An Opening on Chechnya
By Zbigniew Brzezinski, Max Kampelman and Alexander M.
Haig Jr.
Wednesday, July 4, 2001; Page A19
Shortly after the Bush-Putin meeting in Slovenia last month, the Russian president held a lengthy press conference with a group of American newsmen. His comments in it were obviously designed for the American audience. Not surprisingly, the interview drew much attention and commentary.
It is thus all the more surprising that a remarkable passage in Putin's answer pertaining to the tragic war in Chechnya (quoted in the Moscow newspaper Strana) drew so little public attention. In fact, it was not much noted in the major American stories covering the interview.
Putin, although offering the usual justifications for the Russian military campaign, then went on to note -- and the passage deserves to be quoted in full -- the following:
"For us the question today of Chechnya's dependence on or independence from Russia is absolutely of no fundamental importance. What is of fundamental importance to us is just one issue. We will not allow this territory to be used any longer as a bridgehead for an attack on Russia. We will not allow it!"
It is perfectly reasonable for a head of state to declare his determination not to permit any territory to be used as "a bridgehead" for hostile attack on his country. That posture is not only normal but also quite legitimate under international law. But the phrasing implies more than that: It draws a subtle though unstated distinction between Russia and the alleged origin of the security threat. Moreover, the opening sentence of the passage quoted above carefully but deliberately distinguishes between what is "fundamentally" important and what is secondary.
In making these comments, Putin may have opened the door to a dialogue about ways and means for ending the conflict. After all, no one can, or should, dispute the point that Putin defines as "of fundamental importance."
To be sure, any dialogue on the issue of Chechnya will be both difficult and delicate. Too much blood has been spilled for it to be otherwise. Many Russians died to preserve the territorial status of the Russian Federation, and even more Chechens died for national independence. But the basic premise of such a dialogue can be exactly what Putin defined as centrally important.
In making these points it is also necessary to stress that the Russian people should understand that not all opponents of the war -- including the writers of this article -- are motivated by hatred for Russia. In fact, it is undeniable that some Russian concerns regarding developments within Chechnya prior to the outbreak of hostilities had merit, even if the conduct of the war as such -- and especially the suffering it inflicted -- prompted serious international criticism.
But the war not only precipitated enormous suffering, it also adversely affected the process of Russia's gradual engagement with the democratic Western world. That engagement is in the interest of international stability; whatever impedes it affects the long-term interests of Russia, other European countries and the United States. That is why President Bush was justified in raising the issue of Chechnya with President Putin during their recent meeting.
There have been some recent indications that Russian public opinion is beginning to reevaluate that war. For the first time since its start, more Russians -- according to two recent polls -- favor its peaceful resolution than its endless pursuit. On the Chechen side, too, according to journalists who have recently been to Chechnya, there is war-weariness and a prevailing desire to end the fighting. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, elected in voting supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has recently again indicated his willingness to discuss peace without any preconditions.
Given that political context, it should prove possible to undertake a careful, and probably indirect, exploration of what a reasonable -- and perhaps initially only transitional -- arrangement might involve. One can envisage various formulas that would satisfy the fundamental standard of expectations as defined by Putin while not trampling on the aspirations for which so many Chechens sacrificed their lives.
The key point is that the international community should now explore more actively whether Putin's formulation can serve as a "bridgehead" for a peace that is long overdue.
The writers lead the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Carter. Max Kampelman is former head of the American delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Alexander M. Haig Jr. is a former U.S. secretary of state and NATO commander.
Miroslav Antic,
http://www.antic.org/
