Why U.S. can't find Osama bin Laden

By Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst

October 19, 2010 -- Updated 1134 GMT (1934 HKT)

 

Editor's note: Peter Bergen, CNN's national security analyst, is a fellow at 
the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank that promotes 
innovative thought from across the ideological spectrum, and at New York 
University's Center on Law and Security. He's the author of  
<http://books.simonandschuster.com/Osama-bin-Laden-I-Know/Peter-L-Bergen/9780743278928>
 "The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader." 

(CNN) -- American taxpayers have forked over around half a trillion dollars to 
U.S. intelligence services since the 9/11 attacks, yet nearly a decade after al 
Qaeda assaults on New York and Washington, the American intelligence community 
still cannot answer the most basic of questions:

Where is Osama bin Laden? Where is his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri? And where 
is Taliban leader Mullah Omar?

As reported 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/18/afghanistan.bin.laden/index.html?iref=allsearch>
  by CNN on Monday, NATO officials believe al Qaeda's leaders are hiding 
somewhere in northwestern Pakistan, while Mullah Omar is thought to orbit 
between Quetta in western Pakistan and the southern port city of Karachi. As 
Pakistan is roughly twice as large as California and Karachi is a city of 18 
million, these are not particularly precise locations for the world's most 
wanted men.

If the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies were private companies and were 
chronically unable to accomplish one of their key missions, their shareholders 
would have long ago revolted, fired their management and their stock would be 
trading at values near zero. Instead, the budgets for the U.S. intelligence 
agencies continue to spiral upward, while almost a million Americans possess 
top-secret clearances.

What does a top-secret clearance gain you?

Not much, judging by the content of the tens of thousands of secret documents 
about the Afghan War made public by WikiLeaks in July. The one surprising thing 
about this massive classified data dump was how little of it was in any way 
surprising. It contained the kind of material that the casual reader of news 
articles have long known: Elements of Pakistan's military intelligence service 
may be supporting the Taliban!

The dirty little secret of the intelligence world is that much of what you 
really need to know isn't exactly a secret anyway. Bin Laden declared war on 
the United States on CNN in 1997 and then again on ABC News a year later, and 
he soon made good on those threats with al Qaeda's attacks on two U.S. 
embassies in Africa and the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen.

In the summer of 2001, bin Laden and his top commanders gave an interview to 
the Middle East Broadcasting Corp., in which they dropped broad hints that they 
were planning a large-scale, anti-American assault, which turned out to be the 
9/11 attacks. When President George W. Bush was briefed by the CIA a month 
before 9/11 that bin Laden intended to attack the United States, it was merely 
to state the blindingly obvious.

Similarly today, al Qaeda and allied groups such as the Taliban constantly 
release videotapes and print products in which they lay out their doctrines and 
strategies and document their attacks and tactics, all of which are widely 
available on the Internet. 

The conflict with al Qaeda and its allies is effectively the first open-source 
war, which is the opposite of how the highly secretive Kremlin conducted the 
Cold War. Yet U.S. intelligence agencies remain largely configured as if they 
are doing battle with a superpower, rather than a network of jihadist networks.

As a result, the CIA today more resembles an accounting firm than the 
swashbuckling, action-oriented spy agency of popular imagination.

This is not an accident. Hiring by the CIA and other agencies in the 
intelligence community is predicated on passing a background check that has 
become more onerous since 9/11 and is a legacy of the Cold War notion that a 
superpower adversary with billions of dollars at its disposal is trying to 
recruit spies and informants.

But al Qaeda has no capacity to buy spies inside America's intelligence 
community, and, more broadly, al Qaeda and its allies have shown no ability to 
recruit inside the U.S. government.

U.S. intelligence agencies today remain largely configured as if they are doing 
battle with a superpower...
--Peter Bergen 

 

Yet applicants to the American intelligence agencies today are likely to 
encounter real problems with their background checks if they have relatives in 
the Arab world or have spent time in countries such as Pakistan, precisely the 
sort of life experiences necessary for effective spies. 

By contrast, the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the CIA, 
recruited bilingual agents deeply familiar with European culture who took great 
risks to undertake highly effective operations in Nazi-occupied Europe. In 
today's CIA, those brave men and women wouldn't have made it past the 
background check.

Much of the work that has been done to reform the intelligence community since 
9/11 has been directed at fussing with the wiring diagram of its bureaucracy: 
Should the director of National Intelligence control CIA station chiefs, or is 
that the purview of the CIA director? This kind of jockeying, of course, does 
nothing to solve the real question American taxpayers want answered: Where is 
bin Laden? That question is likely only to be resolved by good old-fashioned 
espionage.

Emblematic of what ails the intelligence community today was its reaction to 
the failed attempt by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to blow up a 
Northwest passenger jet landing in Detroit, Michigan, with a bomb made of 
plastic explosives on Christmas Day 2009. To do the job, AQAP recruited in 
Yemen a Nigerian graduate of the elite University College London. His name was 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

There was a great deal of subsequent hand-wringing by Obama administration 
officials about how improved information sharing protocols might have worked 
better to assemble the shards of information known to the government about 
Abdulmutallab, which might have prevented him from boarding the Northwest 
flight.

Their solution: Hire more analysts. But this was to misdiagnose the problem. 
The intelligence community is awash in analysts. While the precise number is 
classified, it is reasonable to assume that there are tens of thousands. What 
is needed is not more analysts but better on-the-ground intelligence.

If the CIA had had a spy on the fringes of AQAP, the appearance of an educated 
Nigerian from London in the remote desert areas of Yemen where al Qaeda members 
hide out would have been something that the spy would have flagged to his 
handlers as remarkable. There does not appear to have been such an agent.

What can be done? The House and Senate Intelligence committees that oversee the 
intelligence community should hold the CIA to real account using a simple 
metric: How many jihadist groups including al Qaeda have been penetrated by its 
agents?

This is less onerous a demand then one might imagine. After just a few months 
of hanging out in Pakistan, Bryant Neal Vinas, an unemployed Hispanic-American 
convert to militant Islam from Long Island, managed to waltz into an al Qaeda 
training camp where he was trained how to attack American bases in Afghanistan. 
And that was seven years after 9/11.

Budgets should be cut if the CIA can't provide proof that it is penetrating al 
Qaeda and its affiliates; at the end of the day, this is the most likely way 
that we will ever find bin Laden, who is not going to be voluntarily given up 
by the few who know his location today.

President Obama should appoint someone in the U.S. government whose job it is 
to find bin Laden and who can coordinate that effort across the 16 agencies 
that make up the U.S. intelligence community.

Finally, the background check for spies should be reformed so that men and 
women with the regional expertise and linguistic abilities to penetrate and 
recruit inside jihadist terrorist groups are hired to go outside the wire and 
get the job done.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Peter Bergen.

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/19/bergen.finding.bin.laden/index.html

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