unty logo]
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* NANOG *On Behalf
> Of *Amir Herzberg
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 16, 2023 19:58
> *To:* NANOG
> *Subject:* [External] announcing IPs by scrubbing service to help with
> DDoS attacks and ROAs
>
>
>
> *CAUTION:* Th
: [External] announcing IPs by scrubbing service to help with DDoS
attacks and ROAs
CAUTION: This email was sent from outside of Hennepin County. Unless you
recognize the sender and know the content, do not click links or open
attachments.
Hi, do people use scrubbing services, when under DDoS attack
Hi, do people use scrubbing services, when under DDoS attack, by having the
scrubbing service announce the attacked IP prefix(es)?
If so, and you have a ROA for these prefixes, do you authorize the
scrubbing AS (by issuing ROA or otherwise), and if so, do you do it in
advance or only when you
Any one else seeing this? Hearing some isolated events across different
industry segments. If you are, can you provide any TTPs?
I have no idea who was the reviewer (academic or industry or whatever).
However, he didn't actually object to the assertion that latency increases
with congestion; he only raised the question of the which latency values
would be typical/reasonable for a congestion DoS attack. Notice also that
the
On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 at 13:11, Etienne-Victor Depasquale wrote:
> " he/she doubts that delays increase significantly under network congestion
> since he/she thinks that the additional queuing is something mostly in small
> routers such as home routers (and maybe like the routers used in our
>
gt;> increases traffic rather than the typical congestion-control approach of
>>> reducing it, I'm well aware of it; but some applications are critical (and
>>> often low-bandwidth) so such tool is important.
>>>
>>> I am looking for data on loss rate and cong
.
Guys: if you can share data but only privately, please do :) thanks!
Amir
--
Amir
On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 12:38 PM Damian Menscher wrote:
> Getting (and releasing) numbers from DDoS attacks will be challenging for
> most, but I think your research could apply to more than jus
Getting (and releasing) numbers from DDoS attacks will be challenging for
most, but I think your research could apply to more than just DDoS. There
are often cases where one might want to work from an environment which has
very poor networking. As an extreme example, in 2007 I got online from
ased on data you see now
> it may seem reasonable, but now is only result of minimum viable ddos,
> which is trivial to increase should need occur.
I still think evaluation should preferably compare to attacks reported in
reality, with potential additional analysis of projections of potenti
um viable ddos,
which is trivial to increase should need occur. Similarly DDoS attacks
are excessive dumb often, like dumb UDP ports which are easy drop, but
should we solve protection well for these, it's trivial to make it
proper HTTPS TCP SYN.
> Also, latency values (under congestion) would be ap
ions are critical (and
>> often low-bandwidth) so such tool is important.
>>
>> I am looking for data on loss rate and congestion of DDoS attacks to make
>> sure we use right parameters. Any chance you have such data and can share?
>>
>> Many thanks!
>> --
&
pproach of
> reducing it, I'm well aware of it; but some applications are critical (and
> often low-bandwidth) so such tool is important.
>
> I am looking for data on loss rate and congestion of DDoS attacks to make
> sure we use right parameters. Any chance you have such data and can
clearly
increases traffic rather than the typical congestion-control approach of
reducing it, I'm well aware of it; but some applications are critical (and
often low-bandwidth) so such tool is important.
I am looking for data on loss rate and congestion of DDoS attacks to make
sure we use right
The idea of restricting access to a certain content during an attack
on the trusted networks only will make all interested ISPs be more
trusted
don't the lawyers already have enough money?
networks.
-Original Message-
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of Ramy Hashish
Sent: Sunday, 24 May, 2015 22:49
To: morrowc.li...@gmail.com; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks
The idea of restricting access to a certain
Message-
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of Ramy Hashish
Sent: Sunday, 24 May, 2015 22:49
To: morrowc.li...@gmail.com; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks
The idea of restricting access to a certain content during an attack
On 25 May 2015, at 19:44, Keith Medcalf wrote:
Whatever this trusted network initiative is, I take that it was
designed by fools or government (the two are usually
indistinguishable) for the purpose of creating utterly untrustworthy
networks.
