Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-17 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Douglas E. Engert wrote: > Can you run klist -e -t -K -k afstest-md5.keytab > and verify that the key matches what asetkey has. Thank you! This led to the solution... It did NOT match, as the key had been added with bos addkey with the most recent s

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-17 Thread Douglas E. Engert
Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH wrote: On Jul 17, 2009, at 15:01 , Eric Chris Garrison wrote: [r...@rufus2 etc]# klist -e Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0 Default principal: afs/afstest.iu@ads.iu.edu Valid starting ExpiresService principal 07/17/09 14:34:44 07/18/09 00:34:44 kr

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-17 Thread Russ Allbery
"Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" writes: > On Jul 17, 2009, at 15:01 , Eric Chris Garrison wrote: >> [r...@rufus2 etc]# klist -e >> Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0 >> Default principal: afs/afstest.iu@ads.iu.edu >> >> Valid starting ExpiresService principal >> 07/17/09 14:34:44 07

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-17 Thread Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH
On Jul 17, 2009, at 15:01 , Eric Chris Garrison wrote: [r...@rufus2 etc]# klist -e Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0 Default principal: afs/afstest.iu@ads.iu.edu Valid starting ExpiresService principal 07/17/09 14:34:44 07/18/09 00:34:44 krbtgt/ads.iu@ads.iu.edu

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-17 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Jeffrey Altman wrote: > Eric Chris Garrison wrote: >> Anything else that we might be missing? I keep thinking it must be >> something simple. > > It has to be key related. An authenticated/encrypted connection is > possible provided that the key wor

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Jeffrey Altman
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: > Anything else that we might be missing? I keep thinking it must be > something simple. It has to be key related. An authenticated/encrypted connection is possible provided that the key works. Even if the user name is not found in the protection database. I would ve

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Douglas E. Engert
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Douglas E. Engert wrote: And after you reset the desonly bit in AD, did you use ktpass with -pass somepassword -out keytabfile or did you use the -rndPass option? The ADS admin says "We always use the rndPass option fo

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Douglas E. Engert wrote: > And after you reset the desonly bit in AD, did you use ktpass with > -pass somepassword -out keytabfile > or did you use the -rndPass option? The ADS admin says "We always use the rndPass option for generating the keytabs. Y

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Jeffrey Altman
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: > Okay, we continue to fight this. We found that despite having an > alternate realm name in /usr/afs/etc/krb.conf, users from that realm were > being treated as unauthorized, anonymous users, rather than being mapped > as they should be. > > We looked into enctypes as

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Douglas E. Engert
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Okay, we continue to fight this. We found that despite having an alternate realm name in /usr/afs/etc/krb.conf, users from that realm were being treated as unauthorized, anonymous users, rather than being mapped as they

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Russ Allbery wrote: > Did you update KeyFile with the new service principal that you got from > your ADS admin and make sure that the kvno in KeyFile matches the kvno in > Active Directory? Yes. - -- Eric Chris Garrison | Principal Mass St

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Russ Allbery
Eric Chris Garrison writes: > So, we got a des-crc-md5 service principal from our ADS admin. Now the > ticket decoding is failing in krb5_des_decrypt() in rxkad/ticket5.c on > the server side. > > After aklog, this is what klist shows for afs/afstest.iu.edu: > 07/16/09 14:43:22 07/17/09 00:43:1

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-16 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Okay, we continue to fight this. We found that despite having an alternate realm name in /usr/afs/etc/krb.conf, users from that realm were being treated as unauthorized, anonymous users, rather than being mapped as they should be. We looked into enct

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-09 Thread Vincent Fox
Simon Wilkinson wrote: On 9 Jul 2009, at 16:50, Douglas E. Engert wrote: Depends on what data you put in AFS, and is the AFS network traffic sniffable You would need to do a risk assessment of you situation. And when you do that risk assessment, consider the sentiments expressed in: http

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-09 Thread Simon Wilkinson
On 9 Jul 2009, at 16:50, Douglas E. Engert wrote: Depends on what data you put in AFS, and is the AFS network traffic sniffable You would need to do a risk assessment of you situation. And when you do that risk assessment, consider the sentiments expressed in: http://xkcd.com/538/ S.

