Libyan Rebels Threaten Gadhafi's Supply Lines STRATFOR August 16, 2011 | 1328 GMT <http://media.stratfor.com/files/mmf/1/a/1a6dd3397583727385302eba09b3b773a88 0de38_two_column.jpg> Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's forces enter Zawiya on March 11 Summary Guerrillas based out of Libya's Nafusa Mountains claimed Aug. 13 to have seized two key towns along the last remaining supply lines connecting Tunisia and the Libyan capital of Tripoli. If rebel fighters are able to take and hold both cities, they could cut the Gadhafi regime off from its primary sources of smuggled fuel - a potentially devastating blow and something that had not seemed possible until the recent advance. The purported rebel advance also comes amid a number of other developments that could have serious consequences for Gadhafi, including Russia signaling its support for the U.N. resolution that authorized military action in Libya, a series of meetings in Tunisia on resolving the conflict in Libya, and the possibility that the forces at his disposal on the western front are no longer sufficient to defend vital supply lines to Tunisia. Analysis Rebel fighters from the Nafusa Mountains in northwestern Libya claimed Aug. 13 to have seized two key towns along the last remaining supply lines that connect Tunisia to Tripoli. One of these supply lines enters the Libyan capital from the south and runs through Gharyan at the easternmost point of the mountain chain. The other, more important route passes through Zawiya along a well-paved coastal road that connects Tripoli to the Tunisian border post of Ras Ajdir. Zawiya is the site of Libya's only functioning oil refinery, but is also a crucial transit point for fuel smuggled across the loosely monitored border with Tunisia. If both these towns (especially the much larger population center of Zawiya) fall under permanent control of rebel forces, Tripoli risks being cut off from its primary sources of fuel. With NATO patrolling the skies and waters around Libya, a permanent cutoff of supply lines would force the Gadhafi regime to rely almost entirely on fuel reserves for its energy needs. Gadhafi's forces continue to hold the other two main fronts at Marsa el Brega and Zlitan (where the Misurata-based rebels are now on the offensive), and show no signs of leaving those locations. It is only on the front with the guerrillas based in the Nafusa Mountains that Gadhafi has shown serious signs of weakening in recent days. This change coincides with several other developments that could indicate the conflict in Libya is headed for a dramatic shift. The Libyan interior minister's apparent defection to Egypt, Russia's recent shift in support of the U.N. resolution that authorized the NATO bombing campaign, and a series of meetings in Tunisia designed to bring an end to the conflict, all intersect the sudden inability of Gadhafi's forces to halt the advance of the poorly trained guerrillas. There are several unknowns, however. It is not clear whether Moscow's position toward the Gadhafi regime has changed in any substantive way. Meanwhile, it is not known whether Gadhafi is being consulted in the Tunisia meetings, nor whether Libya's armed forces have been substantially weakened, or are simply redeploying troops around Tripoli to solidify the defense of the capital. Why These Supply Lines Matter As U.N. sanctions bar the export of petroleum products to Libya, it is primarily the poorly enforced border controls with Tunisia and Algeria that allow fuel to be shipped into Gadhafi-held territory. The direct coastal road from Ras Ajdir is the primary route. Another route does exist, passing from Ghadamis (at the nexus of the Libya-Tunisia-Algeria border) along the southern rim of the Nafusa Mountains, and then northward through Gharyan, but it is less efficient than the coastal route. <http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/Libya_supply_lines_800.jpg> Libyan Rebels Threaten Gadhafi's Supply Lines <http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/Libya_supply_lines_800.jpg> (click here to enlarge image) Fighting is currently ongoing in Zawiya, but little information is available on how much of either Zawiya or Gharyan each side controls at the moment - few independent news reports emerge from either city. For the first time, however, it appears that the guerrillas are potentially on the verge of taking both locations. NATO has provided close air support, especially in the push toward Zawiya, but this is not a new strategy in seeking to aid rebel advances, and cannot by itself explain the sudden shift in battlefield fortunes. However, as the rebels seek to root out remaining Gadhafi loyalists from a city as densely populated as Zawiya - which had a population of around 300,000 before the war - NATO will find it harder to select targets while avoiding civilian casualties. Zawiya is not the only location under siege along the coastal road. Rebels claim to be in full control of Surman, located southwest of the city, and say they are fighting Gadhafi's forces in Sabratha, which is home to a Libyan military camp. Any bulwark the rebels could establish to cut off traffic along this road would deal the regime a severe blow, but the fall of Zawiya (home to Libya's last functioning oil refinery, even if it is producing below capacity) would be especially crippling. While rebels claimed to control 80 percent of Zawiya as of Aug. 15, they say that they have yet to take the refinery, which is located on the far side of the city. Only by seizing these locations could rebel forces guarantee the halt of smuggled fuel from its western borders to Gadhafi. The Tunisian government, while refusing to take Gadhafi's side in the conflict, turns a blind eye to such shipments for a variety of reasons. However, there has been a recent rise in negative publicity for Tunisia regarding its perceived lack of desire to stop the fuel shipments into Libya. The Tunisian Defense Ministry announced Aug. 11 that its troops were patrolling fuel stations in places such as Tataouine, Ben Gardane and Remada in an effort to prevent anyone from filling large numbers of fuel containers that could be smuggled across. Media reports from journalists who entered Zawiya on Aug. 13, before being turned back by a firefight between rebels and government troops, also claimed that a military checkpoint has been established on the Tunisian side of the border - something that did not exist before. Still, the Berber guerrillas fighting Gadhafi in this area will not be able to rely on the Tunisians to cut off the supply lines for them. Potential Political Losses for Gadhafi The Egyptian Interior Ministry announced that Libyan Interior Minister Nasser al-Mabrouk Abdullah turned up at Cairo International Airport on Aug. 15. Al-Mabrouk arrived with nine of his relatives. He claimed he was visiting Egypt as a tourist, but the fact that he arrived unbeknownst to the Libyan Embassy, and was not received by any Libyan government officials, makes it likely that he has defected. This would not mark the first significant defection from the Gadhafi regime. Some defectors went on to fill key positions in the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC). These include NTC head Mustafa Abdel-Jalil and now-deceased former NTC military commander Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis. The regime has also lost former intelligence chief and Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa and former Oil Minister Shokri Ghanem, as well as a handful of other ministers and diplomats. All of these defections sparked concerns that the regime was on the verge of imploding. This never happened, however, and al-Mabrouk's defection alone will not determine Libya's fate. The plane that carried al-Mabrouk and his family came from the Tunisian island of Djerba, not from Libya. Djerba is a common destination for Libyans who are either seeking a respite from the war, trying to do illicit business designed to circumvent sanctions, or conducting negotiations with a variety of international players. On Aug. 14, the day before al-Mabrouk departed, a group of unnamed Libyan officials were reportedly in Djerba conducting closed-doors negotiations with NTC representatives. Tunisian state media later reported that three Libyan ministers - Health Minister Ahmed Hijazi, Social Affairs Minister Ibrahim Cherif and Foreign Minister Abdelati Obeidi - stayed in Djerba that night. Obeidi later returned to Tripoli, and though he denied in an Aug. 16 interview with Saudi media that the reported talks in Tunisia had taken place, he did state that Tripoli is open to negotiating with the NTC. Talks definitely did take place, however, and the question is whether the ministers who took part were trying to negotiate a settlement on behalf of Gadhafi, or simply trying to protect their own positions (especially in light of potential International Criminal Court warrants). There are other signs that serious negotiations designed to bring an end to the Libyan war did in fact take place in Tunisia. Most significantly, U.N. envoy to Libya Abdul Ilah al-Khatib arrived in Tunis on Aug. 15 for negotiations he said were to take place in a hotel in the suburbs of the capital; al-Khatib told Tunisian state media Aug. 16 that he had held informal talks with representatives from both the Libyan government and the rebel council. An AFP report citing an airport official at Djerba also claimed that a South African jet and two Qatari military helicopters were present at the airport. (Both South Africa and Qatar have been involved in efforts to negotiate an ending to the war, though their loyalties lie with opposite camps.) The intentions of both the Russians and Gadhafi himself are key to understanding where negotiations are headed. The Western countries participating in the bombing campaign have clearly wanted Gadhafi out of power since March, and will continue with the air campaign so long as they see the potential for success and face no serious domestic opposition to the war effort. Moscow had previously shown a willingness to play the role of negotiator between Libya and the West, but appears to have shifted its position. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Aug. 12 issued a decree that placed Moscow's support behind U.N. Resolution 1973, the legal foundation for the NATO bombing campaign. While Russia itself abstained on the vote that allowed the resolution to pass, the resolution had subsequently become a frequent target of Russian criticism after it became clear that the mission was not "protection of civilians," but actually regime change in Tripoli. Russia has hedged its position on Libya throughout the war, but if Medvedev's decree indicates a move by Moscow toward the Western position, it is a bad sign for Gadhafi. It is unclear at this time whether Russia means to pressure Gadhafi with the apparent shift, or Russia is done with mediating and has abandoned him. Gadhafi, meanwhile, remains in hiding. Until the Nafusa guerrillas' recent advances, he had not been heard from publicly since July 31. On Aug. 15, Libyan state television broadcast a program which purportedly showed a large crowd in Tripoli's Green Square listening to the Libyan leader deliver a speech condemning enemies of the regime. The audio quality indicates that no such event truly took place, rather that the message was recorded and then played over archived video footage of crowds in the square. Gadhafi is trying to use this video to show the Libyan people that he remains in command. But he may in fact be on the verge of defeat, or of being overthrown from within. In the meantime, he may be ramping up efforts to find a location for exile. If the rebels demonstrate they can hold the towns that would cut off Gadhafi's supply lines and force the Libyan leader to exhaust his remaining fuel reserves, it could be a devastating blow for Gadhafi. Whether the rebel advance proves too much for Gadhafi to withstand depends largely on a few critical factors: The loyalty of his remaining forces, the intentions of those participating in negotiations to end the fighting, and the extent of Gadhafi's remaining fuel reserves in Tripoli. <http://media.stratfor.com/images/clear.gif?n=200503&h=0&u=128209&t=13135019 65&j=203855> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, discuss-os...@yahoogroups.com. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor biso...@intellnet.org http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com Subscribe: osint-subscr...@yahoogroups.com Unsubscribe: osint-unsubscr...@yahoogroups.com *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: osint-dig...@yahoogroups.com osint-fullfeatu...@yahoogroups.com <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: osint-unsubscr...@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
