Hes still a fat little kid.
-Bruce
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20060812.HEZ12/TPStory/
>From 'fat little kid' to Israel's worst nightmare
PATRICK MARTIN explains why Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's star just
keeps on rising
PATRICK MARTIN
BEIRUT -- To Israel and many in the West, he's public enemy No. 1, head of
an organization that U.S. President George W. Bush says is on "the A-team of
terrorists," the man running what Israelis call a "state within a state" in
Lebanon, and posing a constant threat to Israel.
But to most Lebanese, and many in the Arab world, Hassan Nasrallah is an
Islamic hero, a modern-day Saladin, vanquishing Israelis and galvanizing the
public in a manner reminiscent of Egypt's much-beloved Gamal Abdel Nasser.
The reality, of course, is more complicated.
Hassan Nasrallah's declared goal is to rid Lebanon of all Israeli presence
and to work within the Lebanese political system to advance the cause of his
largely impoverished Shia people. (Although he clearly dreams of doing much
more: of taking the Islamic campaign to Jerusalem one day, of ridding the
region of Israel, of opposing the United States at every turn.)
His tactics are both military and political; his power derives from his
movement's successes and from his personal charisma and shrewd planning. To
many, he epitomizes what an Arab leader should be at this volatile time in
the Middle East.
The question is: Will he limit his ambitions to Lebanon and work within the
system, or will he use his phenomenal new clout to advance some larger
cause? No one knows for sure, but hints of what he may do can be found in
his past.
Israelis probably don't realize it, but a bomb they dropped in the first
hours of the current conflict fell within a few hundred metres of Mr.
Nasrallah's birthplace.
Carantina, a scattering of warehouses and a small Lebanese army base, sits
just inland from the industrial port of east Beirut. In 1960, it was the
site of a sprawling camp for displaced Lebanese, mostly Christian Armenians
and Shia Muslims. A few of the camp's three-storey, cinder-block residences
still stand (now they house soldiers), and in one of them Hassan Nasrallah
was born that year, the first of nine children.
Khalid Mustafa, who still lives a few blocks away, remembers "the fat little
kid" who sat in front of him in Grade 4 at the camp's primary school. "He
was one of those kids who always wanted to sit at the front of the class.
"I remember he wore the same outfit to school every day, but it was always
clean," Mr. Mustafa says. "He was always polite and loved to read. My mother
told me to be his friend, hoping it would help me get good grades.
"It didn't. The next year, Hassan skipped a grade, and I stayed behind."
Sheik Rida Farhat, imam of the Naaba mosque in the nearby neighbourhood of
Bourj Hamoud, says the young Hassan came to pray regularly at the mosque,
when Sheik Rida's grandfather was the imam. "All the religious boys from the
camp came here," he says.
The 30-year-old imam claims to have great respect for Sayyed Hassan
("Sayyed" means "master"), but he doesn't always agree with everything
Hezbollah does. "I agree with about 90 per cent of their policies," he says,
declining to elaborate.
Across the street at a tiny dress shop, none of the women in the store
realizes that Mr. Nasrallah was born nearby, but the wall behind the young
clerk is papered with his picture, along with those of the late Iranian
Ayatollah Khomeini, Musa Sadr, Lebanon's "vanished imam," and Hezbollah's
spiritual leader, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah -- a veritable Shia hall of
fame.
"We love him," gushes the woman behind the counter. Of all the leaders,
"Sayyed Hassan is the greatest," insists a customer named Mahr, "because he
is on the ground with us."
In 1975, civil war disrupted the relative harmony of Bourj Hamoud, as the
more established Christians turned on their Shia neighbours. Hassan, then
15, and his family fled to the south of the country, to their ancestral home
in the village of Bassouriyeh, near Tyre.
The following year, he finished secondary school and, having impressed a
local religious scholar, was sent off to Najaf in southern Iraq, where he
entered the famous Hawza, or Shia seminary. It was there he met Abbas
al-Musawi, the fellow Lebanese who would later precede him as Hezbollah's
secretary-general.
Forced by Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq, both men returned to Lebanon, where
Hassan took up residence in Beirut's southern suburbs, known as the Dahiyeh.
