> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of
> Karl Denninger
> Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 09:22
> On 5/14/2019 09:48, Michael Wojcik wrote:
> > I can't think of what remnant of the old certificate would be there,
> > except the ce
ackup. Encrypting the key helps
but then you're relying on the entropy in the key passphrase.)
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ly means using
a mechanism such as select or poll to determine when the socket is readable,
then trying the OpenSSL receive again. But looking at the return value of
SSL_want_write() seems safe enough.
That's my understanding. Someone else may know better.
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Michael Wojcik
, the attack succeeds.
Even just attempting to decrypt and log the partial data could be dangerous,
for example if the log is later displayed using a web-based tool that has an
XSS vulnerability, or some sort of binary parser with an exploitable overflow
(e.g. a buggy Wireshark dissector).
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pted) when it's available. The alternative is to support 1.0.2
yourself, and I'd estimate that 99% of OpenSSL users aren't qualified to do
that.
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the way of internal noise sources such as clock skew. Some CPUs have entropy
sources, such as Intel's RDRAND; if you trust them (and in an embedded
application you may not have much choice) you can use that.
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ry to trace it back to confirm what
was locked after the fork (put a breakpoint on the child side of the fork, then
inspect the mutex object at that point). Then you can try to figure out why it
was locked when you forked.
OpenSSL 1.1.1b doesn't seem to provide a way to reinitialize the mutexe
hey prefer.
I'm by no means an ASN.1 expert, so this may be a dumb idea.
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> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of
> Ken Goldman
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 13:44
> To: openssl-users@openssl.org
>
> On 3/20/2019 12:41 PM, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>
> >
> > Sounds like you might have i
ft C runtime if you were building static
libraries, whereas we wanted static libraries linked with the dynamic runtime.
(I don't remember offhand if we had to do the same for 1.1.1.)
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for use by non-TLS X.509 applications). (See e.g.
http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/openssl-org-1854-GeneralizedTime-support-in-openssl-ca-td38848.html.)
Personally, I find that argument persuasive too, and think that it would be
appropriate to have a mechanism to disable the 5280 checks.
Maybe I&#
> From: Michael Wojcik
> Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2019 15:55
>
> Have you tried just changing the PEM header and footer? ...
Whoops. Just saw Viktor's response. Never mind.
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hat (it expects an unencrypted EC keypair for "EC PRIVATE KEY"), but maybe
this other library does.
Are you sure the other library is expecting an encrypted key? Have you tried
with an unencrypted one, but using the "EC PRIVATE KEY" header/footer?
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> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of
> Matt Caswell
> Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2019 12:07
>
> On 27/02/2019 16:47, Michael Wojcik wrote:
> >
> > Frankly, this latest vulnerability in OpenSSL 1.0.2 feels pretty minor in
> &
econd if the
first succeeds), and it has to have different behavior that's visible to the
attacker for the two cases, in order to be a useful oracle. AND it has to be
using a non-stitched implementation of a vulnerable cipher.
It's a relatively narrow branch of the attack tree.
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figuration issue? That's the approach I've taken with
my test CA.
See https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man5/config.html.
Unfortunately I haven't looked at how the engine system may have changed in
1.1.1, so I can't respond to your main question.
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> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of
> Viktor Dukhovni
> Sent: Friday, February 08, 2019 13:00
>
> > On Feb 8, 2019, at 12:55 PM, Michael Wojcik
> wrote:
> >
> > For IPv4: Create your socket, bind it to the local interfac
alue. Then connect using that, create BIO, etc.
Note that all of this will only work if the peer can actually be reached using
that interface.
Another alternative is to configure your routing table with a host route to the
peer using the desired interface.
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x27;t have it, you'll have to build it.
opensc-pkcs11.dll is the PKCS#11 driver from the OpenSC open-source smartcard
interface project. OpenSC has a configuration file which needs to be set up to
match your particular hardware.
