On 8/21/06, Michael Holstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If you're using TOR, you shouldn't be
using your name in the first place (what's the point of *anonymously*
identifying yourself?).
I know there are other arguments for TOR like defeating geolocation, but
if that's all you're after, there a
On Fri, Aug 18, 2006 at 08:49:07PM -0700, Anothony Georgeo wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I have been thinking about the issue of exit node
> operators and/or adversaries sniffing clear-text
> ingress/egress traffic locally and/or remotly on an
> exit node. I have a possible solution but I would
> like the Tor
> 4. A couple dozen _fast_ 24x7 exit nodes are run by
> trusted operators (read: known personally by Nick or
> Roger) on a local machine the operators control.
The $3_letter_agency would just *love* to have a dozen places (or 2
people) they already know about to serve the subpoenas.
> 7. All Tor
On Fri, 2006-08-18 at 20:49 -0700, Anothony Georgeo wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I have been thinking about the issue of exit node
> operators and/or adversaries sniffing clear-text
> ingress/egress traffic locally and/or remotly on an
> exit node. I have a possible solution but I would
> like the Tor devs.
Hi,
I have been thinking about the issue of exit node
operators and/or adversaries sniffing clear-text
ingress/egress traffic locally and/or remotly on an
exit node. I have a possible solution but I would
like the Tor devs. and experts here to weigh-in.
If this won't work feel free to ignore th
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