At 19, he married Fatima Yassin, who was from another southern village, and
the couple had four children.
The galvanizing moment in the young clerical student's life came in 1982,
when Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to eliminate militants operating
from what Israelis then called the Palestine Liberation Organization's
"state within a state" in southern Lebanon. Hassan was only 21.
Shiites didn't much like the PLO either, finding themselves pushed around by
the relatively powerful refugee militia. But most believed that Israel's
continued presence in their country was far worse.
Amid the civil war that broke out, a series of kidnappings and suicide
bombings in Beirut carried out from 1982 to 1985 by an assortment of upstart
groups, mostly supported by Syria, succeeded in driving out U.S. and French
troops, and confining Israeli forces to the south of the country.
It is unclear whether Hezbollah as a group existed at that time. Certainly,
many of those responsible for the attacks would later end up in the
movement.
According to Judith Palmer Harik, a retired professor at the American
University in Beirut and author of Hezbollah: The Changing Face of
Terrorism, Hassan Nasrallah was part of Hezbollah's inner circle, the majlis
a-shura, from its official beginning in 1984 or 1985.
The organization's hit-and-run tactics and suicide bombings drove the
Israelis farther south, and in about 1987 (accounts vary), he resumed his
religious studies in the Iranian holy city, Qom, where he is said also to
have acted as Hezbollah's link to Iran's religious establishment.
His return, two years later, coincided with a split developing inside
Hezbollah just as Arab states were attempting to help end Lebanon's civil
war after almost 15 years.
Accounts again vary, but, according to Ms. Harik, the organization's first
secretary-general, Subhi Tufeili, a fiery leader from the Bekaa Valley who
was close to Syria and to the most radical Iranian activists, adamantly
opposed any form of co-operation with the "apostate" government in Beirut.
Others in the shura, including Mr. Nasrallah, and Sheik Fadlallah, the
Hezbollah spiritual guide, realized that some co-operation was required to
guarantee their organization's survival.
Matters came to a head in 1991 after the civil war had ended and the Arab
countries' Taif Accord had called for the disbanding of all Lebanese
militias. Sheik Tufeili was voted out of office (fearing for his life, he
later went into hiding) and replaced by Mr. Nasrallah's old seminary friend,
Abbas al-Musawi, who had commanded Hezbollah's resistance.
A year later, Sheik Musawi was assassinated by Israeli helicopter gunships,
and the torch was passed to a 31-year-old Hassan Nasrallah.
Sayyed Hassan, as he soon came to be called, was nothing if not pragmatic.
Rather than shunning the government, he decided that Hezbollah should become
active in politics. The organization mounted a campaign in the 1992
parliamentary elections, capitalizing on its leadership of the resistance
movement with posters that depicted suicide bombers and read: "They resist
with their blood. Resist with your vote." That year, it won 12 of the 128
seats, and last year led a bloc that captured 30 seats, earning two spots at
the cabinet table.
Using funds mostly from Iran, Mr. Nasrallah also launched reconstruction
programs throughout the parts of south Lebanon not occupied by Israel and
opened schools and hospitals in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
All the while, his militia kept up a relentless campaign against Israeli
forces and their South Lebanese Army allies.
In 1993, and again in 1996, Mr. Nasrallah oversaw Hezbollah's first formal
agreements with Israel (arrived at through U.S. intermediaries) that had
both sides agree not to fire on each other's civilian populations and not to
cross the "blue line," which separate Lebanon from Israel, according to a
1949 truce that has largely been respected over the years.
And through it all, Sayyed Hassan's popularity rose.
People liked his round, youthful face and warm, personal style. He likes to
joke and laugh during his speeches, says Amal Saad Ghorayeb, a professor at
Lebanese American University and author of Hizbullah: Politics and Religion,
and he mixes both classical and colloquial Arabic "to appeal to the widest
possible following."
That following reached almost cult status in 1999, according to Ms.
Ghorayeb, when his eldest son, Hadi, 18, was killed in fighting with Israeli
troops in the security zone. "Nasrallah didn't make a big fuss about it,"
she says. "He told people his son had died a martyr, and even refused to ask
the Israelis for the return of his body.
"People were very impressed with how he handled himself and with his obvious
commitment to the cause."
