Nuclear Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say

By Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 29, 2004; Page A01


Of all the clues that Osama bin Laden is after a nuclear weapon, perhaps the
most significant came in intelligence reports indicating that he received
fresh approval last year from a Saudi cleric for the use of a doomsday bomb
against the United States.

For bin Laden, the religious ruling was a milestone in a long quest for an
atomic weapon. For U.S. officials and others, it was a frightening reminder
of what many consider the ultimate mass-casualty threat posed by modern
terrorists. Even a small nuclear weapon detonated in a major American
population center would be among history's most lethal acts of war,
potentially rivaling the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Despite the obvious gravity of the threat, however, counterterrorism and
nuclear experts in and out of government say they consider the danger more
distant than immediate.

They point to enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting
would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al Qaeda nor any
other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them.

So difficult are the challenges that senior officials on President Bush's
national security team believe al Qaeda has shifted its attention to other
efforts, at least for now.

"I would say that from the perspective of terrorism, the overwhelming bulk
of the evidence we have is that their efforts are focused on biological and
chemical" weapons, said John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms
control and international security. "Not to say there aren't any dealings
with radiological materials, but the technology for bio and chem is
comparatively so much easier that that's where their efforts are
concentrating."

Still, the sheer magnitude of the danger posed by a nuclear weapon in
terrorist hands -- and classified intelligence assessments that deem such a
scenario plausible -- has spurred intelligence and military operations to
combat a threat once dismissed as all but nonexistent. The effort includes
billions of dollars spent on attempts to secure borders, retrain weapons
scientists in other countries and lock up dangerous materials and
stockpiles.

"The thing to keep in mind is that while it is extremely difficult, we have
highly motivated and intelligent people who would like to do it," said
Daniel Benjamin, a former National Security Council staff member and senior
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Each type of
weapon of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical -- presents
special challenges for the groups seeking to acquire them, but also
opportunities that can be exploited by people determined to unleash their
awesome destructive powers. This is the first of three articles aimed at
exploring those risks and challenges.

Difficult Course


Without sophisticated laboratories, expensive technology and years of
scientific experience, al Qaeda has two primary options for getting a bomb,
experts say, both of which rely on theft -- either of an existing weapon or
one of its key ingredients, plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

Nuclear scientists tend to believe the most plausible route for terrorists
would be to build a crude device using stolen uranium from the former Soviet
Union. Counterterrorism officials think bin Laden would prefer to buy a
ready-made weapon stolen in Russia or Pakistan, and to obtain inside help in
detonating it.

Last month, Michael Scheuer, who ran the CIA's bin Laden unit, first
disclosed in an interview on CBS's "60 Minutes" that bin Laden's nuclear
efforts had been blessed by the Saudi cleric in May 2003, a statement other
sources later corroborated. As early as 1998, bin Laden had publicly labeled
acquisition of nuclear or chemical weapons a "religious duty," and U.S.
officials had reports around that time that al Qaeda leaders were discussing
attacks they likened to the one on Hiroshima.

A week after his CBS appearance, Scheuer said at breakfast with reporters in
Washington that he believed al Qaeda would probably seek to buy a nuclear
device from Russian gangsters, rather than build its own.

There were as many as a dozen types of nuclear weapons in the hands of the
Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, but Russian officials have said
that several kinds have since been destroyed and that the country has
secured the remainder of its arsenal. The nature and scope of nuclear caches
are among the most tightly held national security secrets in Russia and
Pakistan.

It is unclear how quickly either country could detect a theft, but experts
said it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own
how to work a Russian or Pakistani bomb.

Newer Russian weapons, for example, are equipped with heat- and
time-sensitive locking systems, known as permissive action links, that
experts say would be extremely difficult to defeat without help from
insiders.

"You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including
changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the
weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and
then for it to allow itself to be fired," said Charles D. Ferguson, science
and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "You don't get it
off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off."

The strategy would require help from facility guards, employees with
knowledge of the security and arming features of the weapons, not to mention
access to a launching system.

Older Russian nuclear weapons have simpler protection mechanisms and could
be easier to obtain on the black market. But nuclear experts said even the
simplest device has some security features that would have to be defeated
before it could be used.

"There is a whole generation of weapons designed for artillery shells,
manufactured in the 1950s, that aren't going to have sophisticated locking
devices," said Laura Holgate, who ran nonproliferation programs at the
Pentagon and the Energy Department from 1995 to 2001. "But it is a tougher
task to take a weapon created by a country, even the 1950s version, a
tougher job for a group of even highly qualified Chechen terrorists to make
it go boom."

Transporting a weapon out of Russia would provide another formidable
obstacle for terrorists.

Most of the ready-made bombs that could be stolen would be those made with
plutonium, which emits far higher levels of radiation and is therefore more
easily detected by passive sensors at ports than is highly enriched uranium,
or HEU.