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-09 Thread Douglas E. Engert
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Jeffrey Altman wrote: Garrison, Eric C wrote: 07/08/09 14:53:56 07/09/09 00:53:44 afs/afstest.iu@ads.iu.edu renew until 07/09/09 14:53:40, Etype (skey, tkt): AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC, AES-256

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-09 Thread Russ Allbery
Eric Chris Garrison writes: > Jeffrey Altman wrote: >> The answer is right above. AES-256 is not DES-CBC-CRC > > I'm told by our ADS admin that DES3 isn't supported, That wouldn't help; AFS doesn't support DES3 anyway. > and DES-CBC-CRC is somewhat weak by modern standards. How concerned > sh

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-09 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Jeffrey Altman wrote: > Garrison, Eric C wrote: > >> 07/08/09 14:53:56 07/09/09 00:53:44 afs/afstest.iu@ads.iu.edu >> renew until 07/09/09 14:53:40, Etype (skey, tkt): AES-256 CTS mode >> with 96-bit >> SHA-1 HMAC, AES-256 CTS mode with 96

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-08 Thread Jeffrey Altman
Garrison, Eric C wrote: > 07/08/09 14:53:56 07/09/09 00:53:44 afs/afstest.iu@ads.iu.edu > renew until 07/09/09 14:53:40, Etype (skey, tkt): AES-256 CTS mode > with 96-bit > SHA-1 HMAC, AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC > > So what else should I look for in the token being bad in

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-08 Thread Douglas E. Engert
Garrison, Eric C wrote: Quoting Jeffrey Altman : Eric Chris Garrison wrote: ...but as ecgar...@ads.iu.edu: Wed Jul 1 15:58:37 2009 [6] EVENT AFS_Aud_Unauth CODE -1 STR AFS_SRX_StData Wed Jul 1 15:58:37 2009 [6] EVENT AFS_SRX_StData CODE 0 NAME --UnAuth-- HOST 149.166.144.33 ID 32766 FI

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-08 Thread Garrison, Eric C
Quoting Jeffrey Altman : Eric Chris Garrison wrote: ...but as ecgar...@ads.iu.edu: Wed Jul 1 15:58:37 2009 [6] EVENT AFS_Aud_Unauth CODE -1 STR AFS_SRX_StData Wed Jul 1 15:58:37 2009 [6] EVENT AFS_SRX_StData CODE 0 NAME --UnAuth-- HOST 149.166.144.33 ID 32766 FID 536870933:2:2 So the ADS.I

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Jeffrey Altman
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: > ...but as ecgar...@ads.iu.edu: > > Wed Jul 1 15:58:37 2009 [6] EVENT AFS_Aud_Unauth CODE -1 STR AFS_SRX_StData > Wed Jul 1 15:58:37 2009 [6] EVENT AFS_SRX_StData CODE 0 NAME --UnAuth-- > HOST 149.166.144.33 ID 32766 FID 536870933:2:2 > > So the ADS.IU.EDU user is s

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Derrick Brashear
>>>  If the >>> krb.conf file states >>> >>>   ADS.IU.EDU AFSTEST.IU.EDU > > wait, they should be one per line. are they? I reread the code. All on one line, space-separated, should be fine. however, you need not relist the one that's in ThisCell. Russ' point also matters. Is the ADS user's key a

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Russ Allbery
Eric Chris Garrison writes: > What I'm seeing now though, is that although used asetkey to add the > service principal from the ADS realm to my test cell, permissions > aren't working as I'd expect. > > So, we have realm AFSTEST.IU.EDU and ADS.IU.EDU. Both in the KeyFile and > in the /usr/afs/et

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Derrick Brashear
On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 4:52 PM, Eric Chris Garrison wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > Jeffrey Altman wrote: >> Eric Chris Garrison wrote: From: Andrew Deason > I've added an afs service principal from each of two realms to the > KeyFile using asetkey.   I've

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Jeffrey Altman wrote: > Eric Chris Garrison wrote: >>> From: Andrew Deason I've added an afs service principal from each of two realms to the KeyFile using asetkey. I've added both realms in /etc/krb.conf, the first two lines of the f

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Jeffrey Altman
Eric Chris Garrison wrote: >> From: Andrew Deason >>> I've added an afs service principal from each of two realms to the >>> KeyFile using asetkey. I've added both realms in /etc/krb.conf, the >>> first two lines of the file being the two realms. >> You probably want /usr/afs/etc/krb.conf (if us

Re: [OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Derrick Brashear
On Jul 1, 2009, at 12:17, Eric Chris Garrison wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 From: Andrew Deason I've added an afs service principal from each of two realms to the KeyFile using asetkey. I've added both realms in /etc/krb.conf, the first two lines of the fil

[OpenAFS] ADS and MIT Kerberos transition auth continued

2009-07-01 Thread Eric Chris Garrison
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 > From: Andrew Deason > > I've added an afs service principal from each of two realms to the > > KeyFile using asetkey. I've added both realms in /etc/krb.conf, the > > first two lines of the file being the two realms. > > You probably want /usr/afs