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IG_new, and
X509_SIG_free. Similarly, there's PKCS12_AUTHSAFES but no PKCS12_AUTHSAFES_it.
It's possible those were introduced after 1.0.2n, though.
My suggestion would be to scan all the generated .o files with nm to see where
those symbols are being introduced (apparently they
would have been with
OpenSSL 1.0.2 or possibly earlier. I'm not sure when we switched to gcc on
Solaris. So unfortunately I don't have any more-specific advice for building
1.1.1 using the Developer Studio toolchain.
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for it to be a shared object) with a
case-insensitive string comparison function named cmpstrci. It can use
strcasecmp if it must, or you can implement your own.
Or the problem might be something else, of course, but the fact that strings.h
does appear in the output but strcasecmp isn't declared do
t told us what version of OpenSSL you're using. Or
your platform, though since this is an API question that shouldn't matter
(unless someone can suggest an alternative API - which, come to think of it,
someone might, if only we knew more about your platform and application).
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ggest many, likely most, SSH users
practice poor key hygiene, accepting public keys without checking their
provenance.
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/handles, but
it does send a FIN (for SHUT_WR) or flush inbound data and refuse to receive
any more (for SHUT_RD) on the conversation, which of course affects all
descriptors/handles.
So if your application creates multiple references to the conversation, then
depending on your design, you might wa
plications used shutdown(SHUT_RDWR)
+ getsockopt(SO_ERROR) + close, and reported the error (if there is one) for
diagnostic purposes. But beyond that there isn't a lot most applications can
do, and for most a simple close is probably going to be fine.
But as I said I may have overlook
r approach than inventing your own mechanism.
Regarding Corey's original note: SSL/TLS does not have a "username" concept
because it would be redundant or inconsistent. A certificate is a peer
identifier; it takes the place of a username.
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he intention clear. (Yes, the intention of your version is clear to
old UNIX hands. It might not be to other people.)
I'm ignoring portability considerations, since I personally don't think this
would be a great thing to implement in the apps, so I'm not going to be
submitting a PR
> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of
> Jakob Bohm via openssl-users
> Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 09:52
> To: openssl-users@openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Session params output fails via cron
>
>
> Maybe cron jobs are run without a valid std
or in whatever version of nginx you're running.
It's also possible that there's some issue with the Firefox build you're
running and its 0-RTT support. My suspicion though is that nginx is not
enabling 0-RTT in nginx.
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tocol to know which would be appropriate
in your case.
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e are at least a few labeled
"good first issue" (I'm not sure how many because I'm not enabling a bunch of
scripts just to get github's filtering to work), and in any case there are
plenty there to choose from.
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have expressed, and continue to
express, their opinions of the Assistance and Access Bill. That includes
numerous cryptography and security experts, and representatives of
organizations which are active in those areas. Some random posts in
openssl-users will not materially change the course or
> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Michael Ströder
> Sent: Saturday, December 08, 2018 06:59
>
> On 12/7/18 11:44 PM, Michael Wojcik wrote:
> > Homograph attacks combined with phishing would be much cheaper and
> > easier
those requirements can't be verified
by the vast majority of users.
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ven better, two different error codes:
>
> - "Only self-signed end certificate provided"
>
> - "Provided chain ends with unknown root certificate"
>
> (Deciding which one keeps the old error code is left as
> an exercise).
I can raise that as a possibilit
ten there are better things to
address first. TLS configuration is important, but certainly for the software
projects I work on there are any number of important areas for further work.
You can't do everything at once.
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mostly consistent, safe naming conventions for external
identifiers, thank goodness.)
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> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Viktor Dukhovni
> Sent: Saturday, December 01, 2018 13:53
>
> On Sat, Dec 01, 2018 at 07:12:24PM +, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>
> > > Are there compatibility concerns around changing error m
; I agree the text could be better, but not sure in what releases
> if any to change the text, since the change may cause issues
> for some users.
