http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/08/pirates-vs-congress-how-pira
tes-are.html

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Pirates vs. Congress: How Pirates Are a Better Bargain

I was sent a copy of remarks made by Stephen M. Carmel, Senior Vice
President of Maersk Line, Limited given August 3rd, 2011 at the Commander
Second Fleet Intelligence Symposium. After reading these remarks, I emailed
Steve and publish them here with his permission. 

These are his personal views and not those of Maersk Line Limited, nor those
of the very diverse shipping industry. The title was provided by me. Enjoy. 
----- 

Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to share my
perspectives on piracy with you today. First let me say right out of the
gate I am no fan of pirates. Do not like them at all in fact, contrary to
what many may perceive from my remarks on the topic. Pirates do impose a
cost on our business that we would rather not bear if possible so it is
something I worry about. But, while worrying about pirates I also worry
about the effect of MARPOL Annex VI and the cost of complying with
increasingly harsh emissions control requirements, something that will cost
our industry roughly $6 Billion a year to comply with now and that figure
will go up as tighter standards kick in in the 2014 time frame. I worry
about the requirement to cold iron in LA, something that is very expensive
and disruptive. And since while common for Navy ships to go on shore power,
commercial ships never do it and are not fitted with a system to do so, a
modification is required that will cost the equivalent of one ransom for
each ship it is done on. 

I worry about things like a proposal fronted by the World Bank, UNEP and
others for a $50/ton carbon tax on ships bunkers, which will cost our
industry about $17.1 Billion dollars per year. I worry about invasive
species related ballast water mandates which will cost our industry
approximately $15 Billion a year and I worry even more about California not
going along with federal ballast water control mandates and instead
implementing their own program at even greater cost to us. So tree huggers
and environmentalists are costing us a heck of a lot more than pirates ever
will, but interestingly I don't see anyone agitating for the Navy to get
underway to get the quasi-failed state of California under control. But if
any of you are up for the mission I'd like to see it. 

I worry about the cost of fuel where each dollar increase in bunkers costs
our industry well over $300 million a year and over the last 2 years the
cost of fuel has gone up about $120 / ton meaning something on the order of
a $36 Billion per year increase in fuel costs for the industry. I worry
about Ad Valorum tax - a protectionist tax designed to benefit US shipyards
we must pay on repairs on our ships done outside the US. My company alone
paid over $10 Million in Ad Valorum tax last year - so US shipyards are
doing way more damage to us than pirates are. I'd ask for the Navy's help on
getting US yards under control but based on what I read about the Navy's
adventures in shipbuilding, you're having a tough time with them too. Maybe
we would jointly be better off partnering on a strategy to deal with that
threat instead of pirates since it is worse for both of us. 

I worry about bad policy such as the requirement for 100% scanning of
containers imposed by congress in the "Implementing the requirements of the
9/11 commission Act", a requirement which the European Commission estimates
will cost the global economy 150 billion Euros or about 215 billion dollars
per year were it to be implemented by all our trading partners. With that
single act congress potentially does 20 times more damage to the global
economy than pirates do by even the most ridiculous estimates of the cost of
piracy, and in the process actually degrades maritime security rather than
improves it. 

I worry about the politically motivated "war on ear marks" which has brought
dredging in this country to a near halt, meaning that ships loaded with our
agricultural exports leaving the Mississippi are light loading by upwards of
2 feet, many ports on the East Coast will be unable to accept the larger
ships an expanded Panama Canal could bring this way, and upwards of half the
ports in the Great Lakes will soon close due to lack of adequate water
depth, something that will not be good for industrial activity in the
heartland, exports, and by extension our business. All this not to mention
the $3.1 Trillion dollars the American Society of Civil Engineers now says
it will cost to repair our country's crumbling infrastructure upon which our
business, and yours by the way, depends. And that number does not allow for
expansion of infrastructure to accommodate economic growth, a critical issue
for us in the shipping business, that number is only to repair and upgrade
what we have now. The actual investment needed for accommodate growth over
the next 30 years is more like $6.6 Trillion. Next to $6.6 Trillion needed
to recover from shortsighted politicians pirates barely register as an
irritant. 

