Re: [OAUTH-WG] Indicating origin of OAuth credentials to combat login CSRF

2011-02-27 Thread Manger, James H
Hi Francisco, >> Q. Should an OAuth client app list the authorization server >> in the Origin header of requests to resource servers? >> >> In OAuth (delegation) flows a server dynamically issues >> credentials (such as a bearer token) to a client app to use >> in subsequent HTTP requests t

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Indicating origin of OAuth credentials to combat login CSRF

2011-02-27 Thread Manger, James H
Torsten Lodderstedt said: "I would expect the token to carry information about its issuer. Would this be sufficient in order to detect CSRF?" No. A Login CSRF attack involves a legitimate token (listing the legitimate issuer) that an attacker received being given to a victim client. The client

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth v2 Mac token spec

2011-02-27 Thread Peter Wolanin
To clarify a bit in terms of of the flexibility I mention being gained by keeping a body hash filed in the headers and for constructing the signature - I'm imagining myself implementing 2 layers of servers for handling the upload and processing of large files. The public facing server (e.g. a load

[OAUTH-WG] OAuth v2 Mac token spec

2011-02-27 Thread Peter Wolanin
Dear Mr. Hammer-Lahav regarding http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-v2-mac-token-02 I was quite happy to find this, since I had overlooked it before and it define the sort of robust HMAC-based auth we have been using for our APIs in various forms, but has the advantage of being a standa

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Breaking change for authorization code flow?

2011-02-27 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
Am 26.02.2011 17:49, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav: I think you are making too much of this. glad to hear :-) I just want to make sure native apps are OAuth 1st class citizens. The aibility to issue refresh tokens to such clients is a key feature, which is by no meaning an exception. Even if they