"I wouldn't rule out plutonium altogether, but if one were a terrorist bent
upon demonstrating a nuclear explosion, the HEU route is technically much
easier," said William C. Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California.

Building a Bomb


Such difficulties have led some nuclear experts to believe bin Laden would
be more likely to try to build an improvised nuclear weapon using a
combination of uranium and conventional explosives. That design, known as a
gun-type device, was used in the atomic bomb over Hiroshima.

While the technology is relatively simple and has been described in dozens
of published scientific studies and policy journals, the path to development
is filled with technological and logistical challenges -- the most
significant of which is obtaining at least 50 kilograms of bomb-grade
uranium. That amount would yield a slightly smaller device than "Little
Boy," the code name for the Hiroshima bomb, but would be enough to
obliterate any life or structure within a half-mile radius of the blast
zone.

"If they got less material than that, it would be really dicey that they
could build such a bomb," said Ferguson, at the Council on Foreign
Relations.

According to a database maintained by the United Nations' International
Atomic Energy Agency, there have been 10 known incidents of HEU theft in the
past 10 years, each involving a few grams or less. Added up, the stolen
goods total less than eight kilograms and could not be easily combined
because of varying levels of enrichment. Most important, the thieves -- none
of whom was connected to al Qaeda -- had no buyers lined up, and nearly all
were caught while trying to peddle their acquisitions.

"Making the connection between buyer and seller has proved to be one of the
most substantial hurdles for terrorists," said Matthew Bunn, a senior
researcher at Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom. Of the few
known attempts by al Qaeda to obtain HEU, each allegedly stumbled because
there was either no seller or the material on offer was fake. "Each time
they tried, they got scammed," said Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert
at the Rand Corporation who has tracked al Qaeda for years.

A September report on terrorism by the Congressional Research Service warned
that terrorists could "obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors
worldwide that use HEU as fuel." The report noted that the nations of
"greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile material are
widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan."

The largest stocks outside the United States are in Russia and around the
former Soviet Union, some in facilities with notoriously weak security and
safety procedures.

"Once you have the fissile material, it's a matter of basic chemistry, basic
machinery and a truck," said Holgate, now a vice president at the nonprofit
Nuclear Threat Initiative. "You have to have some technical capability, but
once you have those skills, it's certainly within the grasp of the kind of
sophisticated, planning-capable terror organizations out there."

Even so, there are a great many steps between obtaining the material and
setting off an explosion. That may account for why such an attack has not
materialized, despite intelligence warnings.

The uranium would have to be smuggled out of the facility and then
transferred, possibly across several borders, seaports and airports, to a
location where the device could be assembled. As described in unclassified
literature, the gun-type bomb works when one mass of uranium is shot into
another inside a tube. Such a device would be small enough to hide in a
corner of a shipping container, but that would mean getting it to a port,
onto a container and probably bribing a shipper or cargo crew to transport
it.

An oil shipment would be optimal for a ready-made device, according to the
congressional report, because the "size of the supertanker and thickness of
the steel, especially with the use of double hulls," renders some detection
equipment unusable.

But HEU emits low levels of radioactivity anyway, and that could be masked
with lead shielding. A primitive device could be assembled in a small garage
using machine tools readily available at an auto shop and concealed in a
lead-plated delivery truck about the size of a delivery van, experts said.

It is also unclear how a terrorist group would know if its weapons
development effort was on the right track. Nations with nuclear bombs
conduct tests, including explosions that can be detected by scientists and
governments. Bunn, who has published two studies on nuclear terrorism, said
terrorists would not necessarily need to conduct such tests, but doing
without them would increase chances that human error would foil plans or
delay progress.

The most elaborate known effort by a terrorist group to develop a nuclear
program was undertaken by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which instead of
stealing enriched uranium planned to mine and enrich the material itself.

Members of Aum Shinrikyo, intent on world destruction when it began its 1993
quest for a nuclear weapon, had all the means to pull it off, on paper at
least: money, expertise, a remote haven in which to work, and most
important, a private uranium mine.

But the group made dozens of mistakes in judgment, planning and execution.
It shifted course, launching its chemical attack on the Tokyo subway in
1995.

"There are valuable lessons in Aum's experience, and there are false
lessons," said Benjamin, co-author of "The Age of Sacred Terror." "The
valuable lesson is that WMD terrorism is hard to do," he said. "But given
that they didn't try what would be the most efficient way to put together a
nuclear bomb, we shouldn't overrate their example as a reason why it's not
going to happen."

Al Qaeda has been on the run since the United States deprived it of a haven
in Afghanistan, making it more difficult for the group to operate on such an
ambitious scale.

"At this moment, they are less capable of carrying out an operation like
this because it would require so many different experts and operatives,"
Benjamin said. "But even a depleted group could do it if they got the right
breaks."



C 2004 The Washington Post Company


http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32285-2004Dec28?language=printer




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