Fixes following vulnerabilities: CVE-2016-1285 bind: malformed packet sent to rndc can trigger assertion failure CVE-2016-1286 bind: malformed signature records for DNAME records can trigger assertion failure
[YOCTO #9400] External References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2016-1285 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2016-1286 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1285 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1286 References to the Upstream commits and Security Advisories: =========================================================== CVE-2016-1285: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01352 https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=patch; h=70037e040e587329cec82123e12b9f4f7c945f67 CVE-2016-1286_1: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01353 https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=patch; h=a3d327bf1ceaaeabb20223d8de85166e940b9f12 CVE-2016-1286_2: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01353 https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=patch; h=7602be276a73a6eb5431c5acd9718e68a55e8b61 Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarm...@enea.com> --- .../bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch | 154 ++++++++++ .../bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch | 79 ++++++ .../bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch | 314 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 550 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2149bd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1285.patch @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +From 70037e040e587329cec82123e12b9f4f7c945f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Andrews <ma...@isc.org> +Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 12:11:27 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] 4318. [security] Malformed control messages can + trigger assertions in named and rndc. (CVE-2016-1285) + [RT #41666] + +(cherry picked from commit a2b15b3305acd52179e6f3dc7d073b07fbc40b8e) + +CVE: CVE-2016-1285 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[Removed doc/arm/notes.xml changes from upstream patch] + +Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarm...@enea.com> +--- + CHANGES | 3 +++ + bin/named/control.c | 2 +- + bin/named/controlconf.c | 2 +- + bin/rndc/rndc.c | 8 ++++---- + doc/arm/notes.xml | 11 +++++++++++ + lib/isccc/cc.c | 14 +++++++------- + 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES +index b9bd9ef..2c727d5 100644 +--- a/CHANGES ++++ b/CHANGES +@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ ++4318. [security] Malformed control messages can trigger assertions ++ in named and rndc. (CVE-2016-1285) [RT #41666] ++ + --- 9.10.3-P3 released --- + + 4288. [bug] Fixed a regression in resolver.c:possibly_mark() +diff --git a/bin/named/control.c b/bin/named/control.c +index 8554335..81340ca 100644 +--- a/bin/named/control.c ++++ b/bin/named/control.c +@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ns_control_docommand(isccc_sexpr_t *message, isc_buffer_t *text) { + #endif + + data = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_data"); +- if (data == NULL) { ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(data)) { + /* + * No data section. + */ +diff --git a/bin/named/controlconf.c b/bin/named/controlconf.c +index 765afdd..a39ab8b 100644 +--- a/bin/named/controlconf.c ++++ b/bin/named/controlconf.c +@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ control_recvmessage(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { + * Limit exposure to replay attacks. + */ + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(request, "_ctrl"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL) { ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl)) { + log_invalid(&conn->ccmsg, ISC_R_FAILURE); + goto cleanup_request; + } +diff --git a/bin/rndc/rndc.c b/bin/rndc/rndc.c +index cb17050..b6e05c8 100644 +--- a/bin/rndc/rndc.c ++++ b/bin/rndc/rndc.c +@@ -255,8 +255,8 @@ rndc_recvdone(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { + isccc_cc_fromwire(&source, &response, algorithm, &secret)); + + data = isccc_alist_lookup(response, "_data"); +- if (data == NULL) +- fatal("no data section in response"); ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(data)) ++ fatal("bad or missing data section in response"); + result = isccc_cc_lookupstring(data, "err", &errormsg); + if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { + failed = ISC_TRUE; +@@ -321,8 +321,8 @@ rndc_recvnonce(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { + isccc_cc_fromwire(&source, &response, algorithm, &secret)); + + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(response, "_ctrl"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL) +- fatal("_ctrl section missing"); ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl)) ++ fatal("bad or missing ctrl section in response"); + nonce = 0; + if (isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_nonce", &nonce) != