are dot government only.. For obvious reasons. Erm ... yesandno. Lots of defense contractor

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-03-12 Thread Mike A
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 04:41:42PM +, Warren Bailey wrote: > Not to mention, the KG units are dot government only.. For obvious reasons. Erm ... yesandno. Lots of defense contractors have one end of a secured circuit. Been there, installed-and-maintained them. -- Mike Andrews, W5EGO mi...@mi

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-21 Thread Warren Bailey
: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat) On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 11:23 AM, Jack Bates wrote: > On 2/21/2013 12:03 AM, Scott Weeks wrote: >> >> I would sure be interested in hearing about hands-on operational >> experiences with encryptors. Re

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 11:23 AM, Jack Bates wrote: > On 2/21/2013 12:03 AM, Scott Weeks wrote: >> >> I would sure be interested in hearing about hands-on operational >> experiences with encryptors. Recent experiences have left me >> with a sour taste in my mouth. blech! >> >> scott >> >> > > Ag

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-21 Thread Jack Bates
On 2/21/2013 12:03 AM, Scott Weeks wrote: I would sure be interested in hearing about hands-on operational experiences with encryptors. Recent experiences have left me with a sour taste in my mouth. blech! scott Agreed. I've generally skipped the line side and stuck with L3 side encryptio

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Scott Weeks
--- s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote: From: Steven Bellovin An amazing percentage of "private" lines are pseudowires, and neither you nor your telco salesdroid can know or tell; even the "real" circuits are routed through DACS, ATM switches, and the like. This is what link encryptors are all abou

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Steven Bellovin
On Feb 20, 2013, at 3:20 PM, Jack Bates wrote: > On 2/20/2013 1:05 PM, Jon Lewis wrote: >> >> See thread: nanog impossible circuit >> >> Even your leased lines can have packets copied off or injected into them, >> apparently so easily it can be done by accident. >> > > This is especially tr

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Jack Bates
On 2/20/2013 1:05 PM, Jon Lewis wrote: See thread: nanog impossible circuit Even your leased lines can have packets copied off or injected into them, apparently so easily it can be done by accident. This is especially true with pseudo-wire and mpls. Most of my equipment can filter based m

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread David Barak
--- On Wed, 2/20/13, Jay Ashworth wrote: > - Original Message - > > From: "Owen DeLong" > > The DACS question wasn't about DACS owned by the people > using the > > circuit, it was about DACS inside the circuit provider. > When you buy a > > DS1 that goes through more than one CO in betw

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Owen DeLong
If you have that option, I suppose that would be one way to solve it. I, rather, see it as a reason to: 1. Cryptographically secure links that may be carrying private data. 2. Rotate cryptographic keys (relatively) often on such links. YMMV, but I think encryption is a

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Warren Bailey
Isn't this a strong argument to deploy and operate a network independent of the traditional switch circuit provider space? On 2/20/13 11:22 AM, "Jay Ashworth" wrote: >- Original Message - >> From: "Owen DeLong" > >> Many DACS have provision for "monitoring" circuits and feeding the >> d

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Jay Ashworth
- Original Message - > From: "Owen DeLong" > Many DACS have provision for "monitoring" circuits and feeding the > data off to a third circuit in an undetectable manner. > > The DACS question wasn't about DACS owned by the people using the > circuit, it was about DACS inside the circuit p

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Owen DeLong
Many DACS have provision for "monitoring" circuits and feeding the data off to a third circuit in an undetectable manner. The DACS question wasn't about DACS owned by the people using the circuit, it was about DACS inside the circuit provider. When you buy a DS1 that goes through more than one CO

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Jon Lewis
On Wed, 20 Feb 2013, Jay Ashworth wrote: Well, Warren, I once had a discussion with someone about whether dedicated DS-1 to tie your SCADA network together were "secure enough" and they asked me: "Does it run through a DACS? Where can you program the DACS from?" See thread: nanog impossible c

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Warren Bailey
I did not approach the inline encryption units on purpose. Obviously anything that leaves .mil land not riding something blessed by DISA is going to have something like a KG on both ends. Generally Satellite systems use TRANSEC, though in our line of work it's an extremely expensive add-on to an ot

RE: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Jamie Bowden
> From: Warren Bailey [mailto:wbai...@satelliteintelligencegroup.com] > If you are doing DS0 splitting on the DACS, you'll see that on the > other > end (it's not like channelized CAS ds1's or PRI's are difficult to look > at > now) assuming you have access to that. If the DACS is an issue, buy t

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Cameron Byrne
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 9:13 AM, Jay Ashworth wrote: > - Original Message - >> From: "Warren Bailey" > >> We as Americans have plenty of things we have done halfass.. I hope an >> Internet kill switch doesn't end up being one of them. Build your own >> private networks, you can't get root

Re: Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Warren Bailey
If you are doing DS0 splitting on the DACS, you'll see that on the other end (it's not like channelized CAS ds1's or PRI's are difficult to look at now) assuming you have access to that. If the DACS is an issue, buy the DACS and lock it up. I was on a .mil project that used old school Coastcom DI I

Network security on multiple levels (was Re: NYT covers China cyberthreat)

2013-02-20 Thread Jay Ashworth
- Original Message - > From: "Warren Bailey" > We as Americans have plenty of things we have done halfass.. I hope an > Internet kill switch doesn't end up being one of them. Build your own > private networks, you can't get rooted if someone can't knock. Simple > as that. Well, Warren, I