-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hello,
I'm trying to get OpenLDAP to work with SSL. This is the error I get when I
try to search the server:
# ldapsearch -x -H ldaps://master.pupeno.com
ldap_bind: Can't contact LDAP server (-1)
additional info: error:14077410:SSL
routines:
On Mon, Mar 14, 2005, cmb wrote:
> Thank you, duh, turning on debug for config cleared up all my stack
> trace problems.
>
> Here is the excerpt of a stack trace that is double freeing:
>
> #11 0x081a39db in CRYPTO_free (str=0x0) at mem.c:378
> #12 0x081b1fa6 in ERR_get_state () at err.c:605
>
On Mon, Mar 14, 2005, John Draper wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I'm using the OpenSSL cryptlib encryption tools shipped with the Mac OS-X.
> I'm unable to decrypt a text file encrypted on a Windows XP, using the
> "CryptEncrypt" functon, an API in windows.
>
> The file was encrypted with a 16 byte key (12
Thank you, duh, turning on debug for config cleared up all my stack
trace problems.
Here is the excerpt of a stack trace that is double freeing:
#11 0x081a39db in CRYPTO_free (str=0x0) at mem.c:378
#12 0x081b1fa6 in ERR_get_state () at err.c:605
#13 0x081b2023 in get_error_values (inc=1, top=0, f
Hi,
I'm using the OpenSSL cryptlib encryption tools shipped with the Mac OS-X.
I'm unable to decrypt a text file encrypted on a Windows XP, using the
"CryptEncrypt" functon, an API in windows.
The file was encrypted with a 16 byte key (128 bits) on the Windows.
Using RC4 stream cypher. Yea,
To determine the probability of a birthday pairing, you need the probability
of each birthday pairing not having the same birthday taken to the exponent
of the number of pairings.
The probability of no birthday pairings for 27 people is
(364/365)^(27*26/2)=38%, or a 62% chance that there is at lea
On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, Ferdinand Prantl wrote:
Hi,
you may want to read yet another paper, where a different,
faster method is introduced, than the chinese one (english):
http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/md5/MD5_collisions.pdf
Careful. This is with MD5, a different (but still related) algorithm tha
Hi,
you may want to read yet another paper, where a different,
faster method is introduced, than the chinese one (english):
http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/md5/MD5_collisions.pdf
Ferda
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Erwann ABALE
Bonsoir,
Hodie pr. Id. Mar. MMV est, Alicia da Conceicao scripsit:
> Of course, having a method in 2^69 calculations that find a second message
> that has the same SHA1 hash as a first message does not mean that the second
> message would be of any use to an attacker/forger.
This is not the resul
My point exactly. We don't need to panic- but I do think we need to start
looking for alternatives.
On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, Alicia da Conceicao wrote:
Bruce Schneier said it best on his blog (dated 18 Feb 2005):
Brian
__
OpenSSL Pr
Lecture warning.
On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, alok wrote:
Yeah, you need large key sizes- 128 bits keys just aren't enough (they
allow birthday attacks to be computationally feasible). But I note that
all the AES finalists went to 256 bit key sizes. This would put a birthday
attack at about 128 bits of
Hi everybody:
Bruce Schneier said it best on his blog (dated 18 Feb 2005):
==
Earlier this week, three Chinese cryptographers showed that SHA-1 is not
collision-free. That is, they developed an algorithm for finding collis
Yeah, you need large key sizes- 128 bits keys just aren't enough (they
allow birthday attacks to be computationally feasible). But I note
that all the AES finalists went to 256 bit key sizes. This would put a
birthday attack at about 128 bits of complexity- sufficient. Anything
less than about
On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, alok wrote:
IIRC, you can turn any private key crypto system into a hasing algorithm.
Given an encryption function c = f(k, p) where c is the resulting
ciphertext, k is the private key, and p is the plaintext, you can use it
as a hash function s' = h(t, s) where s' is the n
Personally, I'd like to see OpenSSL start using private key crypto as
hashing functions. The reason that work on dedicated hashing
algorithms kinda died off after MD[45]/SHA* came out was that people
figured out that they were the equivelent of private key encryption.
IIRC, you can turn any pr
On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, alok wrote:
I doubt many people would actually use it if they know it can be easily
broken..
Like someone said on the list "hey everyone uses it, it must be secure" is
the mental genere.
Most people, including a depressingly large number of programmers, would
probably cons
I doubt many people would actually use it if they know it can be easily
broken..
Like someone said on the list "hey everyone uses it, it must be secure"
is the mental genere.
-A
Ted Mittelstaedt wrote:
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Tho
hi
i have written a code for simple secure client server communication. i compile it on cygwin and run it on mips.
SSL_connect returns -1 and ERR_get_error(..) returns 0. and the error is SYS_ERROR_SYSCALL. errno is also 0.
could someone tell me why is this happening?
and how can i access the old
Hi,
I posted the following message to the PostgreSQL mailing list, and one
of the main developers answered:
I think you need to find some SSL hackers; this is below libpq's level too.
- Original message -
I'm trying to use an SSL-enabled (OpenSSL 0.9.7d) Postgres 7.3.9 as database
back
Bonjour,
Hodie pr. Id. Mar. MMV est, [EMAIL PROTECTED] scripsit:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~/Projekte/SSL
> $ gcc -lcrypto -lssl -Wall foo.c -o foo
gcc -Wall -o foo foo.c -lcrypto -lssl
The order is important.
--
Erwann ABALEA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On Mon, 14 Mar 2005 07:27 pm, Ted Mittelstaedt wrote:
> Hmm - well this doesen't look to me like a request for permission, merely
> a request for opinion of whether or not you need to request permission.
Sorry, that wasn't the intent.
> So, in answer to that, no. You must request permission to do
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I am working on an cryptographic abstraction layer for Qt,
> imaginatively called the Qt Cryptographic Architecture (QCA). One of
> the
> back-end plugins
> that is in development links to OpenSSL. Right now, the
> directory name is
> "qca-openssl". When it gets released,
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