I was thinking solely of taps capable of observing user1, user2...
usern.
If user1 injects 1.21 MB of data on one side, and 1.21 MB of data
pops out the other side at injection time + network delay, the users
are made. Regardless of whether the observer can see inside the
network/crypto or
On Thu, Sep 24, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
On Thu, Sep 24, 2009 at 09:02:05AM +0200, László Monda wrote:
I'd like to change exit nodes in every n secs in a way that I don't
want the same exit node to be repeated within m secs.
You want to do non-standard things
Hi Roger!
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009 01:34:19 -0400, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
I just hacked^Wconfigured majordomo to put a footer on every mail to
the list. We'll see if it works.
While you are at it maybe you can also fix something to eliminate
duplicate mails in the list? Sometimes
On the other hand, I do control a fair amount of infrastructure and
bandwidth in multiple locations ... so it's very tempting to leverage those
resources in a way that gives me tor-like anonymity, but without the
(sometimes terrible) speed and latency.
If you limit yourself to a small set
On Wed, Sep 23, 2009 at 11:12:07AM -0700, Jon McLachlan wrote:
*sigh*
See below :)
I did, but I don't get the sigh.
On Sep 23, 2009, at 8:29 AM, Paul Syverson wrote:
On Wed, Sep 23, 2009 at 11:11:29AM -0400, Praedor Atrebates wrote:
It would appear that the tor network should include
We run a private Tor-based network. Email Steve (sms@) or I for questions.
What we have contemplated is operating the exit nodes, and mixing into the
public Tor network for either the middle or both middle and entry nodes. You
could select high bandwidth middle-nodes for this, which would
grarpamp wrote:
[...] they knew they had to find and use some special interface to
subscribe. So why in the world would they think unsubscribing is any
different having already learned the former.
The thing is, sending a message like the one we saw does, practically
always, achieve the
Hello David,
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009, David Jevans wrote:
What we have contemplated is operating the exit nodes, and mixing into
the public Tor network for either the middle or both middle and entry
nodes. You could select high bandwidth middle-nodes for this, which
would give you reasonably
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009, Flamsmark wrote:
On Thu, 24 Sep 2009, Flamsmark wrote:
If you limit yourself to a small set of nodes, you
will definitely compromise your anonymity against a powerful attacker.
But
What would you (loosely) define as a small set of nodes vs. a large set
of
nodes ?
First, am I to understand that this list is referring specifically to ISPs
that allow exit nodes ? Presumably a relay node is not deteted and your
ISP does not care ...
https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/GoodBadISPs
One problem with this list, however, is that it deals
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