AFAICT, the 'Trusted Network Initiative'
On 25 May 2015, at 19:49, jim deleskie wrote:
I agree, we can't even get everyone including some LARGE ( I'll avoid
Tier's because people get stupid around that too) networks to filter
customers based on assigned netblocks.
Customer of my customer [of my customer, of my customer . . . ].
Application layer DDoS attacks , in most (all?) cases require a valid TCP/IP
connection, therefore are not spoofed and BCP38 is irrelevant
Sent from Steve's iPhone
On May 25, 2015, at 8:00 AM, nanog-requ...@nanog.org wrote:
Send NANOG mailing list submissions to
nanog@nanog.org
On 25 May 2015, at 20:31, Steve via NANOG wrote:
Application layer DDoS attacks , in most (all?) cases require a valid
TCP/IP connection
DNS query-floods are a notable exception.
---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net
Application layer DDoS attacks , in most (all?) cases require a valid
TCP/IP connection
DNS query-floods are a notable exception.
may i remind you of the dns query flood i had which you helped research?
udp and tcp, from the same sources.
randy
On 26 May 2015, at 4:27, Randy Bush wrote:
may i remind you of the dns query flood i had which you helped
research?
udp and tcp, from the same sources.
Yes - we determined that the TCP-based queries were a result of RRL,
which is optimized to help with spoofed reflection/amplification
The idea of restricting access to a certain content during an attack on the
trusted networks only will make all interested ISPs be more trusted
Ramy
On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 5:01 AM, Christopher Morrow morrowc.li...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 9:12 PM, jim deleskie
On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 9:12 PM, jim deleskie deles...@gmail.com wrote:
However, the trusted network initiative might be a good approach to start
influencing operators to apply anti-spoofing mechanisms.
explain how you think the 'trusted network initiative' matters in the slightest?
-chris
Just to ask, what is the expected effect on DDoS attacks if folks
implemented BCP38?
How does the cost of implementing BCP38 compare to the cost of other
solution attempts?
H
--- st...@ntp.org wrote:
From: Harlan Stenn st...@ntp.org
Just to ask, what is the expected effect on DDoS attacks if folks
implemented BCP38?
---
A moot point these days. After all the years it has been out
(15 years: https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38
Yes Harlan, you are absolutely right, even if this won't stop the
botnet-based DDoS attacks, but at least will significantly decrease the
volume/frequency of the volume based attacks.
On the other side, the DDoS protection now become a business where
all-tiers ISPs make money of, and those ISPs
On 24 May 2015, at 3:14, Scott Weeks wrote:
Those that care (NANOG type folks) already have deployed it and those
that don't care have not and will not.
Concur 100%.
https://app.box.com/s/r7an1moswtc7ce58f8gg
---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net
anything they don't need to, to get the bit to you.
-jim
On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 6:33 PM, Ramy Hashish ramy.ihash...@gmail.com
wrote:
Yes Harlan, you are absolutely right, even if this won't stop the
botnet-based DDoS attacks, but at least will significantly decrease the
volume/frequency
aggressive
effect on the volume of the DDoS attacks, and will eventually steer the
mindset of the enterprises towards hosting the most critical
applications/services in a well geographically-dispersed cloud and
increasing the surface area using anycast then relatively decreasing the
attack volume
On 23 May 2015, at 19:56, Ramy Hashish wrote:
I am little bit confused; aren't the application firewalls -either
integrated in a NGFW or a UTM- the responsible for mitigating
application layer attacks?
https://app.box.com/s/a3oqqlgwe15j8svojvzl
https://app.box.com/s/4h2l6f4m8is6jnwk28cg
aggressive
effect on the volume of the DDoS attacks, and will eventually steer the
mindset of the enterprises towards hosting the most critical
applications/services in a well geographically-dispersed cloud and
increasing the surface area using anycast then relatively decreasing the
attack
On (2013-12-20 03:24 +), Dobbins, Roland wrote:
I think ipv4 udp is just going to become operationally deprecated. Too
much pollution. It is really an epic amount of trash / value ratio in ipv4
udp.
