F. Fox([EMAIL PROTECTED])@Sun, Sep 07, 2008 at 06:27:08PM -0700:
> Bill Weiss wrote:
> (snip)
> > My Tor node runs a medium-load mail server as well, and I've never been
> > blacklisted for spam stuff [1]. That seems like a decent indication of it
> > not causing problems given how rabid the anti-
As someone involved heavily in IRC and the running of several IRC networks,
I think the primary reason most networks use random blacklists for tor
(there are several, some better than others in terms of operating properly)
is the unusual format of the official dnsel (
https://www.torproject.org/tor
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Bill Weiss wrote:
(snip)
> My Tor node runs a medium-load mail server as well, and I've never been
> blacklisted for spam stuff [1]. That seems like a decent indication of it
> not causing problems given how rabid the anti-spam people can get.
>
>
[EMAIL PROTECTED]([EMAIL PROTECTED])@Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 04:14:17PM -0400:
> On Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 08:25:20AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 1.5K bytes
> in 37 lines about:
> : -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> : Supposedly, one of the exit node operators is going to try opening
> : 465/587
On Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 08:25:20AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 1.5K bytes in
37 lines about:
: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
: Supposedly, one of the exit node operators is going to try opening
: 465/587 where he hasn't done so before.
I've done it. So far, no complaints.
--
Andrew
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Roger Dingledine wrote:
I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
again. The following rules are in the default exit policy and I can't
see any reason why they would be:
reject *:465
reject *:58
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Supposedly, one of the exit node operators is going to try opening
465/587 where he hasn't done so before.
I'm all for opening 465/587 by default, but I also understand the
concern of exit operators that there may be a significant number of
(perhaps
Roger Dingledine([EMAIL PROTECTED])@Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 12:36:47AM -0400:
> On Sun, Aug 31, 2008 at 04:32:29PM +0100, Dawney Smith wrote:
> > Dawney Smith wrote:
> >
> > >> I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
> > >> again. The following rules are in the default ex
Scríobh John Brooks:
But it is worth noting that ISPs often are very unfriendly to spam. I've
received several abuse notifications from my dedi's ISP due to tor exit
traffic, all of it because of outgoing spam using insecure webmail
services (where my node's IP shows up in the headers as origin
But it is worth noting that ISPs often are very unfriendly to spam. I've
received several abuse notifications from my dedi's ISP due to tor exit
traffic, all of it because of outgoing spam using insecure webmail services
(where my node's IP shows up in the headers as originating IP). I imagine
they
On Sun, Aug 31, 2008 at 04:32:29PM +0100, Dawney Smith wrote:
> Dawney Smith wrote:
>
> >> I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
> >> again. The following rules are in the default exit policy and I can't
> >> see any reason why they would be:
> >>
> >> reject *:465
>
On Sun, Aug 31, 2008 at 04:32:29PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 0.9K bytes in
29 lines about:
: >> reject *:465
: >> reject *:587
: So is there going to be a change to the default Exit Policy?
The unofficial answer is that we're not going to change the default exit
policy to open these ports, y
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Dawney Smith wrote:
>> I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
>> again. The following rules are in the default exit policy and I can't
>> see any reason why they would be:
>
>> reject *:465
>> reject *:587
>
> Just so p
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Dawney Smith wrote:
> I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
> again. The following rules are in the default exit policy and I can't
> see any reason why they would be:
>
> reject *:465
> reject *:587
Just so people kno
Am 20.08.2008 um 19:58 schrieb Dawney Smith:
The only reason that your 10.100.145.215 IP appears in the headers
there
is because your email client sends it. Your email client doesn't
need to
send it, and as someone else mentioned, it's "scrubbed" if you're
using
TorButton with Thunderbir
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On 20/08/08 19:04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Sorry, I didn't get it: in case I'm using Thunderbird and Torbutton, and
> connect to the smtp server trough tor. Will my "real" ip adress occur in
> the mail headers, or the ip of the exit node?
>
> I'm g
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Sven Anderson wrote:
>> Sorry, I didn't get it: in case I'm using Thunderbird and Torbutton,
>> and connect to the smtp server trough tor. Will my "real" ip adress
>> occur in the mail headers, or the ip of the exit node?
>>
>> I'm guessing the ip of
Am 20.08.2008 um 19:04 schrieb [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Sorry, I didn't get it: in case I'm using Thunderbird and Torbutton,
and connect to the smtp server trough tor. Will my "real" ip adress
occur in the mail headers, or the ip of the exit node?