While Sayyed Hassan is, technically, not Hezbollah's ultimate decision-maker
-- he must answer to the inner council -- and while the organization is
officially supposed to limit its secretaries-general to one four-year term
in office, he has been re-elected three times, an obvious recognition of his
personal appeal and a reflection of his personal power.
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 gave him his greatest source of
pride -- his resistance movement had defeated the mighty Israelis.
Ironically, it also became perhaps his greatest cause for concern. Absent
the Israeli occupation, Hezbollah's raison d'être, could the organization
survive?
By all accounts, Mr. Nasrallah played things shrewdly.
Recognizing the growing support within Lebanon for disarming Hezbollah, he
came up with a new target to liberate: the Shebaa Farms. Until 2000, few
people had ever heard of the tiny plot of land (about 50 square kilometres)
on the west side of Mount Hermon.
The area had been captured by Israel in fighting with Syria in 1967 and,
while some Lebanese citizens may have owned property there, United Nations
maps clearly state that it is sovereign Syrian territory, occupied by Israel
(along with the nearby Golan Heights.)
That didn't prevent Mr. Nasrallah from using it to justify continuing the
resistance.
In addition, he began to identify Hezbollah with the Palestinians' struggle
against Israel, a not-so-subtle bid to dissuade Lebanese authorities from
pressing him to lay down his arms.
As well, Sayyed Hassan threw his political wing more deeply into Lebanese
politics, winning the two places at the cabinet table last year that give
him a voice in what happens to his movement.
Through it all, he was able to claim that his militia, growing ever stronger
in weaponry and training (both from Iran) and in defensive fortifications,
was Lebanon's greatest deterrent against Israel.
He even oversaw the kidnapping of a shady Israeli businessman who was
quietly visiting Beirut. He was exchanged for several Lebanese prisoners
held by Israel, including prominent religious figures, and the bodies of
Hezbollah fighters (that of his own son very likely among them).
All this gave him enough clout to hold off a campaign to have him disarm,
even after 2004, when the UN Security Council passed its Resolution 1559
calling for all militias to do so. He persuaded the Lebanese government not
to force the issue as long as Hezbollah made reconstruction of the state its
priority.
Meanwhile, with the global war on terror leading to the invasion of Iraq,
Mr. Nasrallah warned of another danger to the region and ultimately to his
movement: the U.S. plan to reshape the Middle East.
While no friend of Saddam Hussein, who had killed thousands of his fellow
Shiites, Mr. Nasrallah believed that a U.S. occupation of Iraq would be
worse. Its goal, he said in 2003, is to "tear the region apart, fracture it
into weak petty states fighting each other in the shadow of [U.S.] military
bases spread throughout the region."
He warned Iraqi Shia leaders who were encouraging U.S. intervention that
they were making a terrible mistake.
And, in a prescient speech just days before the 2003 invasion, he warned the
United States: "Do not expect the people of this region to welcome you with
roses, flowers, rice and perfume. [They] will receive you with guns, blood,
weapons and martyrdom operations."
With such a world view, and with increasing U.S. pressure, it was hardly
surprising that he also said in 2003 that it would be tantamount to suicide
for Hezbollah to lay down its arms.
The assassination last year of influential former Lebanese prime minister
Rafik Hariri intensified efforts to implement both of Resolution 1559's main
objectives: the withdrawal of Syrian forces (widely believed to have been
responsible for Mr. Hariri's killing) from Lebanon and the disarming of
Hezbollah.
So, Sayyed Hassan focused on the domestic front.
He first mounted a million-strong rally in support of Syria, rivalling a
subsequent march by those opposed to Damascus's role in Lebanon, then he won
the cabinet seats, and finally forged a pact with Nabih Berri, who leads
another Shia party, Amal and holds the powerful position of speaker of the
assembly.
This spring, Mr. Nasrallah also signed a remarkable memorandum of
understanding with Christian political leader Michel Aoun, the former head
of the Lebanese army and, very possibly, Lebanon's next president.
The pact with a Christian leader is not entirely out of character. The
Hezbollah leader uses every opportunity to reach beyond his own
constituency, lacing his speeches and televised interviews with biblical
references and reassurances that he would never encourage sectarian policies
or practices.