This isn't a realistic viewpoint.
What are realistic options?
a) QUIC and
On Dec 20, 2013, at 3:27 PM, Saku Ytti s...@ytti.fi wrote:
c) ACL/RPF in significant portion of access ports in whole world
- i'm guessing significant portion of access ports are on autopilot with
no one to change their configs, so probably not practical.
d) The current state of
* James Braunegg
Of course for any form of Anti DDoS hardware to be functional you
need to make sure your network can route and pass the traffic so you
can absorb the bad traffic to give you a chance cleaning the
traffic.
So in order for an Anti-DDoS appliance to be functional the network
Hi,
You can also test WANGUARD, http://www.andrisoft.com/ for DDoS detection
and BGP triggered blackholing.
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 11:32 AM, Eugeniu Patrascu eu...@imacandi.netwrote:
Hi,
You can also take a look at http://www.packetdam.com/ for DDoS protection.
Eugeniu
On Thu, Dec 19,
On Wed, 18 Dec 2013 15:12:28 -0800
cb.list6 cb.li...@gmail.com wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit
ipv4 UDP. It is the simplest solution that is proactive.
I understand your willingness to do this, but I'd strongly advise
you to rethink such a strategy.
On Dec 19, 2013, at 3:53 PM, Tore Anderson t...@fud.no wrote:
So in order for an Anti-DDoS appliance to be functional the network needs to
be able to withstand the DDoS on its own. How terribly useful.
Due to the nature of network infrastructure devices and TCP/IP, it's quite
necessary that
On 19/12/2013 13:17, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
This is a base requirement for any network operator, without exception.
in fact, this comes down to cost / benefit / application analysis, without
exception.
Many hosting profiles don't require this sort of anti-DDoS kit. In many
cases it's far
On Dec 19, 2013, at 8:40 PM, Nick Hilliard n...@foobar.org wrote:
Many hosting profiles don't require this sort of anti-DDoS kit.
My post had nothing to do with 'anti-DDoS kit'.
I'm sure mitigation boxes like this serve well in many situations if the cost
/ benefit justifies the
On 19/12/2013 14:08, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
My post had nothing to do with 'anti-DDoS kit'.
hmm, re-reading it, your post was contextually ambiguous and I read it in a
different way to the way that apparently you meant.
but yes, if you're doing onsite ddos scrubbing, you needs lotsabandwidth.
On 12/18/13 8:03 PM, Jon Lewis jle...@lewis.org wrote:
On Wed, 18 Dec 2013 valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Wed, 18 Dec 2013 15:12:28 -0800, cb.list6 said:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit ipv4
UDP. It is the simplest solution that is proactive.
What
On Dec 18, 2013, at 18:12, cb.list6 wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit ipv4
UDP. It is the simplest solution that is proactive.
Recently it's been said that when a protocol is query/response (like DNS),
willingly suppressing responses might be as
On Thu, 19 Dec 2013, Lee Howard wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit ipv4
UDP. It is the simplest solution that is proactive.
What are the prospects for ipv6 UDP not suffering the same fate?
Roughly 0%, but there's so little v6 traffic compared to v4,
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 8:18 AM, Edward Lewis ed.le...@neustar.biz wrote:
On Dec 18, 2013, at 18:12, cb.list6 wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit ipv4
UDP. It is the simplest solution that is proactive.
Recently it's been said that when a protocol is
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I'm really surprised no one has mentioned Akamai/Prolexic, especially since
their recent marriage.
If someone has already mentioned it: Apologies.
- - ferg
On 12/19/2013 4:08 AM, Adrian M wrote:
Hi,
You can also test WANGUARD,
Ferguson fergdawgs...@mykolab.com
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: ddos attacks
Date: Thu, Dec 19, 2013 2:35 PM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I'm really surprised no one has mentioned Akamai/Prolexic, especially since
their recent marriage.