I worry a heck allot more about bad policy than I do bad guys, bad policy
being easier to inflict and harder, and expensive, to recover from once it
happens. And speaking of bad policy specifically as relates to pirates,
there can be no better example than the Executive order which most believe
heads us down the slope towards making ransoms illegal, which in my view is
breathtaking in its shortsightedness. That would remove the only tool that
is available to us that has proven effective at resolving a piracy incident.
Making ransoms illegal is unenforceable, will increase the violence against
the crew, will criminalize the victims, and will do nothing to deter
pirates. Hostages are a commodity to pirates and they will always find a
buyer. The care and feeding of hostages is an expensive investment on the
part of pirates, an investment they have every expectation of receiving a
return on. In the event we make ransoms illegal they will not stop being
pirates, they will adapt their business model and find new buyers, maybe not
at the same level of compensation, but it will beat starving on the street
in Mogadishu, their other alternative under our current policy. Depending on
the nationality of the crew perhaps selling them to an ideologically
motivated group who would have no intention of ever seeing them go home
might turn a few bucks, or maybe selling them into the very active slavery
market. That would also of course mean that only those hostages useful for
those purposes would be worth the investment of keeping alive. In short, the
EO is a fine example of breaking a model without thinking through how the
pirates will adapt and what we'd do about that, a topic I'll return to again
in a minute. 

So, there are lots of things I worry about and lots of things that impose
costs on our business that I'd rather not have to deal with; piracy is one,
but not the only one and certainly not the worst. On any one of them if we
can get someone to provide some relief, that's great, including piracy. But
piracy is not some existential threat to this country, or the maritime
industry. That has, and is, my central massage when thinking about piracy.
We must keep it in perspective. Piracy today is not remotely as bad as it
was during the days of the Barbary Pirates to which it is usually and
foolishly compared. Piracy then represented a true threat to the security of
a young US. Today piracy has zero direct effect on our economy and I have
yet to hear anyone articulate anything approaching a valid national interest
that justifies the costs, and risks to US lives, of that mission beyond that
it is the traditional role of the US to ensure stability in the global
regime from which the US benefits in an overall way. In fact piracy has had
no real impact on international trade. 

Traffic through the Suez Canal is near record levels according to data from
the Suez Canal Authority, global supply chains through that region remain
intact and we are not diverting around Africa to avoid pirates, although
when bunkers are cheap enough we'll do it to avoid Suez Canal Tolls, since
below about $300/Ton going around Africa is actually cheaper and now that
we're all slow steaming time is less of an issue. Charging around at 24
knots on our big containerships is largely a thing of the past, and sadly so
are $300/ton bunkers. 

It is interesting to note that the US government, in the form of the
Maritime Administration is itself a source of incorrect information
regarding the diversion bit, which is important as virtually every "cost of
piracy" calculation relies heavily on some assumed diversion inefficiency to
have any level of a "wow factor" attached to it. I can tell you that Maersk,
the largest container company in the world, does not divert around Africa
and I don't know of any major carrier that does. Anyway - the Maritime
Administration has on their web site a cost of piracy point paper which is
again reliant on diversion for its major impact. They reference the cost of
diverting a 300k ton tanker as one example, but the only problem there is of
course a 300k ton tanker can't get thru the Suez so would always go around
the cape anyway so the real cost of diversion is zero, and we'll come back
to tankers in a minute. They also talk about the cost of diverting
containerships. When pressed for data on how many containerships are
actually making such a diversion they are silent - don't even answer me. So,
take that sort or argument with a bulker load of salt and even the US
government itself contributes to the voluminous amount of misleading to
patently false information floating around about that. 

Unfortunately for us freight rates on the Asia / Europe trade route - the
only international route directly impacted by piracy, are not where we'd
like them to be due to over capacity and weakening demand, so it is nonsense
so say consumers are paying increased costs due to piracy. Shipping
companies, in the face of weak fundamentals search for any mechanism to
extract an extra nickel out of customers, including things like bunker
adjustment factors and now piracy surcharges - which thanks to frothy news
headlines shippers "understand", but in the end it is the total cost of
shipping a box that counts and that is not going up. 

