"...the attacks in London suggest that a new generation of
Salafi-Jihadists is emerging which do not belong to any recognizable
networks and are not necessarily rooted in specific countries. There
are two contentions here: first, unlike the earlier generation of
Salafi-Jihadists, many of the new generation of terrorists may not
have the extensive experience of fighting in Algeria, Chechnya,
Afghanistan or Bosnia; second, the attacks on London present further
evidence that it is the Salafi-Jihadist movement, rather than
organiza-tions such as al-Qaeda, which draws upon a slightly different
network of support, that constitutes the cur-rent threat in Europe."

"...it is further argued here that the newly-emergent terrorist
networks are neither organized nor inspired by al-Qaeda." 

THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT AFTER LONDON

► http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369754
► Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown / by Cerwyn Moore, Murad Al-Shishani

Jul 29 2005 ► Jul 28. Few events have provoked such contradictory
assessments as this month's bomb attacks in London. Until recently,
the majority of research on terrorism since 9/11 has focused on
militants who may have had experience fighting in Afghanistan, thus
linking them directly to al-Qaeda. But, the attacks in London suggest
that a new generation of Salafi-Jihadists is emerging which do not
belong to any recognizable networks and are not necessarily rooted in
specific countries. There are two contentions here: first, unlike the
earlier generation of Salafi-Jihadists, many of the new generation of
terrorists may not have the extensive experience of fighting in
Algeria, Chechnya, Afghanistan or Bosnia; second, the attacks on
London present further evidence that it is the Salafi-Jihadist
movement, rather than organiza-tions such as al-Qaeda, which draws
upon a slightly different network of support, that constitutes the
cur-rent threat in Europe. Although many of these points have recently
been made in the Security, Terrorism and the UK Report (July 2005)
published through Chatham House, it is further argued here that the
newly-emergent terrorist networks are neither organized nor inspired
by al-Qaeda. [1]

A series of events, marked at the outset by the bomb attacks in
Casablanca, followed by the Madrid train attack and the detentions in
Spain thereafter, the murder of Theo van Gogh and finally the attacks
in Lon-don, highlight how a functional or even organizational reading
of the current terror threat is misleading.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the series of attacks in Europe
and North Africa were largely over-shadowed by the reporting of the
war in Iraq. Thus, this instantaneous and wide-ranging coverage of the
attacks in London has added to the analytical confusion. Indeed, most
analysis on the UK attacks seems to be distorted by the assumption
that those involved in the incidents are part of homogenous groups and
linked to particular causes in specific countries.

Implications: Morocco and Madrid

In a series of arrests in Europe earlier this year, authorities are
reported to have detained a number of militant operatives. In April,
Spanish authorities detained twelve suspected terrorists including six
Moroc-cans, three of Syrian origin, an Egyptian, an Algerian and a
Palestinian. More recently in June, and again in Spain, at least a
further sixteen suspected extremists were detained. Significantly,
almost all of the de-tained suspects were described as extremists
rather than al-Qaeda operatives. Many of those detained appear to be
loosely linked to the Zarqawi network, which automatically
differentiates them from a genera-tion of recognized al-Qaeda leaders
such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

Analyzing the events in London in this context indicates a number of
issues and two of these are high-lighted here; on the one hand, those
in control of operations in Iraq and Europe, and those who have
or-chestrated the wave of attacks since the Casablanca bombings appear
to be linked to the Salafi-Jihadist movement, and on the other hand,
these incremental events and the jihadists associated with them are
drawing extensively upon links with North African militants. In the
case of the first attacks in London on July 7, even though the
attackers appear to be British-born Muslims (three of whom are of
Pakistani origin), some reports suggest that there are links between
handlers, clerics and bomb-makers associated with North African militants.

British newspapers reported that British "police had asked European
counterparts for information on Moroccan Mohammed al-Garbuzi, who
lived in Britain for 16 years before vanishing from his north London
home last year". [2] Initial reports also pointed to links with known
terrorists. As one newspaper report noted: "[F]ollowing detailed
examination of the timings of the explosions and early forensic
analysis of the four blast scenes... links between the terrorists and
the Continent are being actively pursued." [3] Simi-larly, a newspaper
report published soon after the attacks on July 7 highlighted that
"there are at least two distinct groups of people involved in planning
the attacks in the UK: British-born young men...who may have
volunteered for training in Afghanistan and who are prepared to risk
jail or death to carry out an at-tack; and foreign citizens, including
a number from north Africa, who see Britain as the next most
impor-tant target after the US and use false identities to avoid
detection, blending in with existing immigrant communities." [4]

