[OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-28.txt

2020-08-20 Thread internet-drafts
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF. Title : The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) Authors : Nat

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Client authentication on token revocation

2020-08-20 Thread Emond Papegaaij
Hi Torsten, Thanks for your insight. I agree, a sender constraint token, such as when using certificate bound tokens from RFC 8705, cannot be used by an attacker. It makes sense to only allow the owner to revoke them, probably using the same mechanism as by which they are bound to the client. For

[OAUTH-WG] WGLC review of PAR

2020-08-20 Thread Neil Madden
As promised in the last interim meeting, I’ve reviewed the current (03) draft-ietf-oauth-par document. Overall it looks close to ready to me, with mostly minor comments and one security-relevant comment on section 2.1 that should be discussed further, and one additional proposed security

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Client authentication on token revocation

2020-08-20 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
Hi Emond, I tend to agree with your assessment. Revoking bearer tokens without client authentication seems to be better than leaving the attacker the option to use them to invoke resources. However, if the attacker cannot use the access tokens (e.g. because they are sender constrained), the

[OAUTH-WG] Client authentication on token revocation

2020-08-20 Thread Emond Papegaaij
Hi all, We are currently implementing the token revocation endpoint (RFC 7009) on our authorization server and do not understand why it requires client authentication. When a party (a valid client or not) gets hold of a valid access token in whatever way, the least damaging it could do with it,