On Sun, May 26 2019, David Bremner wrote:
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>
>> On Sun 2019-05-26 09:01:46 -0300, David Bremner wrote:
>>> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>>>
This is the third revision of the series originally posted at
id:20190424183113.29242-1-...@fifthhorseman.net
On Sun 2019-05-26 13:54:29 -0300, David Bremner wrote:
> % uncrustify -c devel/uncrustify.cfg --replace $files
thanks for this pointer, i will experiment with it.
> If we do decide to rip off the bandage, that will cause a certain amount
> of rebasing pain for any patch series in flight; now
Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
> On Sun 2019-05-26 09:01:46 -0300, David Bremner wrote:
>> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>>
>>> This is the third revision of the series originally posted at
>>> id:20190424183113.29242-1-...@fifthhorseman.net (revision 2 was at
>>>
On Sun 2019-05-26 09:01:46 -0300, David Bremner wrote:
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>
>> This is the third revision of the series originally posted at
>> id:20190424183113.29242-1-...@fifthhorseman.net (revision 2 was at
>> id:20190520032228.27420-1-...@fifthhorseman.net)
>>
>> This series
Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
> This is the third revision of the series originally posted at
> id:20190424183113.29242-1-...@fifthhorseman.net (revision 2 was at
> id:20190520032228.27420-1-...@fifthhorseman.net)
>
> This series addresses comments raised by David Bremner in his review.
> Thanks,
This is the third revision of the series originally posted at
id:20190424183113.29242-1-...@fifthhorseman.net (revision 2 was at
id:20190520032228.27420-1-...@fifthhorseman.net)
This series addresses comments raised by David Bremner in his review.
Thanks, Bremner!
The most significant change
This is the second revision of the series originally posted at
id:20190424183113.29242-1-...@fifthhorseman.net
(that series no longer applies directly to master due to all the
cleanup that has been merged recently)
This series is an important baseline for my work on protected headers,
which i
E-mail structures are potentially arbitrarily complicated.
Cryptographic protection standards like S/MIME and OpenPGP or PGP/MIME
are often applicable to some elements of some messages.
Last year's "E-Fail" attacks made it clear that trying to provide
normal users with cryptographic protections
