http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/
 
The China-North Korea Relationship
 

Introduction


China and North Korea have been allies for more than half a century. Beijing
is a key provider of food and fuel to Kim Jung-Il's regime, and it is
heavily invested in preventing a destabilizing regime collapse that would
send North Korean refugees flooding across its northeastern border. But as
Kim tests ballistic missiles and develops his nation's nuclear weapons
capacity, China may be rethinking its support. 


How strong is the current relationship between North Korea and China?


China has supported North Korea since Chinese fighters flooded onto the
Korean peninsula to fight for the Communist Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) in 1950. Since the Korean War divided the peninsula between the
North and South, China has given both political and economic backing to
North Korea's leaders: Kim Il Sung, and his son and successor, Kim Jung-Il.
In recent years, China has been seen as one of the authoritarian regime's
few allies. 

On July 4, North Korea test-fired
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/11037/north_korea_missile_tests_draw_worlds_
ire.html> a series of ballistic missiles despite explicit warnings from
Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington. This led to an unusually public rebuke from
Chinese officials, a sign of strain in the relationship. Despite their long
alliance, experts say Beijing cannot control Pyongyang. "In general,
Americans tend to overestimate the influence China has over North Korea,"
says Daniel Pinkston <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/staff/pink.htm> , a Korea
specialist and director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. At the same
time, China has too much invested in North Korea to halt or withdraw its
support entirely. "The idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the
North Koreans is clearly wrong," says Adam
<http://cfr.org/bios/8863/adam_segal.html> Segal, the Maurice R. Greenberg
senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 



How does North Korea benefit from the relationship?


Pyongyang is economically dependent on China, which provides most of its
food and energy supplies. North Korea gets about 70 percent of its food and
70 to 80 percent of its fuel from China. Beijing is Pyongyang's largest
trading partner, and an estimated 300,000 North Koreans live in China, many
of them migrant workers who send much-needed remittances back home. 

China is also a strong political ally. "As an authoritarian regime that
reformed, they understand what Kim Jung-Il is most concerned with-survival,"
Segal says. China has repeatedly blocked UN Security Council resolutions
against North Korea, including some threatening sanctions. China has also
hosted the Six-Party Talks, a series of meetings in which North Korea, South
Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States have tried to resolve the
security concerns associated with North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
There and in other international forums, China is seen as a buffer between
North Korea and the United States and Japan, which favor punitive sanctions
and other measures to prevent Pyongyang from gaining nuclear weapons. 



How does China benefit?


China's support for Pyongyang ensures a stable nation on its northeastern
border, as well as providing a buffer zone between China and democratic
South Korea. North Korea's allegiance is also important for China as a
bulwark against U.S. military dominance of the region and the rise of
Japan's military. And China gains economically from its association with
North Korea; growing numbers of Chinese firms are investing in North Korea
and gaining concessions like preferable trading terms and port operations.
Chinese trade and investment in North Korea now totals $2 billion per year.
"They're becoming a stakeholder in the North Korean economy," Pinkston says.



What are the drawbacks to the relationship? 


Pyongyang is not an ally Beijing can count on. Kim Jung-Il's foreign policy
is, like its leader, highly unpredictable. "North Korea is extremely
difficult to deal with, even as an ally," says Daniel Sneider
<http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/danielcsneider/> , the associate director
for research at Stanford's Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former
longtime foreign correspondent specializing in Asia. "This is not a warm and
fuzzy relationship," he says. "North Korean officials look for reasons to
defy Beijing." Some experts say the missile tests were just one example of
North Korea pushing back against China's influence. ""It was certainly a
sign of independence [and] a willingness to send a message to China as well
as everyone else," Segal says. The Chinese, who favor "quiet diplomacy" with
North Korea instead of public statements, took the unusual step of making
public the fact that Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, warned North Korea not
to launch their missiles. The fact that Pyongyang did anyway has hurt
China's image, other experts say. 


What kind of leverage does Beijing have over Pyongyang?


Not as much as outsiders think, experts say. Beijing has bullied or bribed
Pyongyang officials to get them to the negotiating table at the Six-Party
Talks many times. "It's clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage on
North Korea in many respects," Sneider says. "But can China actually try to
exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime? Probably not."
Pinkston says that for all his country's growing economic ties with China,
Kim still makes up his own mind: "At the end of the day, China has little
influence over the military decisions." 


