On Fri, 12 Jun 2009 15:24:33 -0400 grarpamp
wrote:
>While node operators are certainly welcome to characterize and
>define both traffic and policy as deemed fit for their own purposes...
>
>I might suggest that node operators examine things more fully in
>order to make better policy decisions
Well. I see that there has been moderately vigorous discussion going
on since I posted my new information regarding port 43 exit statistics, which
is just what I had hoped for. :-) I don't have responses for all of the
points raised in the followups so far, but I can comment on some of them.
Being familiar with ISP practice in this area, it is why you examine
the content and what you do with the knowledge of the content
observed, be it stored in your head or on disk, that matters.
It's pretty well established that one may monitor traffic in a
general way in order to figure out what's
On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 07:32:24PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> There are two categories to consider here: wiretapping and pen
> registers.
I should note that in the previous post I did that thing that EFF lawyers
always do that confuses people: I pretended there's only one country in
the worl
On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 03:51:25PM -0700, Kyle Williams wrote:
> I think "snooping" and "statistical information" should be treated
> differently. Take Scott's case here. He is making a claim that by using
> the exit policy outlined above, it would reduce the amount of traffic on tor
> by 70% or
Hello All
I am trying to use specific country selection in the torrc as per the
FAQs in the Tor website. The following is a snippet from my torrc
...
EntryNodes {us}
ExitNodes {us}
StrictEntryNode 1
StrictExitNode 1
However when I run tor - 0.2.1.15 with this configuration , I get the
foll
On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 3:28 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> grarpamp wrote:
> > 3 - Further, there needs to be an understanding of what the traffic
> > ACTUALLY IS. Operators should be using tools such as wireshark,
> > tcpdump, bro, etc to determine the content. And if it turns out to
> > be encrypt
grarpamp wrote:
> 3 - Further, there needs to be an understanding of what the traffic
> ACTUALLY IS. Operators should be using tools such as wireshark,
> tcpdump, bro, etc to determine the content. And if it turns out to
> be encrypted to destinations and services unknown, NO such determination
>
On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 03:11:39PM -0700, Kyle Williams wrote:
> It is a work in progress. Thank you for your feedback. This is meant to
> test all anonymity services, not just Tor.That is why I didn't bother to
> check to see if they are coming through a Tor router. I guess I could check
> that
It is a work in progress. Thank you for your feedback. This is meant to
test all anonymity services, not just Tor.That is why I didn't bother to
check to see if they are coming through a Tor router. I guess I could check
that if it would please more people.
- Kyle
2009/6/12 Matej Kovacic
> Hi
Hey Scott,
On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 9:29 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
> I replaced the "ExitPolicy accept *:43" in my torrc file with the
> following:
>
> ###---Limited list of allowed whois exit addresses
> ExitPolicy accept 192.103.19.12:43 # whois access to whois.6bone.net
> ExitPolicy acce
Hi,
if I go to the JanusVM deanonimyzer test without being connected through
Tor, the test passes (of course), but I get info, that I have very good
anonymizer service:
If you do not see your real IP address in the report, then CONGRATULATIONS!
This means that you have a very good anonymity servi
While node operators are certainly welcome to characterize and
define both traffic and policy as deemed fit for their own purposes...
I might suggest that node operators examine things more fully in
order to make better policy decisions overall.
1 - The use of any given TCP port alone is not suff
On 2009.06.11 15:19, Scott Bennett wrote:
> On Thu, 11 Jun 2009 21:23:33 +0200 Johannes Nitsche
> top-posted (please learn not to do that):
>
> >Thanks for all the answers.
> >It seems my view of what a bridge is was
> >wrong. I thought a bridge is a link point between tor nodes which
> >for
On 6/12/2009 3:29 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
> In other words, by restricting just port 43 exits to only the legitimate whois
> IP addresses, I eliminated at least 70% of *all* exits through my tor node,
> which suggests to me that the vast, overwhelming majority of exits from the
> tor network are i
On Fri, 12 Jun 2009 00:44:19 -0700 Kyle Williams
top-posted:
Please stop doing that. It is terribly rude.
>Got a couple of questions.
>
>- Have you looked deeper into the request for port 43, using tcpdump or
>Wireshark?
No, of course not!
>- Do you KNOW that it is a WHOIS requ
Hi Scott,
Got a couple of questions.
- Have you looked deeper into the request for port 43, using tcpdump or
Wireshark?
- Do you KNOW that it is a WHOIS request, not OpenVPN or something else
running on the WHOIS port?
- Have you logged what IP's are being connected to?
I just curious, as this s
A bit over a month ago, I posted here some exit statistics by port number.
One major oddity among them was the count of port 43 (whois) exits, which
seemed extraordinarily large, especially in relation to the counts for other,
more expectedly popular port numbers. Some of the comments I got i
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