If someone has already mentioned
Ferguson fergdawgs...@mykolab.com
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: ddos attacks
Date: Thu, Dec 19, 2013 2:35 PM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I'm really surprised no one has mentioned Akamai/Prolexic, especially since
their recent marriage.
If someone has already mentioned
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 10:30 PM, den...@justipit.com
den...@justipit.comwrote:
Just about every security, network and ADC vendor out there is claiming
anti-dos capabilities. Be careful when going that route and do your own
validation. I suggest looking at Radware and Arbor (both leaders in
further offlist.
Cheers
Dennis
Sent from my Sprint phone.
- Reply message -
From: Eugeniu Patrascu eu...@imacandi.net
To: den...@justipit.com den...@justipit.com
Cc: fergdawgs...@mykolab.com, NANOG list nanog@nanog.org
Subject: ddos attacks
Date: Thu, Dec 19, 2013 3:51 PM
On Thu, Dec 19
further offlist.
Cheers
Dennis
Sent from my Sprint phone.
- Reply message -
From: Eugeniu Patrascu eu...@imacandi.net
To: den...@justipit.com den...@justipit.com
Cc: fergdawgs...@mykolab.com, NANOG list nanog@nanog.org
Subject: ddos attacks
Date: Thu, Dec 19, 2013 3:51 PM
On Thu, Dec 19
On Dec 19, 2013, at 10:40 PM, Nick Hilliard n...@foobar.org wrote:
hmm, re-reading it, your post was contextually ambiguous and I read it in a
different way to the way that apparently you meant.
It was quite clear what was meant, even without looking at the linked
presentation, which
On Dec 19, 2013, at 6:12 AM, cb.list6 cb.li...@gmail.com wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit ipv4 UDP.
QoS is a very poor mechanism for remediating DDoS attacks. It ensures that
programmatically-generated attack traffic will 'squeeze out' legitimate
On Dec 19, 2013 4:25 PM, Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
On Dec 19, 2013, at 6:12 AM, cb.list6 cb.li...@gmail.com wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply rate limit ipv4
UDP.
QoS is a very poor mechanism for remediating DDoS attacks. It ensures
--- cb.li...@gmail.com wrote:
On Dec 19, 2013 4:25 PM, Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
On Dec 19, 2013, at 6:12 AM, cb.list6 cb.li...@gmail.com wrote:
I am strongly considering having my upstreams to simply
rate limit ipv4 UDP.
QoS is a very poor mechanism for remediating DDoS
* Dobbins, Roland
Once again, nothing in my post said or referred to bandwidth;
The post of mine, to which you replied, did.
Perhaps if you had taken your own advice quoted below when replying to
me, Nick wouldn't have been contextually confused.
Tore
In future, it might be a good idea to
On Dec 20, 2013, at 4:39 AM, cb.list6 cb.li...@gmail.com wrote:
Not answering any of that. But thanks for asking.
I wasn't asking those questions in order to elicit information from you, but
rather as food for thought as you work through these issues.
I think ipv4 udp is just going to
Can anyone recommend a vendor solution for DDOS mitigation? We are looking
for a solution that detects DDOS attacks from sflow information and
automatically announces BGP /32 blackhole routes to our upstream providers,
or a similar solution.
Thank You.
On 08/05/13 21:09 +1000, Ahad Aboss wrote
:36 AM, Dan White dwh...@olp.net wrote:
Can anyone recommend a vendor solution for DDOS mitigation? We are looking
for a solution that detects DDOS attacks from sflow information and
automatically announces BGP /32 blackhole routes to our upstream
providers,
or a similar solution.
Thank You.
On 08
recommend a vendor solution for DDOS mitigation? We are looking
for a solution that detects DDOS attacks from sflow information and
automatically announces BGP /32 blackhole routes to our upstream providers,
or a similar solution.
Thank You.