What are China's goals for its engagement with North Korea?


"For the Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top
priorities," Sneider says. "From that point of view, the North Koreans are a
huge problem for them, because Pyongyang could trigger a war on its own."
Stability is a huge worry for Beijing because of the specter of hundreds of
thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into China. "The Chinese are
most concerned about the collapse of North Korea leading to chaos on the
border," Segal says. 

If North Korea does provoke a war with the United States, China and South
Korea would bear the brunt of any military confrontation on the Korean
peninsula. Yet both those countries have been hesitant about pushing
Pyongyang too hard, for fear of making Kim's regime collapse. "They're
willing to live with a degree of ambiguity over North Korea's military
capability," Sneider says, as long as Pyongyang doesn't cross the "red line"
of nuclear testing. Even then, "the Chinese can live with a nuclear North
Korea, because they see the weapon as a deterrent against the United States,
not them," agrees Segal. But North Korea's military moves could start an
arms race in Northeast Asia and are already strengthening militarism in
Japan, which could push for its own nuclear weapons if North Korea
officially goes nuclear. 


How does Washington factor into the relationship?


The United States has pushed North Korea to verifiably and irreversibly give
up its uranium enrichment activities before Washington will agree to
bilateral talks. Experts say Washington and Beijing have very different
views on the issue. "Washington believes in using pressure to influence
North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars
have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics," Pinkston
says. "They tend to see public measures as humiliating and
counterproductive." Since U.S. officials have repeatedly refused North
Korean invitations to establish bilateral talks, "the Chinese have some
sympathy for the North Korean view that the United States is not interested
in negotiating," Segal says. 

Pinkston says the adversarial Pyongyang-Washington ties will likely not
improve. "I don't think the relationship with the Bush administration is
reparable," he says. "It's a complete disaster, and someone else has to pick
up the pieces. We can only hope it doesn't degenerate more, but that the
status quo will be maintained" until a new U.S. administration takes over,
he says. In the meantime, U.S. pundits and lawmakers who push China to take
what it sees as destabilizing actions in its region-i.e. support punitive
actions or sanctions against North Korea-"are living in a different world,"
Pinkston says. 

"There's always been a difference between how the Chinese felt we should
approach these negotiations and how the Bush administration felt about it,"
Sneider says. "That tension has always been there, and both governments have
gone out of their way to obscure that gap because they're well aware that
the North Koreans are good at exploiting those differences."



What is likely to happen to the China-North Korea relationship?


Despite the tensions caused by the recent missile tests, the relationship
will likely continue to be close. Each side has too much invested in the
other to drastically change the situation, experts say. If North Korea
continues to test missiles, it's possible that China will react more
strongly than it has in the past. Most of the nations involved in the crisis
will try to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. But after that,
it is unclear what happens next. "Everyone who deals with North Korea
recognizes them as a very unstable actor," Sneider says. 

However, some experts say North Korea is acting assertively both in its
relationship with China and on the larger world stage. "The North Koreans
are developing a much more realist approach to their foreign policy,"
Pinkston says. "They're saying imbalances of power are dangerous and the
United States has too much power-so by increasing their own power they're
helping to balance out world stability. It's neo-realism straight out of an
International Relations textbook."

*       


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Independent Task Force report on Russia says "partnership" between the two
countries is not a realistic short-term goal.


More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa


 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9302/> More Than Humanitarianism: A
Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa cover Independent Task Force report on
Africa finds that "a policy based on humanitarian concerns alone serves
neither U.S. interests nor Africa's."

To learn more about Independent Task Forces at the Council, click here
<http://www.cfr.org/about/what_we_do/task_forces.html> .


New Council Special Reports


U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward


 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10795/> U.S.-India Nuclear cover Council
Special Report on U.S.-India nuclear deal argues that Congress should
formally endorse the deal's basic framework, while delaying final approval
until critical nonproliferation needs are met. 


Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland
Security


 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10570/> Neglected Defense coverCouncil
Special Report on Homeland Security warns "the federal government is not
doing enough to harness the capabilities, assets, and goodwill of the
private sector" to protect the homeland.

 


 



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