April 23, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor

My Tortured Decision

By ALI SOUFAN

FOR seven years I have remained silent about the false claims 
magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation 
techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed 
government hearings, as these matters were classified. But the 
release last week of four Justice Department memos on interrogations 
allows me to shed light on the story, and on some of the lessons to 
be learned.

One of the most striking parts of the memos is the false premises on 
which they are based. The first, dated August 2002, grants 
authorization to use harsh interrogation techniques on a high-ranking 
terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds that previous methods hadn't 
been working. The next three memos cite the successes of those 
methods as a justification for their continued use.

It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been 
uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several 
C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, 
before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under 
traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important 
actionable intelligence.

We discovered, for example, that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the 
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah also told us about Jose 
Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber. This experience fit what I had 
found throughout my counterterrorism career: traditional 
interrogation techniques are successful in identifying operatives, 
uncovering plots and saving lives.

There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced 
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn't, or couldn't 
have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using 
these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than 
a few occasions - all of which are still classified. The short 
sightedness behind the use of these techniques ignored the 
unreliability of the methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality 
and modus operandi of the terrorists, and due process.

Defenders of these techniques have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah 
to give up information leading to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 
a top aide to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. 
The information that led to Mr. Shibh's capture came primarily from a 
different terrorist operative who was interviewed using traditional 
methods. As for Mr. Padilla, the dates just don't add up: the harsh 
techniques were approved in the memo of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had 
been arrested that May.

One of the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques 
was that it reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the 
C.I.A. and F.B.I., similar to the communications obstacles that 
prevented us from working together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because 
the bureau would not employ these problematic techniques, our agents 
who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the 
investigation. An F.B.I. colleague of mine who knew more about Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the government was not allowed to 
speak to him.

It was the right decision to release these memos, as we need the 
truth to come out. This should not be a partisan matter, because it 
is in our national security interest to regain our position as the 
world's foremost defenders of human rights. Just as important, 
releasing these memos enables us to begin the tricky process of 
finally bringing these terrorists to justice.

The debate after the release of these memos has centered on whether 
C.I.A. officials should be prosecuted for their role in harsh 
interrogation techniques. That would be a mistake. Almost all the 
agency officials I worked with on these issues were good people who 
felt as I did about the use of enhanced techniques: it is 
un-American, ineffective and harmful to our national security.

Fortunately for me, after I objected to the enhanced techniques, the 
message came through from Pat D'Amuro, an F.B.I. assistant director, 
that "we don't do that," and I was pulled out of the interrogations 
by the F.B.I. director, Robert Mueller (this was documented in the 
report released last year by the Justice Department's inspector 
general).

My C.I.A. colleagues who balked at the techniques, on the other hand, 
were instructed to continue. (It's worth noting that when reading 
between the lines of the newly released memos, it seems clear that it 
was contractors, not C.I.A. officers, who requested the use of these 
techniques.)

As we move forward, it's important to not allow the torture issue to 
harm the reputation, and thus the effectiveness, of the C.I.A. The 
agency is essential to our national security. We must ensure that the 
mistakes behind the use of these techniques are never repeated. We're 
making a good start: President Obama has limited interrogation 
techniques to the guidelines set in the Army Field Manual, and Leon 
Panetta, the C.I.A. director, says he has banned the use of 
contractors and secret overseas prisons for terrorism suspects (the 
so-called black sites). Just as important, we need to ensure that no 
new mistakes are made in the process of moving forward - a real 
danger right now.

Ali Soufan was an F.B.I. supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005.
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to Mark Crispin Miller's 
"News From Underground" newsgroup.

To unsubscribe, send a blank email to 
newsfromunderground-unsubscr...@googlegroups.com OR go to 
http://groups.google.com/group/newsfromunderground and click on the 
"Unsubscribe or change membership" link in the yellow bar at the top of the 
page, then click the "Unsubscribe" button on the next page. 

For more News From Underground, visit http://markcrispinmiller.com
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to