Sure, this is always a concern. Maybe the change could be considered for
OpenSSL 3.0, since that's a major release.
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developers (at least in my experience),
I wonder whether changing the text to "Untrusted self-signed certificate in
certificate chain" would help. That would suggest to the user that the problem
might be an issue with the trust store.
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You might want to check what strerror_r gives you, rather than strerror, since
on GCC platforms that's what OpenSSL uses.
Also, OpenSSL builds its table of error strings at startup (or, for older
versions, when you tell it to). It's conceivable an application's NLS settings
changed between the
context) should not try to control
how messages appear on the wire, aside from attempting to avoid small sends
when there is additional data available to send.
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time you post a question to any
public forum about any software product.
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ed sources to fail
when the implementation doesn't support unsigned long long. That's better than
a bunch of warnings which many people are likely to ignore. If there are
platforms which support 64-bit integer constants but not the "ULL" suffix, we
could hide this behind a
e use cases.
> I want to keep at least two copies of data in different locations for
> disaster recovery. Each copy itself should
> have a backup stored with it in case of a bit error.
OK. It's good to consider and mitigate various failure modes.
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> From: openssl-users on behalf of Nicholas
> Papadonis
> Sent: Friday, November 2, 2018 14:29
> I read
Where? It's hard for us to determine the quality of your source, or your
interpretation of it, if we don't know what it is.
> that the OpenSSL AES-CBC CLI mode is prone to a malleable atta
TLS is mightly confusing in
general.
It is interesting to note that those two options happen to have the same value,
though, particularly given the similarity of the two function names.
This is one of those cases where C's weak type system is a problem. Though it
would be nice if OpenSSL use
rting ancient Windows
OS and SDK versions which, while unsupported by Microsoft, are still used in
far too many places.
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; error.
You appear to have added /SAFESEH to the generic linker flags, so it's being
used for both x86 (32-bit) and x64 (64-bit). It's only allowed for x86. The
error you showed (and, by the way, it's better to copy and paste text than to
send a screenshot) is for the x64 build
-own cryptosystems are
a Bad Idea. I think providing advice like "use an AEAD mode" is bad, because it
implies that crypto non-experts can safely create cryptosystems that avoid
well-known pitfalls. History suggests otherwise.
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> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Viktor Dukhovni
> Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2018 23:12
>
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 01:23:41AM +, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>
> > - Data recovery from an encrypted backup is tough. With CBC,
, but in my opinion your question is
severely underdetermined, and it sounds like you're potentially open to some
rather serious failures. That may not be a concern - again, I don't know what
your use case or threat model is.
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ns of their
libraries.
Todd may well be correct that OP is looking at a LibreSSL package, not an
OpenSSL one. (LibreSSL isn't "a wrapper for OpenSSL", but whatever.)
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etting only openssl man pages.
Yes, because OpenSSL provides an API for applications. Use it.
> Any other suggestions for porting RSA_verify will also be welcomed.
Don't. Use OpenSSL properly instead.
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e
> code incorrectly, unless you are merely compiling other peoples
> software exactly as instructed.
Yes. And this is a much more likely source of problems than a counterfeit
OpenSSL distribution.
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server, for example via DNS
cache poisoning. And due to the systemic brokenness of the web PKI, it's pretty
easy to fool a lot of people with a counterfeit server.)
So do the work now to set yourself up for verifying the signature, and
inculcate a good habit.
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a 64-bit version of Windows, you should be using a Visual Studio x64
x86 Cross Tools window.
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applications
without a cryptography background is likely to produce insecure systems.
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e no possibility for
the server to send back a response." That's clearly wrong, for transports such
as TCP that support half-close; but it handily eliminates any problem of a UA
trying to delimit a request message-body with half-close when running over TLS.
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Disting
the other
parts of the message, I assume. (I'm no CMS expert so I may be missing
something there.) And, of course, both sender and recipient would have to
support that algorithm.