This linkage with North Africa is brought into sharp focus by looking
at the foreign volunteers involved in the Iraqi insurgency. On the
June 20, the London based Arabic newspaper al-Hayat published a
report, drawing on points made by U.S. forces in Iraq, which noted
that one in every four suicide bombers in Iraq are either Moroccan or
from the North Africa region. [5] Although it is clear that a large
number of Arab volunteers - perhaps as much as 80% according to some
sources - involved in the Iraqi conflict are from neighboring
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and Jordan, a
considerable percentage do appear to be moving into Iraq from North
Africa.

Saudi Arabia, Iraq and London

In the last year there has been an upsurge of violence in Iraq. While
it is clear that the influx of Arab volun-teers into Iraq is in some
ways part of a different phenomenon, it is still worthwhile looking at
the recently published Saudi most wanted list of suspected terrorists
(announced on June 29) which illustrates that those involved in the
Jihadi movement do appear to be from a younger generation. [6] In
fact, the average age of the new list is 26.8, while the previous
list's average was 28.4. Most of those named in earlier re-ports had
the experience of fighting or were involved in the Afghan-Taliban
wars, while many of those mentioned on the new list do not have this
experience. This hints that, following the increase in clashes between
Saudi forces and jihadis over the past two years, a new generation of
militants is emerging. This new generation of militants, which is
being produced in every place where there is conflict between the
state (or in the case of Iraq, an occupying army propping up a new
regime) and radicalised Muslims, illus-trates how the global terrorist
landscape is being transformed.

Of course, many groups have claimed responsibility for attacks in the
past, insofar as such atrocities pro-mote their own organizational
aims and agendas. However outside of the Iraqi theatre, the
traditional re-sponse to spectacular terrorist attacks is one of a
quick, unequivocal and credible statement, from a rec-ognized source,
timed to maximize the impact of the attack. But, in the case of the
London attacks this did not occur. This is yet another indication of
the emergence of a "new wave" or new generation of commit-ted
militants, inspired by Salafi-Jihadism, and not linked to any
recognized networks. In this sense, it ap-pears that many of the new
generation of jihadis are not known militants from recognized
extremist movements, but individuals with multiple allegiances.

Conclusion

The Casablanca attacks in 2003 signified the emergence of a new
generation of Salafi-Jihadi cells which draw on different networks
from those associated directly with al-Qaeda. The proposed legislation
and policy changes following the attacks in London seeks to limit the
activities or prosecute those supporting or advocating terrorist
groups and ideologies. However as recent reports (such as the Chatham
House paper) illustrate, one characteristic of the current terror
threat stems from "no-warning coordinated suicide attacks." It is
increasingly clear that many of those involved in the new terror
networks do not recognize either the legal or the political frameworks
associated with known terrorist organizations. Therefore, what is
being proposed by some UK government officials and influential media
circles runs the very real risk of being - at best - irrelevant to the
real issues.

The UK authorities would be better served by paying closer attention
to three factors which are compounding the existing threat: first, the
use of different tactics - such as the failure to immediately claim
responsibility and the use of home-grown bombers; second, the
importance of networks aiding trans-boundary movement and implicitly
aiding recruitment by appeals to non-territorial forms of identity;
third, the connections with North African militants, suggesting that
the terror threat in Europe is morphing, creat-ing a new
Salafi-Jihadist generation which is no longer in the al-Qaeda orbit.

Notes:
1. Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, 'Riding Pillion for Tackling
Terrorism is a High-risk Policy', Security, Terrorism and the UK, 
    available at: http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/niis/BPsecurity.pdf
2. David Williams "London bombing was precise attack", at 
   
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=244992&area=/london_terror/london_news/
3. Antony Barnett, David Rose, Jason Burke and Jo Revill, "Police
target Europe terror cell as London toll tops 70", The Observer, 
    July 10, 2005.
4. Richard Norton-Taylor and Duncan Campbell "Intelligence officials
were braced for an offensive - but lowered threat levels", The 
    Guardian, July 8, 2005.
5. Rasheed Khashanah, Estshhadeon Magharbeon, al-Hayat Newspaper, June
20, 2005
6. Murad Batal Al-Shishani, The Future of Salfi-Jihadists in Saudi
Arabia, al-Ghad Jordanian daily, July 7, 2005, 
    http://www.alghad.jo/?news=32017.







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