The big question, however, remains: Does he have plans for more than just a
role in Lebanon's future, with or without a militia? Is his dream an Islamic
state?
He, like Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Sheik Fadlallah, has always denied
wanting to turn Lebanon into an Islamic state, and his agreement with
General Aoun would seem to rule that out. The general certainly thinks so.
"Hezbollah must be a part of the power in Lebanon," he has said. That's all.
Some of Mr. Nasrallah's criticism of other Islamist groups and their
activities may be illustrative of his own philosophy.
The Taliban, for example, turned Afghanistan into "a hideous example of an
Islamic state," he told an interviewer this year. It was "the worst, the
most dangerous thing that this Islamic revival has encountered."
And the decision by al-Qaeda in 2004 to behead Nicholas Berg, the U.S.
businessman kidnapped in Iraq, was a "despicable act" that did "grave damage
to Islam and the Muslims," he said
He also told The Washington Post's Robin Wright, author of a forthcoming
book on Islamic groups, that he condemned most of al-Qaeda's practices,
particularly its attack on the World Trade Center five years ago.
"What do the people who worked in those two towers, along with thousands of
employees, women and men, have to do with war that is taking place in the
Middle East? Or the war that Mr. George Bush may wage on people in the
Islamic world?" he asked. (The attack on Pentagon, a military target, was a
bit less of a problem: "We neither favoured nor opposed that act.")
As for Israel, however, desperate times appear to call for more desperate
measures, he says. In general, "women and children need to be avoided," he
told Ms. Wright, but there may be exceptions, such as an attack this year by
Islamic Jihad, another Iran-backed group. "It came after more than two
months of daily Israeli killing of Palestinians, and the destruction of
houses and schools, and the siege that is imposed on the Palestinians. There
is no other means for the Palestinians to defend themselves. That is why I
cannot condemn this type of operation in occupied Palestine."
Occupied Palestine? Indeed, when Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon in
2000, Mr. Nasrallah declared, "We have liberated the south. Next, we'll
liberate Jerusalem."
So, which Mr. Nasrallah will emerge after this conflict is over? And where
will his ambition lie? Has he been chastened by this unexpectedly ferocious
Israeli campaign?
Not necessarily.
A month ago, Hezbollah was the target of growing criticism within Lebanon
for its continued militarization, and Sayyed Hassan had presented a paper on
how his militia might be folded into the Lebanese army. His chief patron,
Iran, was being widely condemned and faced the prospect of international
sanctions over its decision to process weapons-grade nuclear material.
Syria, Hezbollah's secondary supporter, had been ostracized for its possible
role in the Hariri assassination.
Then on July 12, after 10 years of abiding by its commitment not to attack
inside Israel, Hezbollah crossed the blue line and kidnapped some Israeli
soldiers.
Sayyed Hassan had told his people repeatedly that this would be the "year of
the prisoner," that the two or three Lebanese still held in Israeli jails
would be returned. And Hezbollah had conducted prisoner exchanges in the
past. But crossing the line elicited a response from Israel that Mr.
Nasrallah claims he never would have anticipated.
And yet Hezbollah's defences have held, its political stock has soared and
he has emerged a hero.
There's no more talk in Lebanon of disarming Hezbollah, only of
incorporating it in the army. And the most likely scenario, when the UN
eventually implements its Security Council resolutions, will be the return
of Hezbollah's many reserve fighters to their homes in the south with,
rather like Israel's reserves, their guns tucked under the bed.
Meanwhile, Israel and the "moderate" Arab governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Jordan are terrified of what lessons people may draw from this.
A month ago today, when reports that Israelis had been abducted reached UN
headquarters in Beirut, a high-level official telephoned a ranking Hezbollah
officer to ask what was going on.
Informed that the reports were quite true, the diplomat replied: "Are you
crazy? Do you know what you've done?"
Somewhere in the southern suburbs of Beirut, as he packed up his office to
move to a safer location, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah probably knew exactly what
he had done.
Patrick Martin, The Globe and Mail's Comment editor and a former Middle East
correspondent, recently returned to report on the conflict in the region.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL
PROTECTED]
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.intellnet.org
Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com
Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods,
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,'
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml
Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
