On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 02:34:41PM -0600, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > No, of course not. But after letting people depend on this “single
> > cryptographic library” for many years, telling them “too bad” isn’t very
> > nice.
>
> I guess I'm just having a hard time wrapping my head around why, upon
>
On 11/18/2015 12:52 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> On 11/18/15, 12:12 , "openssl-dev on behalf of Benjamin Kaduk"
> wrote:
>
>> On 11/18/2015 07:05 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
>>> So, a full CAdES-A, XAdES-A or PAdES-A implementation _needs_ to
>>> support
>>> both relatively modern TLS
On 18 November 2015 at 17:57, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Wednesday 18 November 2015 11:12:59 Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On 11/18/2015 07:05 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > So, a full CAdES-A, XAdES-A or PAdES-A implementation _needs_ to
> > > support both relatively modern TLS with user certificates,
On 11/18/2015 07:05 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> So, a full CAdES-A, XAdES-A or PAdES-A implementation _needs_ to support
> both relatively modern TLS with user certificates, preferably the newest
> cryptosystems and hashes as well as the oldest ones that were
> standardised and used.
>
> That mean
On 18/11/2015 00:25, Salz, Rich wrote:
ØI have seen rumors (nothing reliable) that the TLS WG is proposing
to disable a whole lot of good cipher suites in TLS 1.3.
Well, it’s pretty easy to verify. Look at the IETF TLS-WG web page,
and get a pointer to the current draft doc.
Yes, TLS remove