And in fact is down considerably from the peak in 2006 just before the
financial collapse. More to the point, the routine peak-season surcharge
that would normally be applied to that route this time of year has been
delayed several times because peak season volumes are not materializing - an
indicator of a bad Christmas retail season in the US and consequently very
bad news for the US economy. So, from a system perspective, piracy is not an
issue. That is an important point - we need to view the effects of piracy
from a system level, but the highly emotional nature, the human drama
associated with a specific piracy incident leads the general public to view
it from a specific individual occurrence perspective and generalize that,
rather than from a true system level perspective, a giant mismatch in
perspective and effect. Piracy is a cost of business just like many other
costs of business and business can manage it, just as they do the others.
Piracy is a little different though because unlike emissions targets or
bunker prices, piracy gets the general public excited, provides politicians
a risk free platform for pontificating, all of which provides some of our
industry an opportunity to burden shift rather than take responsible
measures to protect their ships. 

I assume everyone here knows the basic statistics - piracy is a very rare
event considering the volume of traffic that moves through the area. The
probability of any specific ship being attacked is remote, and for the types
of ships that actually move the majority of international trade even more
so, approaching zero. Attack success rates have fallen into the 14% range.
But we'll not belabor the obvious at this point and instead dwell a little
on the issues that hide behind the numbers - the rest of the story as Paul
Harvey would say. 

>From the US perspective it is difficult to see how piracy affects our
economy or international trade in any significant way. Trade between Asia
and the US all goes via the Pacific. In fact the US Maritime Administration
says that 80% of traffic through the Gulf of Aden represents trade bound
for, or coming from, Europe. By comparison, only roughly 5% of US
containerized trade as measured by volume flows through that region (much
less when measured by value), with India being the largest component of
that. That trade moves on large, fast containerships, a type of ship that is
rarely even attacked and has never been hijacked. Of the oil moving out of
the Persian Gulf that everyone rings their hands about, the overwhelming
majority of it that moves through pirate waters is bound for Europe, and in
fact virtually no oil bound for the US out of the Persian Gulf moves via the
Suez Canal. Only about 14% of US crude imports come from the Persian Gulf
region according to the US Energy Information Agency. That oil moves around
the Cape because that is commercially the best way to do it and has been for
a very long time - oil coming to the US generally moves in ships too large
to get through the Suez. 

It is a curious fact that people connect 2 points on a map and assume that
just because a particular route is shorter that it is cheaper. That is
simply not the case in international shipping where economies of scale
represent a major, if not biggest, cost consideration. The fact is that
loading 2 or 3 million barrels on a VLCC or ULCC and taking it around Africa
to the US is a cheaper way to move oil to the US than loading 1 million bbls
or less on a tanker that can fit through the Suez Canal even though the Suez
is shorter. This by the way, is one of many mistakes people make when
thinking about shipping through the Arctic, where shorter is neither faster
nor cheaper and the Northwest Passage will never be viable as a large scale
transit route, but that's a different soapbox. 

Back to oil from the Persian Gulf - how much does piracy add to the cost of
a gallon of gas in the US? Is the US consumer actually affected? - a
relevant question if this is all about protecting the US economy. First off
- forget all those ridiculous news items about the cost of insurance -
marine insurance is very complex and does not lend itself to one sentence
summaries, they will almost certainly be misleading. The most expensive type
insurance related to piracy is K and R, which no one forces anyone to buy. 

Insurance for us is like insurance for you - the cost is driven by what you
are insuring, the risks you are ensuring against, and the portion of that
risk you are willing to bear yourself. Some insurance we are required by law
to have - liability insurance for oil pollution for example, just as you are
required to have liability insurance for your car. But for most insurance
it's up to the consumer what he wants to buy hence what he has to pay.
Absolute certainty is expensive and if that's what you're after it will cost
you. One way to look at it is like when you rent a car the rental agency
offers you the opportunity to buy insurance from them at an astronomical
rate. Most don't need it because credit cards or personal auto insurance
policies provide that coverage. But if you decide to take it anyway because
you want to be absolutely certain you will never pay a nickel if something
goes wrong, you really don't have any right to complain about the cost of
insurance when renting a car. I would also note that insurance companies
site piracy policies as one reason profits are way up this past year. The
way insurance companies make money writing policies is to collect premiums
on policies they don't pay claims on, which should tell you something about
the actual risk. 