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> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Christian Böhme
> Sent: Tuesday, July 31, 2018 10:16
>
> On 30.07.2018 20:12, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>
> > FWIW, SUS Issue 5 defines RLIMIT_AS as applying to both malloc and mmap,
> > b
#x27;t know the source of your "leaks", then I
can't say I'm particularly impressed with a zero-"leak" policy. That amounts to
"let's burn a lot of cycles during process termination, rather than understand
what we're doing".
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at is, mmap'd pages do not count
against the data limit.)
> If you're a 32-bit process, then malloc'ing or mmap'ing a 2GB object will be
> difficult at best.
Agreed. And I'm not endorsing the mmap approach for this problem anyway - I'd
use a streaming ap
mory "leaks". If the leak isn't
growing over the lifetime of the process, it's not causing any trouble. I've
seen some teams obsessing about getting clean reports from dynamic-analysis
tools like Valgrind. In most environments that's pointless "optimization&quo
can be /very/ conveniently
> mmap(2)'ed
> into the process' address space, ignoring possible limits.
Not portably, it can't. There are operating systems other than Linux and UNIX,
and OpenSSL supports a number of them.
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s complicated and likely to be durable.
> What does this confirm (or not confirm) about openssl's vulnerability
> (or knowable status) to TLBleed?
Specifically? Not much. It goes more to the general principle that systems leak
information as they do work. Ultimately it comes down to
e been picking up speed.
And the issues peripheral to cryptography - applications, infrastructure, users
- haven't gone away.
More and better cryptography; more and better attacks against it.
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> From: Michael R. Hines [mailto:mrhi...@digitalocean.com]
> Sent: Friday, July 27, 2018 07:48
>
>
> On 07/27/2018 08:35 AM, Michael Wojcik wrote:
> >
> > (I'm only commenting on TLBleed here because I'm not sure what you
> > mean by "non-constant-t
uthors of the original
Spectre paper, and many other researchers have pointed out, microarchitecture
side channels are a large class of vulnerabilities. Spot defenses against
particular variants rarely help protect against other variants.
Microarchitecture side channel attacks will be with us f
again, that CHAR_BIT is 8).
By the way, sizeof is an operator. There's no need to parenthesize its operand,
unless the operand is a type.
Of course, as Viktor pointed out, this all may be pointless anyway; it's not
clear that the OP needs this functionality.
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id.
Also, calling it "rand" would be a violation of the C specification, so if you
want your C applications to conform to the spec, you'll have to change them
anyway. Or use a macro, provided the application code never suppresses a macro
definition for rand.
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ers list. It is in no way specific to Linux, or to any
other operating system.
(You would know that if you lurked for a while before posting, which is
generally a good idea.)
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er entropy during OpenSSL initialization, perhaps?
I have not looked into how OpenSSL usually gathers entropy in Android.
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lied one, if there is one - so this isn't an issue I have
to deal with professionally. But we do make the cipher-suite list configurable,
with a default that tries to strike a reasonable compromise between strength
and compatibility.
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mend Ivan Ristic's /Bulletproof TLS/ e-book (or the /OpenSSL Cookbook/
free excerpt, if you can't afford the full book) for cipher-suite
recommendations, and much more besides. It's available from the Feisty Duck
website.
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so - why 0.9.8za? That's *ancient*. This seems like a lot of work for a
result of rather dubious value. What problem are you trying to solve?
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ic subject and sometimes people come
up with pointless requirements.) I've known people who don't need FIPS
validation to ask for some FIPS claim anyway, even when that claim is
essentially meaningless. If that's the case, just make it possible for the
customer to enable FIPS mode and let them go their merry way.
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L, so I can't say what would need to be
done with Configure to get that into the generated makefile.
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to see whether the OpenSSL
sources for 1.0.2h or 1.0.2i include Atom assembly modules; that would be
something else to check.
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I haven't looked into it).
