Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Jim Manico
I love you Neil. -- Jim Manico @Manicode > On Oct 30, 2019, at 3:18 PM, Neil Madden wrote: > >  > If you can point out where I recommended disabling TLS or not bothering to > strip headers from incoming requests, or anything else along those lines then > please let me know. Otherwise, yes we

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Salz, Rich
If you strip off the TLS, you *still* cannot pass messages around without protecting them as if they had secrets because, well, the header name you are using is secret. This is not a defense in depth. ___ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.i

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Neil Madden
If you can point out where I recommended disabling TLS or not bothering to strip headers from incoming requests, or anything else along those lines then please let me know. Otherwise, yes we’re done here. > On 30 Oct 2019, at 17:19, Salz, Rich wrote: > >  > To quote your previous claim: "The

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Salz, Rich
* To quote your previous claim: "There is no such thing as an unguessable name." Right. That doesn’t mean *I* have to guess it. * Even if your deployment team had such staggeringly bad operational security practices as to allow people to take packet captures from an internal network a

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Neil Madden
On 30 Oct 2019, at 16:41, Salz, Rich wrote: > > I'm thinking of a uniformly random 16 byte name right now. Have at it. > Cute but missing the point. I don’t have to guess it. To quote your previous claim: "There is no such thing as an unguessable name." > YOU have to securely deploy it across

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Salz, Rich
* I'm thinking of a uniformly random 16 byte name right now. Have at it. Cute but missing the point. I don’t have to guess it. YOU have to securely deploy it across your proxy (however many staff), your backend (however many staff), your application developers (however many), and perhaps yo

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Neil Madden
Combining responses to related messages (429 error): On 30 Oct 2019, at 14:07, Salz, Rich wrote: > >> But an unguessable header name is *simple* and effective and works right now >> with widely implemented functionality. > > You mean like admin/admin for administrator access? There is no suc

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Salz, Rich
* Again, authenticating the *connection* from the RP to the backend services is good, but is completely orthogonal to authenticating the headers themselves. I strongly disagree. Authenticating the sender allows the receiver to make a trust decision in the provenance and quality of the data

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Neil Madden
On 30 Oct 2019, at 14:05, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote: >> On 30. Oct 2019, at 14:56, Neil Madden wrote: >> >> On 30 Oct 2019, at 13:24, Justin Richer wrote: >>> >>> All of these problems can be solved, and I think solved better, by securing >>> the connection between the proxy and the back-end.

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Salz, Rich
> But an unguessable header name is *simple* and effective and works right now > with widely implemented functionality. You mean like admin/admin for administrator access? There is no such thing as an unguessable name. You claim the name will never be exposed to untrusted parties. How so? Y

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
> On 30. Oct 2019, at 14:56, Neil Madden wrote: > > On 30 Oct 2019, at 13:24, Justin Richer wrote: >> >> All of these problems can be solved, and I think solved better, by securing >> the connection between the proxy and the back-end. That way the back end >> will be able look not only for

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Neil Madden
On 30 Oct 2019, at 13:24, Justin Richer wrote: > > All of these problems can be solved, and I think solved better, by securing > the connection between the proxy and the back-end. That way the back end will > be able look not only for a specific header, but verify that the header came > from t

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
+1 > On 30. Oct 2019, at 14:24, Justin Richer wrote: > > All of these problems can be solved, and I think solved better, by securing > the connection between the proxy and the back-end. That way the back end will > be able look not only for a specific header, but verify that the header came >

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Justin Richer
All of these problems can be solved, and I think solved better, by securing the connection between the proxy and the back-end. That way the back end will be able look not only for a specific header, but verify that the header came from the proxy itself. An obscure header name is one way to do th

Re: [OAUTH-WG] client certs and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies (was Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt)

2019-10-30 Thread Neil Madden
Replies below. > On 29 Oct 2019, at 19:13, Justin Richer wrote: > > I would argue that making this standard would actually increase the > likelihood of developers getting this right, as now instead of following some > copy-pasted recipe for NGINX or Apache that they found on the web, they cou