Rather than pay for very expensive insurance it would probably be better to
do something that ensures your ship does not get hijacked to begin with.
That something would be armed security, which is so far at least, 100
percent effective. From personal experience hiring highly trained (in fact
all ex- US SOF folks) as security on our ships I can back of the envelope it
for you. It is two weeks from Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia to Capetown, which
would be the section of the trip you would need security on. A team
sufficient to protect the ship costs about $5000 per day all inclusive, for
a total of $70,000. On a 2 Million BBL VLCC that means security to get it to
the US costs about 3.5 cents per bbl. While it varies a little by grade of
crude, a rule of thumb is that each BBL of crude will produce about 20
gallons of gas. That means piracy adds a little less than 2 tenths of a cent
to the cost of a gallon of gas, or a nickel or so to a 25 gallon fill up.
This as opposed to the approximately 43 cents per gallon or $10.75 in taxes
you pay on a 25 gallon fill up. Once again that Pirates vs. Congress damage
comparison sneaks in there and pirates seem the better bargain. If anyone is
up for the mission of protecting us from Congress there's another one I'd
like to see. In short - the average US consumer, and tax payer, is not at
all impacted by piracy. 

There is no doubt that armed security is an effective way to prevent any
specific ship from being pirated - this does not deal with the problem with
piracy however - just shifts it to those who are least willing to look after
themselves, ironically also the ones most likely to whine for government
solutions. 

But there are a few things to remember when discussing the arming of ships
that are worth mentioning. At my company we are very worried about
liability, so only employ people we know can keep their heads under
pressure, and are not prone to shooting people who should not be shot (an
actually hitting the people that should be). So they are all former SEALS.
We also limit the types of weapons they can have on board. The result is we,
a responsible operator, have the best trained, but very expensive, operators
in the world with a limited, but effective amount of weaponry the operators
themselves chose. But that's our choice, there is no international standard
on the training or vetting of shooters, or even any requirement they are
different than the normal crew. Nor is there any international standard on
what types of weapons are considered appropriate. Nor, by the way, is there
a US flag state standard for either shooters beyond having a TWIC card,
something every AB has, nor limits on weapons and actually no useful
guidance on training. That is all up to us. 

If there is nothing for US flag, you can imagine what exists for your
average flag of convenience. In fairness both the US Coast Guard for US
flag, and IMO for the international community do have general, and voluntary
guidelines. Neither is specific, binding, or useful in any way. It is a
curious fact that virtually everything else we do has some rule or
regulation that governs it, an inspection protocol to insure compliance, and
a certificate we have to post to demonstrate to the world that we do what
we're supposed to do. We lose an inch of draft to all the certificates we
carry around for everything except the use of deadly force, which is
apparently so trivial that it can be left up to individual businesses to do
as they wish, or do nothing at all and just whine for more Navy protection. 

Remember too that the push, hence permission, to arm applies to everyone,
not just US or trusted partner country ships, and once armed they are armed
everywhere they go, not just the Horn of Africa. Absent any regulatory
limits, they are pretty much free to arm however they see fit and give those
guns to whoever they want. So from a port security perspective and as we
push other countries to accept armed US flag ships into their ports, what
happens when a Maltese registered ship with an international crew from
unsavory places, armed to the teeth with heavier weaponry than MLL allows-
but armed IAW their flag state approved ISPS required security plan piracy
annex - what happens when that ship shows up in Norfolk and sails past the
Navy base with the world watching from a reciprocity perspective. 

And we do worry a great deal about disruptions to our ships in foreign ports
as a result of being armed, again remembering once armed, they are armed
everywhere they go. There is no internationally accepted process for the
entry and clearance of armed merchant ships, instead we are at the mercy of
arms import and export laws everywhere we go. We have no doubt that we are
violating arms trafficking laws fairly consistently since such laws are
convoluted, differ by country, and were certainly not written with armed
merchant ships in mind. In fairness to the rest of the world, so far we have
only had problems in one port, where our weapons were confiscated but the
ship not held up, that port being Charleston. Ironically that happened on
the very same day a very senior official at the state department gave a
speech stating that arming merchant ships was the only way to deal with
piracy off Somalia. 