On 08/05/13 21:09 +1000, Ahad Aboss wrote:
Scott
On Aug 2, 2013 10:31 AM, sgr...@airstreamcomm.net wrote:
I’m curious to know what other service providers are doing to
alleviate/prevent ddos attacks from happening in your network. Are you
completely reactive and block as many addresses as possible or null0
traffic to the effected host until
in
this space who provide a self healing/self defending system.
Cheers
Ahad
-Original Message-
From: sgr...@airstreamcomm.net [mailto:sgr...@airstreamcomm.net]
Sent: Friday, 2 August 2013 11:37 PM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: ddos attacks
I’m curious to know what other service providers are doing
I’m curious to know what other service providers are doing to
alleviate/prevent ddos attacks from happening in your network. Are you
completely reactive and block as many addresses as possible or null0
traffic to the effected host until it stops or do you block certain
ports to prevent them
On Fri, 02 Aug 2013 08:37:21 -0500, sgr...@airstreamcomm.net said:
Iâm curious to know what other service providers are doing to
alleviate/prevent ddos attacks from happening in your network.
The answers will vary from nothing to extensive network planning
and contracts with mitigation
On Aug 02, 2013, at 09:37 , sgr...@airstreamcomm.net wrote:
I’m curious to know what other service providers are doing to
alleviate/prevent ddos attacks from happening in your network. Are you
completely reactive and block as many addresses as possible or null0 traffic
to the effected
On Aug 2, 2013, at 10:38 AM, Patrick W. Gilmore patr...@ianai.net wrote:
On Aug 02, 2013, at 09:37 , sgr...@airstreamcomm.net wrote:
I’m curious to know what other service providers are doing to
alleviate/prevent ddos attacks from happening in your network. Are you
completely reactive
to
alleviate/prevent ddos attacks from happening in your network. Are you
completely reactive and block as many addresses as possible or null0
traffic to the effected host until it stops or do you block certain ports
to prevent them. What's the best way people are dealing with them?
#1: Ensure
On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 11:23:11AM +0330,
Shahab Vahabzadeh sh.vahabza...@gmail.com wrote
a message of 55 lines which said:
Those ip addresses I send were only sample, its 5 page :D and not
only those addresses.
Because the attacker attacks when they have a new opponent. They DoS
it long
Hi.
The IPs you see is the exploited gameservers, so just contact them,
and send them the link below.
There is a workaround for it:
http://rankgamehosting.ru/index.php?showtopic=1320
We have had problem with this in the past. Usually we get abuse
complaints from the admin of the game
On Thu, 31 Jan 2013 10:34:29 +0330
Shahab Vahabzadeh sh.vahabza...@gmail.com wrote:
Attacks takes only 20 or 30 minutes and it happens only 4 times in
two days. I could'nt capture any packet but this is out put of my
show ip accounting that time:
Attacks on gaming systems or at the gamers
On 2013-01-31 08:04 , Shahab Vahabzadeh wrote:
Hi everybody,
Last two days I was under an interesting attack which comes from multiple
sources to three of my ADSL users destination.
You say that it comes from multiple sources to 3 of your DSL users.
The below source/dest though shows that the
On 2013-01-31 08:53 , Shahab Vahabzadeh wrote:
Those ip addresses I send were only sample, its 5 page :D and not only
those addresses.
And you are looking to target 128.141.X.Y its mine
128.141.0.0/16 is CERN in Switzerland.
Thus not yours, but owned(*) by n...@cern.ch.
(unless you work
Hi everybody,
Last two days I was under an interesting attack which comes from multiple
sources to three of my ADSL users destination.
The attack make router to ran out of CPU and we had to reload it to solve.
I ask those three users and they said we are only game players and all of
them were
I see these type of reflection/amplification attacks pretty frequently.
Some games (mostly older games) are exploitable in this manner. The
attacker sends a short spoofed request, and the game server sends back a
huge chunk of data aimed at you. The chances of you finding the actual
source are
Those ip addresses I send were only sample, its 5 page :D and not only
those addresses.
