Re: Certificate subject match validation

2020-03-29 Thread George-Theodor Serbana
Yes, indeed I don't want to take into account the CN, only the SANs. Thanks for the extra flag and all the clarifications! Best regards, Theodor > > > > > > For now I am using X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host with > SSL_CTX_set1_param to > > > > do this specific check. > > > > > > That's the

Re: Certificate subject match validation

2020-03-28 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Sat, Mar 28, 2020 at 10:56:20PM +0200, George-Theodor Serbana wrote: > > > For now I am using X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host with SSL_CTX_set1_param to > > > do this specific check. > > > > That's the slightly less convenient legacy API from OpenSSL 1.0.2. > > In 1.1.0 and later, you can

Re: Certificate subject match validation

2020-03-28 Thread George-Theodor Serbana
> I am writing a SSL/TLS client (using Boost.Beast but underlying it's using > OpenSSL) and although I have set on the SSL context the 'verify_peer' flag, > there is no verification to prove the server presents an X509 which > contains in the Subject Alternative Names the hostname of that server.

Re: Certificate subject match validation

2020-03-27 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Fri, Mar 27, 2020 at 07:38:35PM +0200, George-Theodor Serbana wrote: > I am writing a SSL/TLS client (using Boost.Beast but underlying it's using > OpenSSL) and although I have set on the SSL context the 'verify_peer' flag, > there is no verification to prove the server presents an X509 which

Certificate subject match validation

2020-03-27 Thread George-Theodor Serbana
I am writing a SSL/TLS client (using Boost.Beast but underlying it's using OpenSSL) and although I have set on the SSL context the 'verify_peer' flag, there is no verification to prove the server presents an X509 which contains in the Subject Alternative Names the hostname of that server. As this