Lastly I would note there is no internationally agree framework for dealing
with liability issues, where if we shoot a pirate off a US flag ship there
is nothing to prevent that aggrieved pirate from suing us in a Pakistani
court and having our ship arrested next time it shows up in Karachi. Unlike
you folks, our ships do not enjoy sovereign immunity and port state
authorities are free to board, search, and arrest our ships and crew at
their discretion and/or whim. There has been some legislation passed in the
US providing such liability protection, which of course is very helpful for
piracy off the coast of New Jersey, but does nothing to help us where it
actually matters. At this point the single most helpful thing regarding
piracy (aside of course from solving Somalia) the worlds governments can do
would be to push through IMO a rule set that standardizes training and
certification of shooters, a standard weapon set, and international
protocols for entry and clearance of armed merchant ships in ports and a
standard framework for liability cover. That to me would be a heck of a lot
more useful than banal calls for the worlds Navy's to do more. 

That leads to the cost of piracy. There are lots of very big numbers
circulating about the cost of piracy, and they do not come with any sort of
breakdown or analysis, and are generally produced by entities with a
particular point of view they are trying to support, and most are very
difficult to believe. For example, One Earth Foundation published a wildly
quoted report a couple months ago that calculated the cost of piracy as
being between 7 and 10 billion, but the largest component of that cost was
the supposed cost of routing around Africa of ships that otherwise would
have gone through the Suez, where the authors arbitrarily assume 10% of
traffic is rerouting. In other words their single largest component of cost
is a total plug unsupported by anything other than the conclusion they had
predetermined to reach. There is no basis for that assumption, and it fly's
in the face of the Suez canal authority showing record levels of traffic,
but it was just accepted as reasonable by an uncritical public. 

The numbers that seem to be most frequently cited are a cost of piracy in
the 6 to 8 billion range. While I personally take the number with a large
grain of salt, we'll assume it's true for this discussion. First to keep it
in perspective, the international shipping industry earned $380 billion in
2009 carrying $10.5 trillion dollars worth of international trade - 1
trillion of it going through the GOA region. So the cost of piracy number
looks a little less large when placed in proper context. If it really did
cost $8 billion to secure the smooth flow of $1 trillion worth of trade
personally I'd say we're getting a good deal. Also remember the other costs
of business governments inflict on us I mentioned at the opening and the
cost of piracy looks outright inconsequential. 

But then if we look a little deeper a curious item to note is that the cost
of piracy is 6 to 8 billion, but in 2009 the total ransom payments were $74
million according to the US GAO. Using the low end of the cost of piracy
then pirates themselves only made 1.2% of the money earned in the pirate
industry and of course less than that at the high end of the piracy cost
estimate. If piracy started because Somali's thought they were getting
cheated by international fishing fleets they must really be pissed at how
much they are losing out in the piracy business. By the way, while $74
million might sound like allot of cash in a country like Somalia - again you
need to place it in context of the very large and surprisingly active
informal and largely cash based economy that exists in Somalia. In contrast
to the $74 million in ransoms you have $1.6 Billion that enters Somalia
every year through remittances and the Somali Khat industry which an article
just published in the Somaliland times estimates at $180 million per year
are examples. I don't see an outcry to get hawala's in Minneapolis under
control though. 

So, if piracy is costing that much money but pirates themselves are only
earning 1% of it, allot of money must be going other places besides pirates.
Piracy is indeed a big business these days, and as the numbers suggest,
pirates themselves are a very small part of it. The piracy conference for
profit circuit alone is a big money generator and if pirates knew how much
money people were making talking about them they'd quit being pirates and go
on the speaking circuit. There is no shortage of people lining up to sell us
the latest in anti-pirate gizmo's ranging from goo guns to exploding fouling
nets to even jars of killer bees (no kidding, that was a real sales pitch).
The number of people who earn a good living off exploiting a fear of pirates
is very large and all to be unemployed if piracy ever gets solved, meaning
there is a vast army of people in whose economic benefit it is to make
everyone think piracy is bad and getting worse. 

