I rsync'd and pulled OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable today. With the strtoull() fix
and this patch
...
--- apps/apps.c.old 2011-12-12 11:02:32.593185016 -0800
+++ apps/apps.c 2012-01-05 22:31:30.011105020 -0800
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
*
*/
-#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
+#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) &&
On Sat, 14 Jan 2012, Andy Polyakov wrote:
> > More adventures with OpenServr 5.
> > It looks like OpenSSL 1.0.1 uses strtoull().
> > Unfortunatly at least one very old (and currently being sold) platform
> > does not have strtoull().
> > ..
> > Undefined first referenced
On Jan 23, 2012, at 9:39 AM, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
> OK well in short it was pretty much finalised and changing it now while of
> course possible would cause a fair bit of disruption. I'd have to check but
> most of the discussion was a couple of years ago with the release of OpenSSL
> 1.0.0.
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Jan 23, 2012, at 9:07 AM, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Jan 23, 2012, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> >
> >> Was there a discussion of the decision to add significant features but
> >> not go to 1.1? I'd like to review it before advocating for 1.1.
On Jan 23, 2012, at 9:07 AM, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2012, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
>> Greetings. I will likely be using features that only appear in "this new
>> version" of OpenSSL in a project. There has been a question about whether
>> the new features will really be in 1.0
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> Greetings. I will likely be using features that only appear in "this new
> version" of OpenSSL in a project. There has been a question about whether the
> new features will really be in 1.0.1, because they are very clearly not in
> 1.0.0.
>
Which ne
Greetings. I will likely be using features that only appear in "this new
version" of OpenSSL in a project. There has been a question about whether the
new features will really be in 1.0.1, because they are very clearly not in
1.0.0.
Was there a discussion of the decision to add significant feat
> Well, if you had say a single thread collecting data to feed an entropy
> pool, once an attacker syncronized on that, they'd win.
Cross-correlation data doesn't really support the assertion that they
win. As depicted in last my message most favorable synchronization
scenario on multi-core CPU ex
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
OpenSSL version 1.0.1 Beta 2
OpenSSL - The Open Source toolkit for SSL/TLS
http://www.openssl.org/
OpenSSL is currently in a release cycle. The second beta is now released.
The beta release is available for
Ah, OK (on the 1.0.1 beta)
I agree with your reasoning and surprise on the misalignment (regarding
the appending, etc), but there it is. I am referring to my 3rd party
application, I didn't bother to inspect the openssl.exe. Also, it
doesn't _always_ wind up this way (though always for me, haha)
Let's consider following code:
ENGINE * e;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER * cipher;
const unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = {0};
const unsigned char key[32] = {0};
ASN1_TYPE asn = {0};
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
e = ENGINE_by_id("gost");
if(e == NULL || ENGINE_init(e) == NULL)
11 matches
Mail list logo
