From: Jörg Sommer <joerg.som...@navimatix.de> The patches for CVE-2021-45444 were applied upstream on 2022-02-12.
The snipped for do_install was taken from https://salsa.debian.org/debian/zsh/-/blob/8cc745c38fba1d4ec3e5d66cffbeadd8b492c2ce/debian/rules#L132 Signed-off-by: Jörg Sommer <joerg.som...@navimatix.de> --- .../zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_1.patch | 60 -------- .../zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_2.patch | 140 ------------------ .../zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_3.patch | 77 ---------- .../zsh/{zsh_5.8.bb => zsh_5.9.bb} | 28 ++-- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 291 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_1.patch delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_2.patch delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_3.patch rename meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/{zsh_5.8.bb => zsh_5.9.bb} (61%) diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_1.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fb8fa3427..000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -Origin: commit c187154f47697cdbf822c2f9d714d570ed4a0fd1 -From: Oliver Kiddle <o...@zsh.org> -Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 01:56:40 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 1/9] security/41: Don't perform PROMPT_SUBST evaluation on - %F/%K arguments - -Mitigates CVE-2021-45444 - -https://salsa.debian.org/debian/zsh/-/raw/debian/5.8-6+deb11u1/debian/patches/cherry-pick-CVE-2021-45444_1.patch?inline=false -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2021-45444 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang....@intel.com> ---- - ChangeLog | 5 +++++ - Src/prompt.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -index 8d7dfc169..eb248ec06 100644 ---- a/ChangeLog -+++ b/ChangeLog -@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ -+2022-01-27 dana <d...@dana.is> -+ -+ * Oliver Kiddle: security/41: Src/prompt.c: Prevent recursive -+ PROMPT_SUBST -+ - 2020-02-14 dana <d...@dana.is> - - * unposted: Config/version.mk: Update for 5.8 -diff --git a/Src/prompt.c b/Src/prompt.c -index b65bfb86b..91e21c8e9 100644 ---- a/Src/prompt.c -+++ b/Src/prompt.c -@@ -244,6 +244,12 @@ parsecolorchar(zattr arg, int is_fg) - bv->fm += 2; /* skip over F{ */ - if ((ep = strchr(bv->fm, '}'))) { - char oc = *ep, *col, *coll; -+ int ops = opts[PROMPTSUBST], opb = opts[PROMPTBANG]; -+ int opp = opts[PROMPTPERCENT]; -+ -+ opts[PROMPTPERCENT] = 1; -+ opts[PROMPTSUBST] = opts[PROMPTBANG] = 0; -+ - *ep = '\0'; - /* expand the contents of the argument so you can use - * %v for example */ -@@ -252,6 +258,10 @@ parsecolorchar(zattr arg, int is_fg) - arg = match_colour((const char **)&coll, is_fg, 0); - free(col); - bv->fm = ep; -+ -+ opts[PROMPTSUBST] = ops; -+ opts[PROMPTBANG] = opb; -+ opts[PROMPTPERCENT] = opp; - } else { - arg = match_colour((const char **)&bv->fm, is_fg, 0); - if (*bv->fm != '}') --- -2.34.1 diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_2.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e5b6d7cdc..000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,140 +0,0 @@ -From 8a4d65ef6d0023ab9b238529410afb433553d2fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Marc Cornellà <he...@mcornella.com> -Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 09:43:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 2/9] security/89: Add patch which can optionally be used to - work around CVE-2021-45444 in VCS_Info -Comment: Updated to use the same file name without blanks as actually - used in the final 5.8.1 release. - - -https://salsa.debian.org/debian/zsh/-/blob/debian/5.8-6+deb11u1/debian/patches/cherry-pick-CVE-2021-45444_2.patch -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2021-45444 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang....@intel.com> ---- - ChangeLog | 5 + - Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 103 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch - -diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -index eb248ec06..9a05a09e1 100644 ---- a/ChangeLog -+++ b/ChangeLog -@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ - 2022-01-27 dana <d...@dana.is> - -+ * Marc Cornellà: security/89: -+ Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch: Add patch which -+ can optionally be used to work around recursive PROMPT_SUBST -+ issue in VCS_Info -+ - * Oliver Kiddle: security/41: Src/prompt.c: Prevent recursive - PROMPT_SUBST - -diff --git a/Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch b/Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch -new file mode 100644 -index 000000000..13e54be77 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch -@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ -+From 972887bbe5eb6a00e5f0e73781d6d73bfdcafb93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -+From: =?UTF-8?q?Marc=20Cornell=C3=A0?