[openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Matt Caswell via RT
Closing this ticket: works as intended, won't fix. ___ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 08:25:53PM +, Sekwon Choi via RT wrote: > Hi Viktor and Kurt, > > Thanks for the quick response. I think I agree with you guys. I looked up > hostname RFC again (RFC952 and 1123), not URI RFC, and indeed, '_' and '~' > are not valid character to be used for hostname. >

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Sekwon Choi via RT
Hi Viktor and Kurt, Thanks for the quick response. I think I agree with you guys. I looked up hostname RFC again (RFC952 and 1123), not URI RFC, and indeed, '_' and '~' are not valid character to be used for hostname. So technically, what openssl is doing is right. What makes tricky is that, sinc

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 07:29:15PM +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 07:22:58PM +, Kurt Roeckx via RT wrote: > > > It looks to me that you're trying to validate an URL instead of a > > hostname. I don't know of any standart that allows you to put a > > URL in a certific

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 07:22:58PM +, Kurt Roeckx via RT wrote: > It looks to me that you're trying to validate an URL instead of a > hostname. I don't know of any standart that allows you to put a > URL in a certificate and it also doesn't make much sense. Certificates IIRC can have URI sub

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Kurt Roeckx via RT
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 06:53:29PM +, Sekwon Choi via RT wrote: > When we want to perform a host verification using openssl's APIs that use > X509_check_host, host URL that includes specific characters such as '_' or > '~' will be failing when CN from the certificate contains wildcard > charact

[openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4003] OpenSSL Bug report / Patch submission - wildcard_match in host verification

2015-08-11 Thread Sekwon Choi via RT
Hi openssl team, I would like to report a bug as below and patch for the fix. [ Version affected ] : 1.0.2d (latest) and below (basically, all versions of openssl) [ Operating system ] : All [ Bug description ] : When we want to perform a host verification using openssl's APIs that use X509_che

Re: [openssl-dev] 1.0.2 long term support

2015-08-11 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 07:55:33PM +0200, stefan.n...@t-online.de wrote: > Hi, > > Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > > 1.0.2 long term support > > === > > > > The OpenSSL project team would like to announce that the 1.0.2 > > version will be supported until 2019-12-31. > > Lookin

Re: [openssl-dev] 1.0.2 long term support

2015-08-11 Thread stefan.n...@t-online.de
Hi, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > 1.0.2 long term support > === > > The OpenSSL project team would like to announce that the 1.0.2 > version will be supported until 2019-12-31. Looking at the release date of 1.0.2 (22 Jan 2015) that seems to be (very slightly) less than the "at

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3992] [PATCH] Allow RFC6962 Signed Certificate Timestamps to be disabled

2015-08-11 Thread Salz, Rich via RT
> Yes. But skimping on security features is not a good way to deal with > software/firmware bloat. And again, attacks on this layer are increasing in > quantity and sophistication. The current protection mechanisms appear > insufficient. Draw your own conclusions. But this isn't a general-purpose

Re: [openssl-dev] tls_session_secret_cb method return value

2015-08-11 Thread Emilia Käsper
Hi Ian, Thanks for the report! Your colleague John Foley suggested to treat this error as unrecoverable: https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-dev/2015-March/001030.html The error is set while processing the ServerHello, at which point the PAC has already been sent to the server in the ticke