On 8/7/07, Frozen Flame [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hello, guys.
Hi!
Is anyone interested on the return of the hidden wiki?
Fire at will.
Alex.
--
I am tired of all this sort of thing called science here... We have spent
millions in that sort of thing for the last few years, and it is time it
On Wednesday 08 August 2007 22:59:56 Ringo Kamens wrote:
It's not the issue of a great wall attack where a person can't
access a public wiki with onion links, it's an issue of whether that
wiki could even exist. You'd have to crazy to host that on a public
machine.
Comrade Ringo Kamens
You
On 8/8/07, Ringo Kamens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I appreciate the concern, but I think that while freenet is a viable
option and certainly there should be a backup on it, tor users need a
central link cache (so they can use the tor hidden network). I think
that tor is the right network for
you'd have to have some method to prevent an attacker from simply
launching a massive amount of sites under this key to destroy it. 1000
fake sites would cause probably cause the load balancer to refer to
the fake sites the majority of the time, effectively take it off line.
The way we were
On 8/9/07, Ringo Kamens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The way we were describing, by giving trusted servers the private key
to make a redundant wiki system wouldn't have that problem unless on
of the trusted servers gave away the key or got taken over by an
adversary (police or what have you).
I just googled for raid over network, but I didn't find anything so
maybe I made it up? How about a
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storage_area_network? This still wouldn't
fix the problem of a server going to the dark side but it would
probably be a bit more practical. I have heard of YaCy which is
On 8/9/07, Ringo Kamens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I just googled for raid over network, but I didn't find anything so
maybe I made it up? How about a
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storage_area_network? This still wouldn't
fix the problem of a server going to the dark side but it would
probably
Hello all,
I've been watching this discussion with some interest. It's an
intriguing problem you are working on. Anyways, I was just wondering..
would it not be possible to use a custom configured/hacked version of
Freenet that the nodes were their own micro Freenet and not connected
to the
I think that a redundant system would be the best thing. The main
hidden wiki could contain script that backs the site up every X hours,
and anyone could download it and host anywhere.
Or, maybe, some more softsticated high availability system could run
on the background to host the same
I like the distributed private key idea. Each wiki copy would have a
separate email address so that if one server got compromised, the
operators could be informed and change the private key. My question
is: what would determine which server got chosen?
Comrade Ringo Kamens
On 8/8/07, Eduardo
On 8/8/07, Ringo Kamens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I like the distributed private key idea. Each wiki copy would have a
separate email address so that if one server got compromised, the
operators could be informed and change the private key. My question
is: what would determine which server got
I'm interested in testing this out with somebody. Until then, can any
devs/tor hackers enlighten us as to what would determine which host
gets picked? Would it be whoever is the fewest hops away? If so, one
host would get the most traffic if it was consistently closest to fast
servers.
Comrade
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi,
I like the distributed private key idea.
Yes, that's really a nice idea. And it might even work.
My question
is: what would determine which server got chosen?
I think that if two or more hidden services used the same private key,
thus
Perhaps instead of just making it redundant, they should shut off at
random times for random lengths (like 10 hours or less). From the way
I understand the attacks remaining against tor, this would make is
much more complicated to do a timing or deductive attack against the
hidden service even for
On Wednesday 08 August 2007 19:32:39 Ringo Kamens wrote:
I'm interested in testing this out with somebody. Until then, can any
devs/tor hackers enlighten us as to what would determine which host
gets picked? Would it be whoever is the fewest hops away? If so, one
host would get the most
Well I think that just through system-backups, maintenance, restarting
etc. that the descriptor upload times would be fairly random anyways,
especially if a random-turn-off function was implemented.
Comrade Ringo Kamens
On 8/8/07, Robert Hogan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wednesday 08 August 2007
Hello Karsten, Ringo and Eduardo,
Feel free to experiment, it's fun... But:
In my opinion it's MUCH easier to:
-have one well known hidden wiki
-have one or more well known backups of the hidden wiki, with the edit
function disabled
If the primary server is down, people can just go to a backup.
I appreciate the concern, but I think that while freenet is a viable
option and certainly there should be a backup on it, tor users need a
central link cache (so they can use the tor hidden network). I think
that tor is the right network for unbreakable hidden website,
especially if we use
It's not the issue of a great wall attack where a person can't
access a public wiki with onion links, it's an issue of whether that
wiki could even exist. You'd have to crazy to host that on a public
machine.
Comrade Ringo Kamens
On 8/8/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you use
Hello, guys. Is anyone interested on the return of the hidden wiki?
I've got a hidden service running idly for months, and with no chances of going
down so soon. The URL is http://5kj3bjvapz7pm3uv.onion/ and is now hosting only
an anarchism page for tests.
I think everybody is interested. The real solution is to use a
distributed system. Right before the fall of the hidden wiki, this had
started to happen. The hidden wiki linked to other wikis and they all
interlinked with eachother. As a result they all had the same links
and it was a lot more
If someone sets up a wiki, why does it have to be hidden?
Is it illegal in any country to have a web page with .onion links and
text?
But anyway, it might be good to have Tor encryption the whole way from
client to server.
As some volunteer most likely will set up a hidden wiki, I have a
22 matches
Mail list logo
