"I went out on an operation, I killed 27 [insurgents] in October,"
said Army Lt. Col. Ross Brown, squadron commander in the 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment. "All they do is fill their spaces with more people;
they have an infinite supply of replacements. We kill a leader or we
detain a leader, and there is somebody else in charge. Every time I
feel good about killing or detaining this guy, there is somebody else
to fill the boots, somebody is standing right behind ready to jump up."
Brown says the 2003 decision to disband the Iraqi military freed up
trained soldiers, leaders and intelligence gatherers to join the
insurgency.
"The guy who was in the army and has five kids, who trained in the
army for 20 years — this is what he knows," Brown said. "If you pay me
$300 to blow up a Bradley, and I trained my whole life to blow up
Bradleys, sooner or later I'm going to blow up a Bradley."
"Funk said the insurgent leadership is mostly former Iraqi military
officers, well-educated and affluent. "They attach themselves to
Zarqawi because of the money. They figure if they're going to attack
Americans anyway, why not get financed for it?"


In "The Mess" (post 65756) the strategic and theater failures were
outlined.  This article describes the results of those bad decisions
from disbanding the Iraq army (providing trained leaders and skilled
technical people) to failure to protect and upgrade the civil
infrastructure (unemployed angry and willing insurgent recruits). 
With endless supplies of both arms and manpower and plenty of expert
leadership, it is no wonder the Iraqi insurgency is able to shrug off
losses, grow in capability and rapidly adapt to any U.S. change in
tactics.  Inadvertently, we have been training a very expert, combat
capable insurgency in the best classroom available: the street.

David Bier

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1484873&C=thisweek

Posted 02/20/06 10:14

 Iraqi Insurgents Find Ways To Bounce Back

By GREG GRANT


After U.S. special forces killed the Palestinian-born terrorist Abu
Azzam in September, U.S. President George W. Bush hailed the death of
the "second-most-wanted al-Qaida leader in Iraq," and said it showed
that the Iraq insurgency was weakening.

But a U.S. Army intelligence officer who tracked al-Qaida fighters in
Baghdad said the removal of high-profile insurgent leaders has little
effect on the overall insurgency, and the terrorist network soon
recovered.

"When they got Abu Azzam, we saw a fairly good disruption — for maybe
three weeks," Capt. David Conkle said in a December interview.

The resiliency of Iraq's insurgent networks are troubling the U.S.
military, more than two and a half years after the invasion. According
to figures released by Multi National Forces-Iraq, 24,470 suspected
insurgents were killed or detained in 2004, and 26,500 in 2005. Still,
the insurgency remains a potent fighting force; during January, it
launched 433 attacks across Iraq.

"We take a lot of people off the streets, but they can regenerate very
rapidly," said Army Col. Edward Cardon, who commanded a brigade in
Baghdad as part of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division. "The insurgent
networks are complex and diffuse. We can take out the leadership, but
it doesn't take long for them to grow new legs."

Iraqis' anger about the U.S. occupation helps the insurgents recruit
new fighters.

"I went out on an operation, I killed 27 [insurgents] in October,"
said Army Lt. Col. Ross Brown, squadron commander in the 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment. "All they do is fill their spaces with more people;
they have an infinite supply of replacements. We kill a leader or we
detain a leader, and there is somebody else in charge. Every time I
feel good about killing or detaining this guy, there is somebody else
to fill the boots, somebody is standing right behind ready to jump up."

Brown says the 2003 decision to disband the Iraqi military freed up
trained soldiers, leaders and intelligence gatherers to join the
insurgency.

"The guy who was in the army and has five kids, who trained in the
army for 20 years — this is what he knows," Brown said. "If you pay me
$300 to blow up a Bradley, and I trained my whole life to blow up
Bradleys, sooner or later I'm going to blow up a Bradley."

A Broad Insurgency

The Bush administration and Pentagon focus much of their rhetoric on
foreign fighters affiliated with Zarqawi's al-Qaida in Iraq network.
In 2005 alone, according to statistics provided by the military, 111
fighters identified as leaders of Zarqawi's network were either
captured or killed. But military sources in Iraq believe Zarqawi's
group functions more as a facilitator, largely through financing or
franchising out attacks carried out by an almost exclusively Iraqi
insurgency.

Conkle said the term "al-Qaida" is now applied to any fighter in Iraq,
regardless of affiliation. "It's kind of like `Xerox'; it's a
ubiquitous term. Anybody who is a terrorist is labeled `al-Qaida.'
[But] they're not foreigners, they're Iraqis."

American military officers in Iraq also insist it is simplistic and
wrong to portray the insurgency in Iraq as purely a Sunni endeavor.
Many attacks on U.S. troops are mounted by Shia insurgent groups,
whose ranks come from Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr's Mahdi militia,
and other Shiite militias.

The Shia groups led the development and use of the explosively formed
penetrator improvised explosive devices, one of the deadliest weapons
in the insurgent arsenal, before they shared the know-how with Sunni
groups.

"The lines blur after a while between groups — can't say, `that's
Ansar al Sunna' or `that group's al-Qaida in Iraq.' They cross cells,"
said Lt. Col. David Funk, who commanded an infantry battalion in
Baghdad's troubled southwestern district. "Half these guys are going
to the highest bidder."

Funk said the insurgent leadership is mostly former Iraqi military
officers, well-educated and affluent. "They attach themselves to
Zarqawi because of the money. They figure if they're going to attack
Americans anyway, why not get financed for it?"

Iraq's high unemployment rate makes it easy to find foot soldiers. In
the early morning hours in Baghdad, unemployed workers gather in the
streets with the hopes of being chosen for day labor. The insurgent
networks draw from the same pool to find men willing to place a
roadside bomb or shoot at American patrols.

"These low-level guys, they get pissed off that they can't get a job,
their electricity doesn't work and they have sewage in the streets,"
said Army Capt. Stephen Capeheart, who commanded a tank company in
Baghdad. "And so they get pissed off, so they go out and attack
Americans."

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
Feb. 8, Joseph Christoff of the Government Accountability Office
provided statistics that showed insurgent attacks had steadily
increased since June 2003 through December 2005, when there were 2,500
attacks across Iraq. •

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