Quoting Tyler Hicks (tyhi...@canonical.com):
> The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used
> to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a
> violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit
> message was being generated.
>
Quoting Tyler Hicks (tyhi...@canonical.com):
> When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user
> namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check.
> This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those
> situations arise.
>
> The common logic bet
Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho.ander...@canonical.com):
> Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because
> this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns.
>
> Instead, let's introduce a new flag, GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM for operations
> which should be al
