Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-15 Thread John Kemp
On Jan 14, 2010, at 7:39 PM, Richard L. Barnes wrote: As such, I can't see how *not* requiring SSL for unsigned requests could pass muster at an IETF security review. Speaking as someone who does IETF security reviews ... :) If I were reviewing a document that defines an optional

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-15 Thread Eve Maler
The points about matching security to use case are excellent. This is why I think we're maybe misinterpreting Eran's argument for MUST. It's not an argument from security alone (we must always have highest security all the time); it's an argument from interoperability of security features at

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-15 Thread John Panzer
AM To: Eve Maler Cc: OAuth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels +1 to MUST implement TLS on both sides. I thought we were only discussing whether the server could decide to skip TLS for a particular use case. No? On Friday, January 15, 2010, Eve

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-15 Thread John Panzer
-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Panzer Sent: Friday, January 15, 2010 8:43 AM To: Eve Maler Cc: OAuth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels +1 to MUST implement TLS on both sides. I thought we were only discussing whether the server could decide

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-15 Thread Richard L. Barnes
] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels +1 to MUST implement TLS on both sides. I thought we were only discussing whether the server could decide to skip TLS for a particular use case. No? On Friday, January 15, 2010, Eve Maler e...@xmlgrrl.com wrote: The points about matching

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-15 Thread Paul C. Bryan
On Fri, 2010-01-15 at 14:41 -0700, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: On 1/15/10 7:58 AM, John Kemp j...@jkemp.net wrote: When I look at what is possible in the offline world, I would ask - would you require that movie theatre tickets bought in advance were encrypted in transport between the

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-14 Thread Paul C. Bryan
On Wed, 2010-01-13 at 23:05 -0700, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: Authentication Open Question #3: Should require using TLS/SSL/secure channel for any request made without a signature? WRAP got a lot of attention (mostly negative) to how it sends requests without using signatures or a secure

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-14 Thread Igor Faynberg
Actually, this makes a lot of sense. I believe that such URLs can be made sufficiently secure by signing with a key bootstrapped from the password (something like PAK or EKE). But they ought to remain secret, which is pretty impossible to ensure, or they must be made unreusable by anyone

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-14 Thread Eran Hammer-Lahav
Doesn't the fact that this approach has clearly failed for HTTP Basic act as a warning sign? 2617 clearly states the problems in using Basic over insecure channels, and yet, given its simplicity, it is one of the most widely used and abused protocol around. I think this is a case where security

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Allowing Secrets in the Clear Over Insecure Channels

2010-01-14 Thread David Recordon
On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 10:05 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav e...@hueniverse.com wrote: Authentication Open Question #3: Should require using TLS/SSL/secure channel for any request made without a signature? Yes. Either TLS/SSL should be used or their should be an appropriate signature. I'll leave