Title: Message
| The
Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did
Stephen T. Hosmer
 $20.00 (paperback, 155 pp.)
ISBN:
0-8330-3003-5
MR-1351-AF, © 2001
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Contents
Preface
Figure
Summary
Acknowledgments
Acronyms
Chapter
One: Introduction
Part 1: Why Milosevic Didn't Settle Earlier
Chapter
Two: He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule
Milosevic Had Major Stakes in Kosovo
Some Rambouillet
Terms Would Have Been Unacceptable to the Serb Public
Accepting
Rambouillet Would Have Been Dangerous for Milosevic Chapter
Three: He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms
Milosevic Had Reason to Expect the Bombing to Be
Limited
Milosevic Believed He Could Force a Halt to the Bombing and
Garner Better Terms Part II: Why Milosevic Decided to
Settle on June 3
Chapter
Four: He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had
Evaporated
Ethnic Cleansing Did Not Produce the Leverage
Expected
NATO Remained United and Resolute
Russia's Support for
the FRY Dissolved Chapter
Five: Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions
The Initial Public Reaction to the Bombing Was Surprise and
Angry Defiance
After a Month of Bombing, Public Attitudes Began to
Change
Concerns About Casualties Provoked Antiwar Demonstrations in
Milosevic's "Heartland"
Bombing Prompted Calls from Party Leaders and
Elected Officials for a Negotiated Settlement
The Final Peace
Settlement Was Met with Relief
Bombing Made Concessions Politically
Feasible Chapter
Six: Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing
Pressure
The Damage to Serbia's Infrastructure and Economy Was
Becoming Severe
Attacks Were Perceived as Aimed at Weakening
Milosevic's Control Mechanisms
The Bombing Imposed Stress, Hardships,
and Costs on the Ruling Elite Chapter
Seven: Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little
Pressure
NATO's Objectives in Attacking Military Targets
Much
Above-Ground Military Infrastructure Was Destroyed The Serbs Adopted
Countermeasures to Reduce Damage to Their Military Structure
VI
Armor, Artillery, and Troops Survived the War Largely Intact
Serb
Forces in Kosovo Were Able to Carry Out Most of Their Missions
The
Bottom Line Concerning Attacks on Purely Military Targets Chapter
Eight: He Expected Unconstrained Bombing if NATO's Terms Were Rejected
NATO's Terms Were Seen as a Russian-Backed Ultimatum
Why
Serbia's Leadership Found the Threat of Unconstrained Bombing
Credible
Milosevic Feared Unconstrained Bombing Might Endanger His
Rule Chapter
Nine: He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion
Invasions Appeared a More Distant Threat
Indications That
Ground Attack Was Being Contemplated Probably Worried Belgrade
Leaders
Serb Leaders May Have Realized That Invasions Would Be
Preceded by Intensified Bombing Chapter
Ten: He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him With Some Political Cover
Rambouillet Compared to the June 10 Agreement
Milosevic
Proclaimed Victory Part III: Concluding Observations
Chapter
Eleven: Concluding Observations
Air Power's Contributions Were Crucial
The Conditions
Prompting the Serbs to Settle Were Also Evident in Other
Conflicts
Milosevic's Decision to Yield Depended on Developments That
Took Time to Mature
NATO and Serb Leaders Perceived Strategic Bombing
Differently
Maintaining Capabilities to Coerce Future Adversary
Leaders Bibliography
Copyright © 2001 RAND
The research described in this report was performed under the auspices
of RAND's Project AIR FORCE.
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Summary:
This report examines the reasons Slobodan
Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating
the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of
Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly
interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions
and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to
defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political,
economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting
expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his
subsequent decision to come to terms.
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http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1351/