This is one of several reasons why FIPS 140-2 is a problem. Unfortunately the
FIPS 140-3 effort seems to be moribund, and I haven't heard anything about "ISO
FIPS" in some time.
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--
opens
ght be informative, if the problem isn't obvious from inspecting
the software and configuration being used by the origin server. Wireshark's
SSL/TLS dissector does a decent job with the unencrypted parts of the
conversation, and it doesn't look like you're getting fa
> From: openssl-users on behalf of Jakob
> Bohm
> Sent: Tuesday, June 5, 2018 02:46
> Hence my solution of using a hardware TRNG shared over the
> network with devices that lack the ability to have one added
> locally.
Yes, I think that's a good approach. It reduces the attack surface, since t
Of course people have been harvesting entropy, or trying to, from network
sources for decades. There's a famous paragraph regarding it in RFC 4086, which
is an expanded version of a similar statement from RFC 1750 (1994):
Other external events, such as network packet arrival times and
le
tems are still deployed.
As do some other products that use OpenSSL. There's a great deal of FUD
regarding ECC.
For the record, I'm with Viktor on this. WeakDH does not justify disabling
finite-field DHE entirely; that's a misinterpretation of the WeakDH discovery.
There&#x
> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of FooCrypt
> Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2018 10:46
> To: openssl-users@openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PRNG is not seeded
>
> > On 30 May 2018, at 11:55 PM, Michael Wojcik
> wrote:
opy by asking them to
bang on the keyboard or wiggle the mouse, or that sort of thing. Again, it
really depends on what your device and application are.
This topic is discussed at some length in the technical literature; see for
example section 3 of RFC 4086.
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blog entry on long-term support, the different phases,
> and so on. It’s here:
This didn't show up in my RSS client. Is the RSS feed not working, or is it
just my client?
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of those quote characters - it'd be a strange thing to
do, but it's possible. Or be running something like bash, but have IFS set to
include the "." character.
The basic point is solid - those three variants may well be indistinguishable
to the application (almos
vements regarding random
seeding, so it may be worth doing that now.
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#x27;s better than nothing,
and indeed better than what many people do for seeding.
Oh, and asking questions about OpenSSL, a smart move is to mention what version
of OpenSSL you're using, platform details, and something about the problem
you're trying to solve.
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ation from the peer application.
In any case, this has drifted far afield from the purpose of openssl-users. I
pesonally don't think flow control should be part of TLS, but I don't care
strongly enough to, for example, argue against it on the IETF TLS mailing list.
Michael Wojcik
Distin
> From: Jordan Brown [mailto:open...@jordan.maileater.net]
> Sent: Saturday, May 19, 2018 14:08
> To: openssl-users@openssl.org; Michael Wojcik; Alex H
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Receive throttling on SSL sockets
> TLS could (but as far as I can tell does not) have such a
ol message flows don't happen that frequently; relatively
short-lived conversations may never see one (until the final close_notify
alert). So throttling may often work. But in the general case, sooner or later
you'll have to buffer at the application level.
Michael Wojcik
Distinguished En
fraught with
difficulties. Trying to code for it without the basic technical background will
be an exercise in frustration and likely lead to errors that greatly weaken the
security of your application.
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Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
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e situation here). Asking questions is one
thing; paid assistance is quite another.
I hope this is helpful.
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Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
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It may be how the (probably somewhat outdated) version of wget is using the
openssl API. Try "openssl s_client -connect server:port", using the server and
port you're trying to get wget to connect to.
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The server is rejecting the connection because it doesn't like the SSL/TLS
version range that wget is offering. Anything prior to TLSv1.1 suffers from
vulnerabilities that can be exploited under practical conditions, so many
servers reject older protocol versions.
You don't have to upgrade the
}
return PEM_TYPE_NONE;
}
Untested. Extending to the remainder of the PEM types (see pem.h) is left as an
exercise for the reader.
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Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
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rsa_padding_mode, for example; I just tried it, and it didn't produce
an error, but didn't seem to have any effect either.
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Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
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