RE: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-09 Thread Ryan Hurst
ion 8-p Ryan -Original Message- From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 12:42 PM To: Ryan Hurst Cc: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'; Openssl-Users ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Subject: Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets. R

Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-09 Thread Ben Laurie
Ryan Hurst wrote: > > Ben -- > I do not understand; after reading the Cryptography research design > review (http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf ) and the Intel technical > brief it sounds as if its design is solid, I do understand that the output > received though the CryptoAPI inte

RE: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-09 Thread Ryan Hurst
-Original Message- From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 4:50 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: 'Rich Salz'; Openssl-Users ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Subject: Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets. Ryan Hurst wrote: > >

RE: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-09 Thread Ryan Hurst
Thanks Eric -- Interesting read :) Ryan -Original Message- From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2001 10:43 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: 'Rich Salz'; Openssl-Dev ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Subject: Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number

Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-09 Thread Ben Laurie
Ryan Hurst wrote: > > Granted; guess I should not have given such high praise to the > quality/uniqueness of that this device produces since they do not provide > information on its design nor state that it has been evaluated by any > qualified independent reviewers. My assumption was and I guess

Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-08 Thread Eric Rescorla
Ryan Hurst <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I have just read the Intel "technical brief" covering the Intel hardware RNG > device (ftp://download.intel.com/design/security/rng/techbrief.pdf) > interesting read; although it and the accompanying documents > (http://developer.intel.com/design/security/

RE: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-08 Thread Ryan Hurst
IL PROTECTED]] Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2001 7:36 PM To: Ryan Hurst Cc: Openssl-Dev ([EMAIL PROTECTED]); Openssl-Users ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Subject: Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets. > I am not sure I understand what you are saying You called the i

RE: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-08 Thread Ryan Hurst
, 2001 7:36 PM To: Ryan Hurst Cc: Openssl-Dev ([EMAIL PROTECTED]); Openssl-Users ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Subject: Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets. > I am not sure I understand what you are saying You called the intel h/w rng "excellent." I beli

Re: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-08 Thread Rich Salz
> I am not sure I understand what you are saying You called the intel h/w rng "excellent." I believe consensus is "we don't know." The code you showed does exactly the right thing: don't rely on the h/w RNG directly, but use it as an entropy source. /r$ -- Zolera Systems, Secu

RE: OpemSSL Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) for Intel Chip sets.

2001-09-08 Thread Ryan Hurst
Rich - I am not sure I understand what you are saying; currently rand_win.c calles CryptGenRandom (CryptoAPI) and the "INTEL_DEF_PROV " to acquire input to the entropy functions in OpenSSL. /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */ if (acquire(&hProvider, 0