Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-06-01 Thread John Pluffum
Paul Syverson wrote: > On Wed, May 30, 2007 at 02:46:20AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote: > >> Thus spake Paul Syverson ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): >> >> ... I don't understand a single bit of mathematics in this paper. Although one symbol looks like Integration function. Damn.. why ar

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-06-01 Thread Paul Syverson
On Wed, May 30, 2007 at 02:46:20AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote: > Thus spake Paul Syverson ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > > > Anyway, the main reason I'm writing is that my objection was not just > > that the GPA was too strong but that it was too weak. Thinking you > > could have an adversary powerful enough

RE: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-30 Thread Tony
.mspx Regards, Tony. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Eugen Leitl Sent: Wed 30/05/2007 13:57 To: or-talk@freehaven.net Subject: Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries On Tue, May 29, 2007 at 01:36:03PM +0100, Tony wrote: > Windows

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-30 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Tue, May 29, 2007 at 01:36:03PM +0100, Tony wrote: > Windows has offered over 10 Gigabit throughput on a workstation (running > Windows Server 2003) since 2005... > > http://www.amd.com/us-en/assets/content_type/DownloadableAssets/AMD_10_GbE_Performance_Paper_August05.pdf Totally different

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-30 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake Paul Syverson ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > Anyway, the main reason I'm writing is that my objection was not just > that the GPA was too strong but that it was too weak. Thinking you > could have an adversary powerful enough to monitor all the links > necessary to watch your whole large networ

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-29 Thread Paul Syverson
On Mon, May 28, 2007 at 04:23:51AM -0700, coderman wrote: > On 5/28/07, Steven Murdoch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >... > >I do think that a global passive adversary is stronger than the real > >world situation. For example, such an adversary could read traffic > >between two computers in my offic

RE: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-29 Thread Tony
] on behalf of Eugen Leitl Sent: Mon 28/05/2007 21:22 To: or-talk@freehaven.net Subject: Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries On Mon, May 28, 2007 at 04:23:51AM -0700, coderman wrote: > ah, agreed; i was unaware of such a myth, and the thought of someone > try

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-28 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Mon, May 28, 2007 at 04:23:51AM -0700, coderman wrote: > ah, agreed; i was unaware of such a myth, and the thought of someone > trying to inspect 10GigE with a workstation and wireshark is comical. Solaris 10 TCP/IP stack rewrite claims 10 GBit/s throughput, but I have not seen this independen

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-28 Thread coderman
On 5/28/07, Steven Murdoch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... I do think that a global passive adversary is stronger than the real world situation. For example, such an adversary could read traffic between two computers in my office, which I suspect is outside of the NSA's capabilities, unless I were

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-28 Thread Steven Murdoch
On Mon, May 28, 2007 at 03:36:05AM -0700, coderman wrote: > you state "an assumption that the global passive adversary is > unrealistic". is this really true in anonymity research circles? The convention in anonymity research is to assume a global passive adversary, since then any system shown to

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-28 Thread coderman
On 5/28/07, coderman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... is the assumption that inspection at OC/WDM layers is too cumbersome/expensive for all but the previously mentioned TLA/$gov adversaries? one more comment that ties into your mention PCIe bus limitations. previous research on monitoring high s

Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

2007-05-28 Thread coderman
On 5/28/07, Steven Murdoch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... an experiment to establish how diverse the topology of the Tor network is -- an important component of how secure it is against traffic analysis. ... I've now finished the draft version of the resulting paper... http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/