= <he...@mcornella.com> -+Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 09:43:28 +0100 -+Subject: [PATCH] security/89: Partially work around CVE-2021-45444 in VCS_Info -+MIME-Version: 1.0 -+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit -+ -+This patch is a partial, VCS_Info-specific work-around for CVE-2021-45444, -+which is mitigated in the shell itself in 5.8.1 and later versions. It is -+offered for users who are concerned about an exploit but are unable to update -+their binaries to receive the complete fix. -+ -+The patch works around the vulnerability by pre-escaping values substituted -+into format strings in VCS_Info. Please note that this may break some user -+configurations that rely on those values being un-escaped (which is why it was -+not included directly in 5.8.1). It may be possible to limit this breakage by -+adjusting exactly which ones are pre-escaped, but of course this may leave -+them vulnerable again. -+ -+If applying the patch to the file system is inconvenient or not possible, the -+following script can be used to idempotently patch the relevant function -+running in memory (and thus must be re-run when the shell is restarted): -+ -+ -+# Impacted versions go from v5.0.3 to v5.8 (v5.8.1 is the first patched version) -+autoload -Uz is-at-least -+if is-at-least 5.8.1 || ! is-at-least 5.0.3; then -+ return -+fi -+ -+# Quote necessary $hook_com[<field>] items just before they are used -+# in the line "VCS_INFO_hook 'post-backend'" of the VCS_INFO_formats -+# function, where <field> is: -+# -+# base: the full path of the repository's root directory. -+# base-name: the name of the repository's root directory. -+# branch: the name of the currently checked out branch. -+# revision: an identifier of the currently checked out revision. -+# subdir: the path of the current directory relative to the -+# repository's root directory. -+# misc: a string that may contain anything the vcs_info backend wants. -+# -+# This patch %-quotes these fields previous to their use in vcs_info hooks and -+# the zformat call and, eventually, when they get expanded in the prompt. -+# It's important to quote these here, and not later after hooks have modified the -+# fields, because then we could be quoting % characters from valid prompt sequences, -+# like %F{color}, %B, etc. -+# -+# 32 │ hook_com[subdir]="$(VCS_INFO_reposub ${hook_com[base]})" -+# 33 │ hook_com[subdir_orig]="${hook_com[subdir]}" -+# 34 │ -+# 35 + │ for tmp in base base-name branch misc revision subdir; do -+# 36 + │ hook_com[$tmp]="${hook_com[$tmp]//\%/%%}" -+# 37 + │ done -+# 38 + │ -+# 39 │ VCS_INFO_hook 'post-backend' -+# -+# This is especially important so that no command substitution is performed -+# due to malicious input as a consequence of CVE-2021-45444, which affects -+# zsh versions from 5.0.3 to 5.8. -+# -+autoload -Uz +X regexp-replace VCS_INFO_formats -+ -+# We use $tmp here because it's already a local variable in VCS_INFO_formats -+typeset PATCH='for tmp (base base-name branch misc revision subdir) hook_com[$tmp]="${hook_com[$tmp]//\%/%%}"' -+# Unique string to avoid reapplying the patch if this code gets called twice -+typeset PATCH_ID=vcs_info-patch-9b9840f2-91e5-4471-af84-9e9a0dc68c1b -+# Only patch the VCS_INFO_formats function if not already patched -+if [[ "$functions[VCS_INFO_formats]" != *$PATCH_ID* ]]; then -+ regexp-replace 'functions[VCS_INFO_formats]' \ -+ "VCS_INFO_hook 'post-backend'" \ -+ ': ${PATCH_ID}; ${PATCH}; ${MATCH}' -+fi -+unset PATCH PATCH_ID -+ -+ -+--- -+ Functions/VCS_Info/VCS_INFO_formats | 4 ++++ -+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) -+ -+diff --git a/Functions/VCS_Info/VCS_INFO_formats b/Functions/VCS_Info/VCS_INFO_formats -+index e0e1dc738..4d88e28b6 100644 -+--- a/Functions/VCS_Info/VCS_INFO_formats -++++ b/Functions/VCS_Info/VCS_INFO_formats -+@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ hook_com[base-name_orig]="${hook_com[base_name]}" -+ hook_com[subdir]="$(VCS_INFO_reposub ${hook_com[base]})" -+ hook_com[subdir_orig]="${hook_com[subdir]}" -+ -++for tmp in base base-name branch misc revision subdir; do -++ hook_com[$tmp]="${hook_com[$tmp]//\%/%%}" -++done -++ -+ VCS_INFO_hook 'post-backend' -+ -+ ## description (for backend authors): -+-- -+2.34.1 --- -2.34.1 diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_3.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index adfc00ae5..000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh/CVE-2021-45444_3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -From 4abf2fc193fc2f3e680deecbf81289a7b02e245b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: dana <d...@dana.is> -Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2021 13:13:33 -0600 -Subject: [PATCH 3/9] CVE-2021-45444: Update NEWS/README - -https://salsa.debian.org/debian/zsh/-/blob/debian/5.8-6+deb11u1/debian/patches/cherry-pick-CVE-2021-45444_3.patch -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2021-45444 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang....@intel.com> ---- - ChangeLog | 2 ++ - NEWS | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ - README | 6 ++++++ - 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -index 9a05a09e1..93b0bc337 100644 ---- a/ChangeLog -+++ b/ChangeLog -@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ - 2022-01-27 dana <d...@dana.is> - -+ * CVE-2021-45444: NEWS, README: Document preceding two changes -+ - * Marc Cornellà: security/89: - Etc/CVE-2021-45444-VCS_Info-workaround.patch: Add patch which - can optionally be used to work around recursive PROMPT_SUBST -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS -index 964e1633f..d34b3f79e 100644 ---- a/NEWS -+++ b/NEWS -@@ -4,6 +4,26 @@ CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF ZSH - - Note also the list of incompatibilities in the README file. - -+Changes since 5.8 -+----------------- -+ -+CVE-2021-45444: Some prompt expansion sequences, such as %F, support -+'arguments' which are themselves expanded in case they contain colour -+values, etc. This additional expansion would trigger PROMPT_SUBST -+evaluation, if enabled. This could be abused to execute code the user -+didn't expect. e.g., given a certain prompt configuration, an attacker -+could trick a user into executing arbitrary code by having them check -+out a Git branch with a specially crafted name. -+ -+This is fixed in the shell itself by no longer performing PROMPT_SUBST -+evaluation on these prompt-expansion arguments. -+ -+Users who are concerned about an exploit but unable to update their -+binaries may apply the partial work-around described in the file -+'Etc/CVE-2021-45444 VCS_Info workaround.patch' included with the shell -+source. [ Reported by RyotaK <secur...@ryotak.me>. Additional thanks to -+Marc Cornellà <he...@mcornella.com>. ] -+ - Changes since 5.7.1-test-3 - -------------------------- - -diff --git a/README b/README -index 7f1dd5f92..c9e994ab3 100644 ---- a/README -+++ b/README -@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ Zsh is a shell with lots of features. For a list of some of these, see the - file FEATURES, and for the latest changes see NEWS. For more - details, see the documentation. - -+Incompatibilities since 5.8 -+--------------------------- -+ -+PROMPT_SUBST expansion is no longer performed on arguments to prompt- -+expansion sequences such as %F. -+ - Incompatibilities since 5.7.1 - ----------------------------- - --- -2.34.1 diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh_5.8.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh_5.9.bb similarity index 61% rename from meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh_5.8.bb rename to meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh_5.9.bb index 7602ff9f6..7940970e4 100644 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh_5.8.bb +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-shells/zsh/zsh_5.9.bb @@ -10,12 +10,8 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE;md5=1a4c4cda3e8096d2fd483ff2f4514fec" DEPENDS = "ncurses bison-native libcap libpcre gdbm groff-native" -SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}/5.8/${BP}.tar.xz \ - file://CVE-2021-45444_1.patch \ - file://CVE-2021-45444_2.patch \ - file://CVE-2021-45444_3.patch \ - " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dcc4b54cc5565670a65581760261c163d720991f0d06486da61f8d839b52de27" +SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9b8d1ecedd5b5e81fbf1918e876752a7dd948e05c1a0dba10ab863842d45acd5" inherit autotools-brokensep gettext update-alternatives manpages @@ -50,13 +46,17 @@ do_configure () { oe_runconf } -pkg_postinst:${PN} () { - touch $D${sysconfdir}/shells - grep -q "bin/zsh" $D${sysconfdir}/shells || echo /bin/zsh >> $D${sysconfdir}/shells - grep -q "bin/sh" $D${sysconfdir}/shells || echo /bin/sh >> $D${sysconfdir}/shells +do_install:append() { + sed -i -e '1!b; s:^#!.*[ /]zsh:#!${bindir}/zsh:; s#/usr/local/bin#${bindir}#;' \ + `find ${D}/usr/share/zsh/${PV}/functions -type f` } -# work around QA failures with usrmerge installing zsh in /usr/bin/zsh instead of /bin/zsh -# ERROR: QA Issue: /usr/share/zsh/5.8/functions/zed contained in package zsh requires /bin/zsh, but no providers found in RDEPENDS:zsh? [file-rdeps] -# like bash does since https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?id=4759408677a4e60c5fa7131afcb5bc184cf2f90a -RPROVIDES:${PN} += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'usrmerge', '/bin/zsh', '', d)}" +pkg_postinst:${PN} () { + touch $D${sysconfdir}/shells + for i in zsh sh + do + grep -q "bin/$i" $D${sysconfdir}/shells || \ + printf >> $D${sysconfdir}/shells \ + "${bindir}/$i\n${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'usrmerge', '/bin/$i\n', '', d)}" + done +} -- 2.34.1
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