On Wed, 25 Nov 2009 16:30 -0500, Xinwen Fu xinwe...@gmail.com wrote:
I guess the approach will not be quite useful.
1. Delay is a big enemy of Tor. Read
http://www.cs.uml.edu/%7Exinwenfu/paper/IPDPS08_Fu.pdf. How much delay is
a
problem too.
2. An attack can be dynamic against your
Most timing attacks require global adversary like a government or ISP since
the attacker wants to find out two parties communicating with each other.
Our attacks have that constraint.
For parameters of the attack in 2, the paper has Lemma 1 for that. That is,
the signal to noise ratio affects the
Hello,
As the recent (and not so recent) research shows [1, 2], it is quite
possible for a low-bandwidth adversary controlling the exit node or
destination server to identify all the nodes in a circuit. If the victim
is unlucky, the further deanonymization may use a malicious entry node.
I guess the approach will not be quite useful.
1. Delay is a big enemy of Tor. Read
http://www.cs.uml.edu/%7Exinwenfu/paper/IPDPS08_Fu.pdf. How much delay is a
problem too.
2. An attack can be dynamic against your mechanism by varying the parameters
of the attack. We already tested the impact of
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