Hi,
i am looking forward to use TorPark on an 1.1 USB-Stick since
some weeks now. The Problem I found while trying this is, that
Tor has got a Problem with the very slow read/write speed,
i think.
Since Tor 1.1.8-alpha it takes very long (5 min.) to build a
circuit when starting tor from that slow
On Sun, Sep 10, 2006 at 11:58:11PM CEST, Enrico Scholz wrote:
> A. On client side
>
> 1. add a new option, e.g. 'Jurisdiction' with possible values of
> * 'other' ... when set, do not use an exit-node when it is the same
>jurisdiction as the target-ip; this should be the
I may be mistaken, but just as is the practise with the linux kernel, it
is not permissible to mix licenses when only interfaces are used, mixing
licenses within a gpl licensed software unit is tainting the license but
using an exported interface is not. The only thing that would be
required would
oh dear, that did not parse correctly. If the licenses are different,
the gpl permits the use of interfaces of the softawre to be exported as
such, this is for the neccessary reason that it is, for example,
possible to use a closed source scripting system with the apache web
server. The http protoc
here is another interesting comment, linking the campaign against TOR
with another one against ANON/JAP:
http://www.etc-network.de/blog/mel/misc/tor-bust-connecting-some-dots.html
all operators affected: please keep us posted with new details! the
public discussion here may yield valuable snip
Arrakistor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I would like some clarification regarding the "Clientonly" setting.
> Does this explicitly mean you do not participate in any circuits, or
> that you are not running as an entrance/exit node but may still run
> mitm.
Perhaps it means what the man page says
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 10:15:56AM CEST, glymr wrote:
Anyway, I've written the script, but I won't release it, since it
creates a vast amount of exit policy rules, which (I guess) would not be
acceptable :-/
In the native variant excluding all german subnets would be something
like 7000 lines of
> Well, I know Roger, Nick, etc are against it but making Tor run as a
> server by default may be worth more consideration (I2P does this).
What about people behind NAT/firewalls that they don't control?
What about people with battery-powered devices?
Juli
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 03:32:26PM +0200, Juliusz Chroboczek wrote:
:> Well, I know Roger, Nick, etc are against it but making Tor run as a
:> server by default may be worth more consideration (I2P does this).
:
:What about people behind NAT/firewalls that they don't control?
:
:What about people w
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lexi Pimenidis) writes:
>> A. On client side
> ...
> Relying on the client side doesn't help the exit node operators much.
yes; first step still allows malicious clients to bring certain exit-nodes
in trouble.
But I guess/hope, that most clients are interested in an operationa
Fabian,
I'm familiar with the man page. That didn't answer my question at all.
Regards,
Arrakistor
Monday, September 11, 2006, 5:39:30 AM, you wrote:
> Arrakistor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> I would like some clarification regarding the "Clientonly" setting.
>> Does this explicitly mean you
I agree that being behind someone else's firewall is a problem as the
user may not understand the implications of this and thus advertise an
impossible exit policy.
Suggestion for the coders .. make the client test itself and adjust the
exit policy on the fly.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (numE) writes:
> The investigations will be harder for a foreign country public
> prosecutor / police department, but beeing jailed on your next travel
> to the unites states (just an example) could be even worse than
> having investigations in your own country (which you are at
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 04:17:40PM CEST, numE wrote:
> But maybe this could be a bad idea anyway.
> The investigations will be harder for a foreign country public
> prosecutor / police department, but beeing jailed on your next travel
> to the unites states (just an example) could be even worse th
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 09:20:44AM -0500, Arrakistor wrote:
:Fabian,
:
:I'm familiar with the man page. That didn't answer my question at all.
entry, middleman, and exit are all server functions, if you aren't
running a server you will not be acting in any of those capacities.
-Jon
:
:Regards,
:
Michael Holstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I agree that being behind someone else's firewall is a problem as the> user may not understand the implications of this and thus advertise an> impossible exit policy.Suggestion for the coders .. make the client test itself and adjust the exit policy on
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 04:10:27PM -0500, Arrakistor wrote:
> I am writing an updater for tor to automatically grab the latest
> version. One problem I am coming across is where to host it so they
> cannot be spoofed. I was thinking of putting it at a server in a
> .onion address.
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 12:12:53PM +0200, Matthias Fischmann wrote:
> i am also wondering whether there should be more dialogue between the
> ANON lawyers and the TOR lawyers. or perhaps there already is?
I'm doing my best to leave actual strategy to the Tor operators and
advocates in Germany, si
Nick,
Yes but the sig is only as good as the person you trust. That is why I
haven't released Torpark 2.0b2 with 0.1.2.1-a, I simply don't have a
trusted binary. I don't think they yet have a pgp plugin for NSIS
language yet. I'll see what else can be done for verifying sigs.
Regards,
Arr
Arrakistor wrote:
> Nick,
>
> Yes but the sig is only as good as the person you trust. That is why I
> haven't released Torpark 2.0b2 with 0.1.2.1-a, I simply don't have a
> trusted binary. I don't think they yet have a pgp plugin for NSIS
> language yet. I'll see what else can be done for
Yes, I am building an updater. If phobos finishes the manual on how to
get it to compile under mingw, I will compile, sign, and release them
myself.
And yes, I am verifying the sigs I use in the release.
Regards,
Arrakistor
Monday, September 11, 2006, 6:27:38 PM, you wrote:
> Arrakistor wrote:
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