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + nonce = 0; +diff --git a/lib/isccc/cc.c b/lib/isccc/cc.c +index 47a3b74..2bb961e 100644 +--- a/lib/isccc/cc.c ++++ b/lib/isccc/cc.c +@@ -403,13 +403,13 @@ verify(isccc_sexpr_t *alist, unsigned char *data, unsigned int length, + * Extract digest. + */ + _auth = isccc_alist_lookup(alist, "_auth"); +- if (_auth == NULL) ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_auth)) + return (ISC_R_FAILURE); + if (algorithm == ISCCC_ALG_HMACMD5) + hmac = isccc_alist_lookup(_auth, "hmd5"); + else + hmac = isccc_alist_lookup(_auth, "hsha"); +- if (hmac == NULL) ++ if (!isccc_sexpr_binaryp(hmac)) + return (ISC_R_FAILURE); + /* + * Compute digest. +@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ isccc_cc_createack(isccc_sexpr_t *message, isc_boolean_t ok, + REQUIRE(ackp != NULL && *ackp == NULL); + + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL || ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl) || + isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_ser", &serial) != ISC_R_SUCCESS || + isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_tim", &t) != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (ISC_R_FAILURE); +@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ isccc_cc_isack(isccc_sexpr_t *message) + isccc_sexpr_t *_ctrl; + + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL) ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl)) + return (ISC_FALSE); + if (isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_ack", NULL) == ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (ISC_TRUE); +@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ isccc_cc_isreply(isccc_sexpr_t *message) + isccc_sexpr_t *_ctrl; + + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL) ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl)) + return (ISC_FALSE); + if (isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_rpl", NULL) == ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (ISC_TRUE); +@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ isccc_cc_createresponse(isccc_sexpr_t *message, isccc_time_t now, + + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl"); + _data = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_data"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL || _data == NULL || ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl) || !isccc_alist_alistp(_data) || + isccc_cc_lookupuint32(_ctrl, "_ser", &serial) != ISC_R_SUCCESS || + isccc_cc_lookupstring(_data, "type", &type) != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (ISC_R_FAILURE); +@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ isccc_cc_checkdup(isccc_symtab_t *symtab, isccc_sexpr_t *message, + isccc_sexpr_t *_ctrl; + + _ctrl = isccc_alist_lookup(message, "_ctrl"); +- if (_ctrl == NULL || ++ if (!isccc_alist_alistp(_ctrl) || + isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_ser", &_ser) != ISC_R_SUCCESS || + isccc_cc_lookupstring(_ctrl, "_tim", &_tim) != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (ISC_R_FAILURE); +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae5cc48 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From a3d327bf1ceaaeabb20223d8de85166e940b9f12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mukund Sivaraman <m...@isc.org> +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2016 12:22:43 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix resolver assertion failure due to improper DNAME handling + (CVE-2016-1286) (#41753) + +(cherry picked from commit 5995fec51cc8bb7e53804e4936e60aa1537f3673) + +CVE: CVE-2016-1286 +Upstream-Status: Backport + +[Removed doc/arm/notes.xml changes from upstream patch.] + +Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarm...@enea.com> +--- +diff -ruN a/CHANGES b/CHANGES +--- a/CHANGES 2016-04-13 07:28:44.940873629 +0200 ++++ b/CHANGES 2016-04-13 07:38:38.923167851 +0200 +@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ ++4319. [security] Fix resolver assertion failure due to improper ++ DNAME handling when parsing fetch reply messages. ++ (CVE-2016-1286) [RT #41753] ++ + 4318. [security] Malformed control messages can trigger assertions + in named and rndc. (CVE-2016-1285) [RT #41666] + +diff -ruN a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c +--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c 2016-04-13 07:28:43.088953790 +0200 ++++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c 2016-04-13 07:38:20.411968925 +0200 +@@ -6967,21 +6967,26 @@ + isc_boolean_t found_dname = ISC_FALSE; + dns_name_t *dname_name; + ++ /* ++ * Only pass DNAME or RRSIG(DNAME). ++ */ ++ if (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_dname && ++ (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_rrsig || ++ rdataset->covers != dns_rdatatype_dname)) ++ continue; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we're not chaining, then the DNAME and ++ * its signature should not be external. ++ */ ++ if (!chaining && external) { ++ log_formerr(fctx, "external DNAME"); ++ return (DNS_R_FORMERR); ++ } ++ + found = ISC_FALSE; + aflag = 0; + if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dname) { +- /* +- * We're looking for something else, +- * but we found a DNAME. +- * +- * If we're not chaining, then the +- * DNAME should not be external. +- */ +- if (!chaining && external) { +- log_formerr(fctx, +- "external DNAME"); +- return (DNS_R_FORMERR); +- } + found = ISC_TRUE; + want_chaining = ISC_TRUE; + POST(want_chaining); +@@ -7010,9 +7015,7 @@ + &fctx->domain)) { + return (DNS_R_SERVFAIL); + } +- } else if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig +- && rdataset->covers == +- dns_rdatatype_dname) { ++ } else { + /* + * We've found a signature that + * covers the DNAME. diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a31ea81 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2016-1286_2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +From 7602be276a73a6eb5431c5acd9718e68a55e8b61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Andrews <ma...