I'm guessing the ip of the exit node, right? Beca
Quoting 7v5w7go9ub0o <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
anonym wrote:
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On 20/08/08 15:42, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
anonym wrote:
Email clients leak tons of information, the most critical I know of
being your IP address and/or host in the EHLO/HELO in the beginning
o
anonym wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 20/08/08 15:42, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
>> anonym wrote:
>>> Email clients leak tons of information, the most critical I know of
>>> being your IP address and/or host in the EHLO/HELO in the beginning
>>> of the SMTP(S) transaction
anonym wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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>
> On 20/08/08 15:42, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
>> anonym wrote:
>>> Email clients leak tons of information, the most critical I know of
>>> being your IP address and/or host in the EHLO/HELO in the beginning
>>> of the SMTP(S) transaction
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On 20/08/08 15:42, 7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
> anonym wrote:
>> Email clients leak tons of information, the most critical I know of
>> being your IP address and/or host in the EHLO/HELO in the beginning
>> of the SMTP(S) transaction.
>
> Nope.
>
> The encry
anonym wrote:
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On 19/08/08 17:46, Dawney Smith wrote:
I have a *lot* of experience with email administration on a very large
scale, I know what I'm talking about.
I'm sure you do. I'd love to have email work flawlessly and securly with
Tor, so open
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On 20/08/08 14:02, Dawney Smith wrote:
> anonym wrote:
>> I'm sure you do. I'd love to have email work flawlessly and securly with
>> Tor, so opening ports 465 and 587 would be great (currently I do have
>> problems since there's few exit nodes which d
On Wed, 20 Aug 2008 11:34:41 +0100 Dawney Smith
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
>
>>> There is a clear misunderstanding of the issue at hand by many people
>>> here. The exit policy was put in place to prevent connections between
>>> Tor users and the last hop (the end MX serve
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anonym wrote:
>> I have a *lot* of experience with email administration on a very large
>> scale, I know what I'm talking about.
>
> I'm sure you do. I'd love to have email work flawlessly and securly with
> Tor, so opening ports 465 and 587 would be
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On 19/08/08 17:46, Dawney Smith wrote:
> I have a *lot* of experience with email administration on a very large
> scale, I know what I'm talking about.
I'm sure you do. I'd love to have email work flawlessly and securly with
Tor, so opening ports 465
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7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:
>> There is a clear misunderstanding of the issue at hand by many people
>> here. The exit policy was put in place to prevent connections between
>> Tor users and the last hop (the end MX server), *not* to prevent
>> connections be
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For what it's worth, I second Dawn's position on this issue - it could
be very useful to allow 465 and 587 by default.
Indeed, many users have stopped using Gmail because of the privacy
policies; however depending on the purpose of a particular nym,
Dawney Smith wrote:
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krishna e bera wrote:
I'm not clear on how authentication (on any port) stops spam,
other than the ISP cutting off a given userid after complaints.
A lot of spam already comes from malware infected computers
via their legitimat
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krishna e bera wrote:
> I'm not clear on how authentication (on any port) stops spam,
> other than the ISP cutting off a given userid after complaints.
> A lot of spam already comes from malware infected computers
> via their legitimately configured
I'm not clear on how authentication (on any port) stops spam,
other than the ISP cutting off a given userid after complaints.
A lot of spam already comes from malware infected computers
via their legitimately configured email.
Those computers are probably not using Tor, let alone transparent proxy
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Dominik Schaefer wrote:
>> Those are ports used for mail submission, not for mail relay. They wont
>> be abused by spammers. ISPs often block their consumer broadband users
>> from connecting to port 25 on servers outside of their network, to
>> preve
Dawney Smith schrieb:
> Those are ports used for mail submission, not for mail relay. They wont
> be abused by spammers. ISPs often block their consumer broadband users
> from connecting to port 25 on servers outside of their network, to
> prevent spam. They don't block 465 and 587, because they're
Hi,
one question related to the port 465/587 thread.
Could it be useful to open at least the ports for mixmaster remailers,
capable of submission via TLS, SSL connections or SMTP (2525)?
reject private:*
# drooper.mixmin.net (banana)
accept 88.198.22.131:587
accept 88.198.22.131:2525
accept 88.1
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xiando wrote:
>> I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
>> again. The following rules are in the default exit policy and I can't
>> see any reason why they would be:
>>
>> reject *:465
>> reject *:587
>
> Are you absolut
> I know this has been discussed before, but I thought I'd bring it up
> again. The following rules are in the default exit policy and I can't
> see any reason why they would be:
>
> reject *:465
> reject *:587
Are you absolutely positivily sure that you can not misconfigure e-mail MTAs
who use s
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