Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread Erilenz
* on the Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 12:08:10PM -0500, Marcus Griep wrote: Yes, they should. However, just because people shouldn't be doing something doesn't mean you should ignore the fact that they are. Responding to a deficiency in an area which Tor does not attempt to solve is a poor use of

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread Jim
Tim Wilde wrote: On 11/18/2009 4:17 AM, Jim wrote: Google was actually the motivating factor in causing me to get serious about overcoming whatever problem I had when I first tried to use Tor. Although my concern at the time was more the ubiquity of google-analytics. But still concerned

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread Andrew Lewman
On 11/19/2009 04:47 AM, Erilenz wrote: That's fine, as long as you're assuming that people only use Tor when they need strong anonymity. As soon as you realise that people who don't need strong anonymity are using it as well, your point fails. Whether or not they *should* be doing so is

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread Erilenz
* on the Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 07:43:01AM -0500, Andrew Lewman wrote: That's fine, as long as you're assuming that people only use Tor when they need strong anonymity. As soon as you realise that people who don't need strong anonymity are using it as well, your point fails. Whether or not

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread Brian Mearns
On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 11:46 AM, Erilenz eril...@gmail.com wrote: * on the Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 07:43:01AM -0500, Andrew Lewman wrote: That's fine, as long as you're assuming that people only use Tor when they need strong anonymity. As soon as you realise that people who don't need strong

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread Flamsmark
My question is: do you really think it would help? If people are using Tor inappropriately (meaning they could get what they want with a simple anonymous proxy), what are the chances they're going to have it configured appropriately to reduce the bandwidth they use? I don't want to weigh in

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-19 Thread krishna e bera
On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 11:46:12AM -0500, Erilenz wrote: This is one of those ideal/practical arguments. Idealistically, Tor would only have 3 hop circuits and those who want simple circumvention wouldn't use it. That doesn't make it the practical truth of what is happening though. Even if

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-18 Thread Jim
Gregory Maxwell wrote: There are a great many people who have merely encountered one too many examples of the ubiquitious tracking on the Internet. For example, Google's abuse of JS fake out the link target display and intercept outbound links on search has been driving me nuts lately as it

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-18 Thread Erilenz
* on the Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 03:26:10PM +0100, Georg Sluyterman wrote: The following occured to me. Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis by very technical adversaries. There are many use cases where that level of protection isn't required. In those cases, if there was a

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-18 Thread Tim Wilde
On 11/18/2009 4:17 AM, Jim wrote: Google was actually the motivating factor in causing me to get serious about overcoming whatever problem I had when I first tried to use Tor. Although my concern at the time was more the ubiquity of google-analytics. But still concerned about using their

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-18 Thread Erilenz
* on the Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 09:03:42AM -0500, Andrew Lewman wrote: On 11/17/2009 08:57 AM, Erilenz wrote: The following occured to me. Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis by very technical adversaries. There are many use cases where that level of protection isn't

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-18 Thread Marcus Griep
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:48 AM, Erilenz eril...@gmail.com wrote: * on the Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 09:03:42AM -0500, Andrew Lewman wrote: On 11/17/2009 08:57 AM, Erilenz wrote: The following occured to me. Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis by very technical

Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-17 Thread Erilenz
The following occured to me. Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis by very technical adversaries. There are many use cases where that level of protection isn't required. In those cases, if there was a config option to reduce the number of hops in a circuit to 2 (or possibly even

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-17 Thread Georg Sluyterman
Erilenz wrote, On 2009-11-17 14:57: The following occured to me. Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis by very technical adversaries. There are many use cases where that level of protection isn't required. In those cases, if there was a config option to reduce the number of

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-17 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 9:03 AM, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.org wrote: People who don't want strong anonymity should use VPNS, single-hop proxy providers, or setup an ssh tunnel somewhere. I thought there were plans to offer officially offer a length-two mode? In particular the current

Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth

2009-11-17 Thread Brian Mearns
On Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 8:57 AM, Erilenz eril...@gmail.com wrote: The following occured to me. Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis by very technical adversaries. There are many use cases where that level of protection isn't required. In those cases, if there was a config