I tend to agree with Ben Schwartz on this. I have two
concerns about this draft:
1. It seems likely that it will lead to ossification. While
it is true that devices can in theory update their MUD
descriptions, as a practical matter expecting middleboxes
to enforce certain properties of the TLS han
Taking a step back from details, ISTM that the whole design of this
document is antithetical to extensibility:
TLS is a protocol with a number of extension points. What this document
does is allow an endpoint to restrict its use of a certain set of extension
points. However, the language provided h
On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 3:12 PM Michael Richardson
wrote:
>
> ekr> Taking a step back from details, ISTM that the whole design of this
> ekr> document is antithetical to extensibility:
>
> I agree. It was my first reaction as well.
> I then had another thought: there are dozens of entities out t
On Sat, Sep 19, 2020 at 3:07 PM Michael Richardson
wrote:
>
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
> ekr> As a thought example, consider a hypothetical TLS 1.4 which
> decided to
> ekr> adopt QUIC-style obfuscation of the CH and SH, putting the
> obfuscated
> ek
On Wed, Sep 23, 2020 at 2:51 AM tirumal reddy wrote:
> Hi Ben,
>
> Please see inline
>
> On Tue, 22 Sep 2020 at 20:45, Ben Schwartz wrote:
>
>> I'm not able to understand the new text in Section 6. Are you saying
>> that clients MUST include all the listed extensions/features, but MAY also
>> i
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Thanks for the updated draft. Some responses below.
On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 12:11 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > DISCUSS
> >session encryption that deployed more easily instead of no
> >encryption.
> >
> > I think I understand what you are sayi
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:23 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF
> wrote:
> > Hi, Benoit,
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 2:15 PM, Benoit Claise
> wrote:
> >>
> >> The way I see it, we're going to fix comments forever.
> >
> >
> > Right. But my c
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:23 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF
> wrote:
> > Hi, Benoit,
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 2:15 PM, Benoit Claise
> wrote:
> >>
> >> The way I see it, we're going to fix comments forever.
> >
> >
> > Right. But my c
Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
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gt; Kathleen
>
> Sent from my mobile device
>
> On Feb 28, 2018, at 9:45 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:23 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF
>> wrote:
>> > Hi, Benoi
Thank you.
-Ekr
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:49 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > No worries. Looking forward to your thoughts on my comments.
> >
>
> Me too! I've created a repo
> (https://github.com/wkumari/
meeting unless I hear a clear signal that there is
> something that you *cannot* live with.
>
> Thank you again for your Abstain and all of your comments on the document,
> W
>
> On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 10:58 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 9:45 AM, Eri
t;,
2017.
You seem to have lost the authors names here.
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 8:04 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 10:12 AM Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>> Hi Warren,
>>
>> I am on travel today, but I expect to read this today or Frid
re all
> new comments and have been responded to and addressed.
>
> I requested that the updated version be posted pending approval.
> Responses inline.
>
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 8:36 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I have reviewed the new version. Thanks for incorporating m
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On Sun, Apr 15, 2018 at 10:28 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
> On 15.04.18 13:32, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-20: Discuss
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact
redential for some device
made by that manufacturer. So, I'm actually left wondering how that feature
is intended to work. I regret not catching this earlier, but perhaps you
could explain?
Thanks,
-Ekr
On Sun, Apr 15, 2018 at 11:27 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
> Trimming
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 6:55 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> Hi Eric,
> On 16.04.18 14:25, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> Hi Eliot,
>
> Thanks for continuing the conversation. My question is how this fits into
> the system as a whole.
>
> ISTM that there are two ways in which
Eliot,
The certificate part seems basically right (I think you should require
specific KeyUsage bits).
Maybe I missed it, but I didn't see anything about the level of trust you
should have in cases where you can't reliably tie the endpoint's
transmissions to its certificate.
-Ekr
On Fri, May 1
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> Hi EKR,
>
>
> On 18.05.18 19:57, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Eliot, > > The certificate part seems basically right (I think you
> should require specific KeyUsage bits).
> It's in there:
>
> It is ex
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 12:52 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>
>
> On 18.05.18 20:59, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>
>> Hi EKR,
>>
>>
>> On 18.05.18 19:57, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > Eliot, &g
Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
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On Mon, Nov 4, 2019 at 5:44 PM Peter Gutmann
wrote:
> I actually think it's a pretty good summary, and delivers exactly what's
> promised in the title. OTOH I can also see that it's going to get
> bikeshedded
> to death, and will probably never be editable into a form where people
> won't
> comp
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