What we end up with is a Horn of Africa piracy industry that is not
insignificant, but in the context of the other economic activity in the
actual region, not out of proportion huge, but appears to be much more
significant as a business elsewhere in the world with the overwhelming
amount of money made by people other than actual Somali pirates. 

I often hear in rebuttal to my arguments that piracy has been getting more
violent and that the old model of piracy for ransom no longer holds. That is
probably partially true. When all this first started piracy was a relatively
clean business with a well defined model operating under a clear rule set
that, while we might not have liked it, we all, pirates and shipping people,
understood it. In exchange for there being no violence on our side pirates
themselves minimized violence to the crew. It was pure business, no one got
hurt, industry paid a ransom and we got the crew and ship back, end of
story. 

In the world of insurance by the way, when probability is low and outcomes
when an event happens are predictable, the risk is quantifiable, easily
priced, and not exorbitant to insure. From the very start in response to
criticism of that model from government folks I have often warned that
Somali's are adaptive, tough, and not easily deterred. If you are going to
destroy a model that, while distasteful, keeps things at a tolerable level
and keeps people from getting hurt, you should have something to replace it
with. If not you will give the pirates free range to devise what the next
model will be on their own. They will not simply stop being pirates because
it gets a little sporting for them and whatever model they come up we will
like much less than the one we had. But that is exactly what happened, the
old model was blown up with no thought into what goes next, and everyone
seemed surprised that things evolved they way they did. 

But from my perspective this is the expected result in reaction to things
the international community did to begin with. It is indicative of the sort
of knee jerk policy development regarding piracy here, from an insurance
perspective, while probability remains low, the predictability of outcome in
the event of an occurrence is much less, meaning a risk that is harder to
quantify hence more expensive to insure, and we did that to ourselves. Doing
nothing until the international community was ready to take on Somalia as an
issue rather than poke around aimlessly at the symptom would have been
better, as what existed before was better than what we ended up with. In the
end, without an overarching strategy to deal with Somalia, and piracy as one
component of that overarching strategy, dealing with piracy alone is
difficult to justify given limited and shrinking resources, at best likely
to be ineffective and could potentially make things worse. 

So, with that I'll wrap up. Piracy is a pain, but a manageable one that must
be kept in context. Nothing I have said should be taken to mean I do not
understand the very real suffering of the crews actually hijacked. But my
perspective is one of the system as a whole, and international response
needs to be oriented around ensuring the stability of the system. I would
also add that nothing I have said should be taken as not being truly
appreciative of the work the Navy does for us and the international shipping
community around the world. I personally have a close and active connection
to many Navy missions, and my company collaborates frequently with the Navy
on many things of mutual interest. I am simply expressing a realist view
that we make a lot of demands on your time and resources. Time and resources
that are shrinking and given the budget environment we are in, that
situation is not likely to get better any time soon. It is therefore
incumbent on us to make sure our demands represent the absolute best use of
your limited resources from a system level, overall good perspective, not
from the parochial, industry specific "what makes us the most money"
perspective that some in our industry take. 

I would certainly like to see piracy gone, but the only way that's going to
happen is if Somalia itself is tackled as an issue for the international
community. Until then the largest impacts are on the East Coast of Africa
region and the land locked countries that depend on East Africa ports such
as Mombasa. Clearly all Africans have a stake in dealing with Somalia and
I'd certainly like to see them do more there, but an interesting and yet to
be fully fleshed out impact of the fall of Quadafi is that he provided a
very large if not dominate amount of funding for the African Union, the
group with troops on the ground in Somalia now. The AU was already suffering
from a funding crisis before the Libyan uprising so it remains to be seen
how well, if at all, the AU will be able to continue to operate, which of
course impacts Somalia and piracy. It is an interesting connection that the
uprising in Libya could actually make piracy worse. The other potential
impact is on Asia / Europe trade, although there is no data to support the
claim that that trade has actually been adversely impacted in any way. There
is no direct US national interest that I have ever heard articulated. Unless
and until Somalia the issue is coherently dealt with, the best things the
international community can do are first avoid doing things that make it
worse, and second, provide the legal and regulatory framework necessary for
responsible ship operators to protect themselves. 

Thank you. 






[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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