Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Richer, Justin P.
I think this advice isn't a bad idea, though it's of course up to the AS what an untrusted client really is. In practice, this is something that was registered by a non-sysadmin type person, either a dynamically registered client or something available through self-service registration of some

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Hans Zandbelt
Classifying like this must also mean that consent should not be stored until the client is considered (admin) trusted, and admin policy would interfere with user policy. IMHO the security consideration would apply only to dynamically registered clients where registration is unrestricted; any

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Antonio Sanso
Hi Hans, I really fail to see how this can be addressed at registration time for cases where registration is unrestricted (namely all the big Providers) regards antonio On Sep 4, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Hans Zandbelt hzandb...@pingidentity.com wrote: Classifying like this must also mean that

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Hans Zandbelt
Agreed, I see you point about the big providers using exactly the unrestricted flow for which the trust model (by definition) is out of scope of the spec. This may be the reason for the implemented behavior indeed and a security consideration is a good idea for other deployments; there's not

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Antonio Sanso
hi Hans On Sep 4, 2014, at 10:58 AM, Hans Zandbelt hzandb...@pingidentity.com wrote: Agreed, I see you point about the big providers using exactly the unrestricted flow for which the trust model (by definition) is out of scope of the spec. This may be the reason for the implemented behavior

[OAUTH-WG] Authentication

2014-09-04 Thread Frizz
Hello there, I have a question regarding Authentication: The following two scenarios, are they typical use cases for OAuth? Or OpenId-Connect? Or something completely different? Flow (A) would be like this: (1) Client calls Business Logic Server (2) Server detects there’s no Access Token in

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Hans Zandbelt
yes, you are right about the unrestricted client use case; I just got caught by the fact that you were talking about *unrestricted* client registration all the time (standards-based or not) which deserves extra caution whereas Google (and the spec) also provides *restricted* client

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Hans Zandbelt
Maybe just to clarify my point: where did the client_id in the example that you gave come from? Hans. On 9/4/14, 1:58 PM, Hans Zandbelt wrote: yes, you are right about the unrestricted client use case; I just got caught by the fact that you were talking about *unrestricted* client

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Authentication

2014-09-04 Thread John Bradley
Inline On Sep 4, 2014, at 11:30 AM, Frizz frizzthe...@googlemail.com wrote: Hello there, I have a question regarding Authentication: The following two scenarios, are they typical use cases for OAuth? Or OpenId-Connect? Or something completely different? Flow (A) would be like this:

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Authentication

2014-09-04 Thread Richer, Justin P.
Neither of these are authentication (they don't tell the client or business logic server who the user is or if they're still there), they're authorization and they're both well within the scope of OAuth. The first one is a redirect flow, that actually works (in OAuth) like this: 1) Clients

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Antonio Sanso
I registered via the Google Developers Console [0] :) [0] https://console.developers.google.com/project On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:09 PM, Hans Zandbelt hzandb...@pingidentity.commailto:hzandb...@pingidentity.com wrote: Maybe just to clarify my point: where did the client_id in the example that you

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread John Bradley
Registration requiring a valid email address is not sufficient to stop a bad person from registering a client that appears to be perfectly legitimate but is later used as a redirect. So it is a bit slippery to differentiate good from bad. In general clearing the referrer and fragment from

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Antonio Sanso
On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:22 PM, John Bradley ve7...@ve7jtb.com wrote: Registration requiring a valid email address is not sufficient to stop a bad person from registering a client that appears to be perfectly legitimate but is later used as a redirect. totally agree! So it is a bit

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Hans Zandbelt
exactly, but my point would be that the attacker needs to have an relationship/account with the OP; this is where the approval is and I agree with Antonio/you that that is tricky for consumer ASs and deserves a warning Hans. On 9/4/14, 2:22 PM, John Bradley wrote: Registration requiring a

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread John Bradley
In a enterprise case likely there is some trusted relationship. In the Web 2.0 API economy case there is a tension between providers wanting the maximum number of users and validating the developer registering the client. Often having a email someplace is sufficient to register a client. That

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Bill Burke
FWIW, Antonio convinced me and I'm going to change this in our IDM project. Thanks Antonio. What convinced me was that the user is probably expecting a login screen. Since there is this expectation, it might make it a little easier for the attacker to convince the user that a spoofed login

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Antonio Sanso
hi Bill On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:52 PM, Bill Burke bbu...@redhat.com wrote: FWIW, Antonio convinced me and I'm going to change this in our IDM project. Thanks Antonio. What convinced me was that the user is probably expecting a login screen. Since there is this expectation, it might make it

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Hans Zandbelt
I am convinced about the issue in the use case Antonio provided but I hope not to close the door on returning errors to known and trusted clients. Not sure anymore if that's possible though because the distinction can't be registered... Hans. On 9/4/14, 3:01 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote: hi Bill

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Antonio Sanso
hi Hans On Sep 4, 2014, at 3:15 PM, Hans Zandbelt hzandb...@pingidentity.com wrote: I am convinced about the issue in the use case Antonio provided but I hope not to close the door on returning errors to known and trusted clients. Not sure anymore if that's possible though because the

Re: [OAUTH-WG] open redirect in rfc6749

2014-09-04 Thread Richer, Justin P.
The distinction can be made, and it's AS policy. Sometimes (like in our case) the AS distinguishes between client registered by an administrator vs. an end user vs. something dynamic (no user involved). And in the latter cases, the AS can still figure out how long something's been registered

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Authentication

2014-09-04 Thread Sergey Beryozkin
Hi Justin On 04/09/14 13:15, Richer, Justin P. wrote: Neither of these are authentication (they don't tell the client or business logic server who the user is or if they're still there), they're authorization and they're both well within the scope of OAuth. The first one is a redirect

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Authentication

2014-09-04 Thread Richer, Justin P.
As John points out, that could be either resource owner or client credentials flow, depending on the use case. -- Justin On Sep 4, 2014, at 11:43 AM, Sergey Beryozkin sberyoz...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Justin On 04/09/14 13:15, Richer, Justin P. wrote: Neither of these are authentication