And you are looking to target 128.141.X.Y its mine and I change it because
of mailing list, maybe attackers are here.
You must check the sources not destination.
Thanks
On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Jeroen
It has been pointed out to me ( Thanks Yuri!) that I screwed up the url
for the AMARA translation page for this, it is
http://www.universalsubtitles.org/en-gb/videos/lvgGlpwZR0lA/info/mitigating-ddos-attacks-best-practices-for-an-evolving-threat-landscape/#video
If I may say a bit more.about
/lvgGlpwZR0lA/info/mitigating-ddos-attacks-best-practices-for-an-evolving-threat-landscape/-
it's possible to just contribute as much or as little as you have time
to
do.
**
joly posted: The Internet Society's New York Chapter (ISOC-NY) and the
New York Technology Council (NYTECH) joined
Technology Council (NYTECH http://nytech.org/) will join the
Public Interest Registry (PIR http://www.pir.org/) in presenting a midday
symposium “Mitigating DDoS Attacks: Best Practices for an Evolving Threat
Landscape http://www.pir.org/why/security/ddos” in New York City on
December 5 2012. Participating
DoS/DDoS Attacks
Sent: Sep 9, 2010 12:13 AM
Brandon Galbraith wrote:
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/film-industry-hires-cyber-hitmen-to-take-down-internet-pirates-20100907-14ypv.html
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/film-industry-hires-cyber-hitmen-to-take-down
man.. this guy is retarded.. good luck posing your company, face and such. lol
He may get some business out of it, now that he has effectively put
out a DDoS for hire ad.
Jeff
On Thu, Sep 9, 2010 at 8:56 PM, Beavis pfu...@gmail.com wrote:
man.. this guy is retarded.. good luck posing your company, face and such. lol
--
Jeffrey Lyon, Leadership Team
On Sep 9, 2010, at 11:43 PM, Jeffrey Lyon wrote:
He may get some business out of it, now that he has effectively put out a
DDoS for hire ad.
The relevant Indian authorities have been notified - my guess is that he'll
soon be receiving some interesting visitors.
;
to gain some publicity. *shrug*
--Original Message--
From: Jeffrey Lyon
To: Beavis
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Copyright Enforcement DoS/DDoS Attacks
Sent: Sep 9, 2010 11:43 AM
He may get some business out of it, now that he has effectively put
out a DDoS for hire ad.
Jeff
On Thu, Sep
to gain some publicity. *shrug*
--Original Message--
From: Jeffrey Lyon
To: Beavis
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Copyright Enforcement DoS/DDoS Attacks
Sent: Sep 9, 2010 11:43 AM
He may get some business out of it, now that he has effectively put
out a DDoS for hire ad.
Jeff
On Thu, Sep
On Fri, Sep 10, 2010 at 1:29 AM, khatfi...@socllc.net wrote:
Kind of a shame.. We are likely already tracking his botnets so I almost
welcome it as well. Out of curiosity, I did pull some stats over the last 60
days and we have seen more attacks originating from the India area than we
with this in the wild? I wasn't aware DoS/DDoS attacks were
suddenly legal.
--
Brandon Galbraith
Voice: 630.492.0464
-hires-cyber-hitmen-to-take-down-internet-pirates-20100907-14ypv.html
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/film-industry-hires-cyber-hitmen-to-take-down-internet-pirates-20100907-14ypv.htmlHas
anyone dealt with this in the wild? I wasn't aware DoS/DDoS attacks were
suddenly legal
anyone dealt with this in the wild? I wasn't aware DoS/DDoS attacks were
suddenly legal.
It's gotta' be tough reading that when you're in the slammer, eh?
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/25/second_scientology_ddoser_jailed/
://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/film-industry-hires-cyber-hitmen-to-take-down-internet-pirates-20100907-14ypv.htmlHas
anyone dealt with this in the wild? I wasn't aware DoS/DDoS attacks were
suddenly legal.
It's gotta' be tough reading that when you're in the slammer, eh?
http
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