On 01/11/2018 04:58 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
>> On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan W
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
>> > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
>> > >
>> > > [ ... snip ... ]
On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
> > >
> > > [ ... snip ... ]
> > >> Andi Kleen (1):
> > >> x86, barrier: stop specu
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
> >
> > [ ... snip ... ]
> >> Andi Kleen (1):
> >> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
> >>
> >> Dan Williams (13):
On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
[ ... snip ... ]
> Andi Kleen (1):
> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
>
> Dan Williams (13):
> x86: implement nospec_barrier()
> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> carl9170: p
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
>
> [ ... snip ... ]
>> Andi Kleen (1):
>> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
>>
>> Dan Williams (13):
>> x86: implement nospec_barrier()
>> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bo
* Alan Cox wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100
> Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> > > wrote:
> > > > In at least one place (mpls) you are patching a fast path. Compile
On 01/05/18 22:30, Dan Williams wrote:
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Please expand this.
It is not clear what the static analysis is looking for. Have a clear
description of what is being fixed is crucial for allowing any of these
changes.
For the details given in
On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 11:43:42AM +, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100
> Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> > > wrote:
> > > > In at least one place (mpls) y
On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100
Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> > wrote:
> > > In at least one place (mpls) you are patching a fast path. Compile out
> > > or don't load mpls by al
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> wrote:
> > In at least one place (mpls) you are patching a fast path. Compile out
> > or don't load mpls by all means. But it is not acceptable to change the
> > fast path without
On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Quoting Mark's original RFC:
>>
>> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack
>> against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows
>> explic
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Quoting Mark's original RFC:
>
> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack
> against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows
> explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing
Le 01/05/18 à 17:09, Dan Williams a écrit :
> Quoting Mark's original RFC:
>
> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack
> against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows
> explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an
> arb
It sounds like Coverity was used to produce these patches? If so, is
there a plan to have smatch (hey Dan) or other open source static
analysis tool be possibly enhanced to do a similar type of work?
I'd love for that to happen; the tricky part is being able to have even a
sort of sensible conce
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Dan Williams writes:
>
>> Quoting Mark's original RFC:
>>
>> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack
>> against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows
>> explicit bounds checks to be by
Dan Williams writes:
> Quoting Mark's original RFC:
>
> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack
> against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows
> explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an
> arbitrary read gadget. Fu
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