@isc.org> +Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 07:16:48 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] Part 2 of: 4319. [security] Fix resolver assertion + failure due to improper DNAME handling when parsing + fetch reply messages. (CVE-2016-1286) [RT #41753] + +(cherry picked from commit 2de89ee9de8c8da9dc153a754b02dcdbb7fe2374) +Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarm...@enea.com> +--- + lib/dns/resolver.c | 192 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- + 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c +index 70aba87..41e9df4 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c ++++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c +@@ -6074,14 +6074,11 @@ cname_target(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *tname) { + } + + static inline isc_result_t +-dname_target(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *qname, +- dns_name_t *oname, dns_fixedname_t *fixeddname) ++dname_target(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *qname, ++ unsigned int nlabels, dns_fixedname_t *fixeddname) + { + isc_result_t result; + dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT; +- unsigned int nlabels; +- int order; +- dns_namereln_t namereln; + dns_rdata_dname_t dname; + dns_fixedname_t prefix; + +@@ -6096,21 +6093,6 @@ dname_target(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_name_t *qname, + if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (result); + +- /* +- * Get the prefix of qname. +- */ +- namereln = dns_name_fullcompare(qname, oname, &order, &nlabels); +- if (namereln != dns_namereln_subdomain) { +- char qbuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE]; +- char obuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE]; +- +- dns_rdata_freestruct(&dname); +- dns_name_format(qname, qbuf, sizeof(qbuf)); +- dns_name_format(oname, obuf, sizeof(obuf)); +- log_formerr(fctx, "unrelated DNAME in answer: " +- "%s is not in %s", qbuf, obuf); +- return (DNS_R_FORMERR); +- } + dns_fixedname_init(&prefix); + dns_name_split(qname, nlabels, dns_fixedname_name(&prefix), NULL); + dns_fixedname_init(fixeddname); +@@ -6736,13 +6718,13 @@ static isc_result_t + answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + isc_result_t result; + dns_message_t *message; +- dns_name_t *name, *qname, tname, *ns_name; ++ dns_name_t *name, *dname, *qname, tname, *ns_name; + dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, *ns_rdataset; + isc_boolean_t done, external, chaining, aa, found, want_chaining; + isc_boolean_t have_answer, found_cname, found_type, wanted_chaining; + unsigned int aflag; + dns_rdatatype_t type; +- dns_fixedname_t dname, fqname; ++ dns_fixedname_t fdname, fqname; + dns_view_t *view; + + FCTXTRACE("answer_response"); +@@ -6770,10 +6752,15 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + view = fctx->res->view; + result = dns_message_firstname(message, DNS_SECTION_ANSWER); + while (!done && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { ++ dns_namereln_t namereln; ++ int order; ++ unsigned int nlabels; ++ + name = NULL; + dns_message_currentname(message, DNS_SECTION_ANSWER, &name); + external = ISC_TF(!dns_name_issubdomain(name, &fctx->domain)); +- if (dns_name_equal(name, qname)) { ++ namereln = dns_name_fullcompare(qname, name, &order, &nlabels); ++ if (namereln == dns_namereln_equal) { + wanted_chaining = ISC_FALSE; + for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list); + rdataset != NULL; +@@ -6898,10 +6885,11 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + */ + INSIST(!external); + if (aflag == +- DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER) ++ DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER) { + have_answer = ISC_TRUE; +- name->attributes |= +- DNS_NAMEATTR_ANSWER; ++ name->attributes |= ++ DNS_NAMEATTR_ANSWER; ++ } + rdataset->attributes |= aflag; + if (aa) + rdataset->trust = +@@ -6956,6 +6944,8 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + if (wanted_chaining) + chaining = ISC_TRUE; + } else { ++ dns_rdataset_t *dnameset = NULL; ++ + /* + * Look for a DNAME (or its SIG). Anything else is + * ignored. +@@ -6963,10 +6953,8 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + wanted_chaining = ISC_FALSE; + for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list); + rdataset != NULL; +- rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(rdataset, link)) { +- isc_boolean_t found_dname = ISC_FALSE; +- dns_name_t *dname_name; +- ++ rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(rdataset, link)) ++ { + /* + * Only pass DNAME or RRSIG(DNAME). + */ +@@ -6980,20 +6968,41 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + * its signature should not be external. + */ + if (!chaining && external) { +- log_formerr(fctx, "external DNAME"); ++ char qbuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE]; ++ char obuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE]; ++ ++ dns_name_format(name, qbuf, ++ sizeof(qbuf)); ++ dns_name_format(&fctx->domain, obuf, ++ sizeof(obuf)); ++ log_formerr(fctx, "external DNAME or " ++ "RRSIG covering DNAME " ++ "in answer: %s is " ++ "not in %s", qbuf, obuf); ++ return (DNS_R_FORMERR); ++ } ++ ++ if (namereln != dns_namereln_subdomain) { ++ char qbuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE]; ++ char obuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE]; ++ ++ dns_name_format(qname, qbuf, ++ sizeof(qbuf)); ++ dns_name_format(name, obuf, ++ sizeof(obuf)); ++ log_formerr(fctx, "unrelated DNAME " ++ "in answer: %s is " ++ "not in %s", qbuf, obuf); + return (DNS_R_FORMERR); + } + +- found = ISC_FALSE; + aflag = 0; + if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dname) { +- found = ISC_TRUE; + want_chaining = ISC_TRUE; + POST(want_chaining); + aflag = DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER; +- result = dname_target(fctx, rdataset, +- qname, name, +- &dname); ++ result = dname_target(rdataset, qname, ++ nlabels, &fdname); + if (result == ISC_R_NOSPACE) { + /* + * We can't construct the +@@ -7005,14 +7014,12 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + } else if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + return (result); + else +- found_dname = ISC_TRUE; ++ dnameset = rdataset; + +- dname_name = dns_fixedname_name(&dname); ++ dname = dns_fixedname_name(&fdname); + if (!is_answertarget_allowed(view, +- qname, +- rdataset->type, +- dname_name, +- &fctx->domain)) { ++ qname, rdataset->type, ++ dname, &fctx->domain)) { + return (DNS_R_SERVFAIL); + } + } else { +@@ -7020,73 +7027,60 @@ answer_response(fetchctx_t *fctx) { + * We've found a signature that + * covers the DNAME. + */ +- found = ISC_TRUE; + aflag = DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWERSIG; + } + +- if (found) { ++ /* ++ * We've found an answer to our ++ * question. ++ */ ++ name->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_CACHE; ++ rdataset->attributes |= DNS_RDATASETATTR_CACHE; ++ rdataset->trust = dns_trust_answer; ++ if (!chaining) { + /* +- * We've found an answer to our +- * question. ++ * This data is "the" answer to ++ * our question only if we're ++ * not chaining. + */ +- name->attributes |= +- DNS_NAMEATTR_CACHE; +- rdataset->attributes |= +- DNS_RDATASETATTR_CACHE; +- rdataset->trust = dns_trust_answer; +- if (!chaining) { +- /* +- * This data is "the" answer +- * to our question only if +- * we're not chaining. +- */ +- INSIST(!external); +- if (aflag == +- DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER) +- have_answer = ISC_TRUE; ++ INSIST(!external); ++ if (aflag == DNS_RDATASETATTR_ANSWER) { ++ have_answer = ISC_TRUE; + name->attributes |= + DNS_NAMEATTR_ANSWER; +- rdataset->attributes |= aflag; +- if (aa) +- rdataset->trust = +- dns_trust_authanswer; +- } else if (external) { +- rdataset->attributes |= +- DNS_RDATASETATTR_EXTERNAL; +- } +- +- /* +- * DNAME chaining. +- */ +- if (found_dname) { +- /* +- * Copy the dname into the +- * qname fixed name. +- * +- * Although we check for +- * failure of the copy +- * operation, in practice it +- * should never fail since +- * we already know that the +- * result fits in a fixedname. +- */ +- dns_fixedname_init(&fqname); +- result = dns_name_copy( +- dns_fixedname_name(&dname), +- dns_fixedname_name(&fqname), +- NULL); +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) +- return (result); +- wanted_chaining = ISC_TRUE; +- name->attributes |= +- DNS_NAMEATTR_CHAINING; +- rdataset->attributes |= +- DNS_RDATASETATTR_CHAINING; +- qname = dns_fixedname_name( +- &fqname); + } ++ rdataset->attributes |= aflag; ++ if (aa) ++ rdataset->trust = ++ dns_trust_authanswer; ++ } else if (external) { ++ rdataset->attributes |= ++ DNS_RDATASETATTR_EXTERNAL; + } + } ++ ++ /* ++ * DNAME chaining. ++ */ ++ if (dnameset != NULL) { ++ /* ++ * Copy the dname into the qname fixed name. ++ * ++ * Although we check for failure of the copy ++ * operation, in practice it should never fail ++ * since we already know that the result fits ++ * in a fixedname. ++ */ ++ dns_fixedname_init(&fqname); ++ qname = dns_fixedname_name(&fqname); ++ result = dns_name_copy(dname, qname, NULL); ++ if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) ++ return (result); ++ wanted_chaining = ISC_TRUE; ++ name->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_CHAINING; ++ dnameset->attributes |= ++ DNS_RDATASETATTR_CHAINING; ++ } + if (wanted_chaining) + chaining = ISC_TRUE; + } +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb index fa057d5..3ad14b2 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.3-P3.bb @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch \ file://0001-gen.c-extend-DIRNAMESIZE-from-256-to-512.patch \ file://0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-1285.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-1286_1.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-1286_2.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "bcf7e772b616f7259420a3edc5df350a" -- 1.9.1 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
