http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=11296
Uzbek institutionalized brutality and corruption While the authoritarian regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov blames the weekend's bloody protests on Islamic "extremists", the protesting public tells a different story of poverty, institutionalized brutality, and corruption. By Ustina Markus for ISN Security Watch (17/05/05) Uzbekistan's authoritarian regime has long used the pervasive law enforcement agencies to suppress the popular demonstrations that routinely take place in other countries. The bloody crackdown of police and security forces on this weekend's protests in Andijan, in the eastern part of Uzbekistan, underlined the strength of those forces and their loyalty to the regime. In this context, the demonstrations and the newfound defiance on the part of the protestors illustrate just how fed up Uzbeks have become with their regime. There is a strong sense that the unrest is influenced by the success of mass protests in replacing unpopular regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, and most importantly, neighboring Kyrgyzstan. None of the former regimes in those countries had the same grip on law enforcement agencies as President Islam Karimov has in Uzbekistan. The public defiance met with a harsh response on the part of the authorities, as was to be expected in a police state. Precursor protests There had been forerunners to the demonstration in Andijan that provoked the security forces to resort to force. In November 2004, some 10,000 traders protested in neighboring Kokand over government restrictions on trading that were preventing them from making a living. In March this year, there was a riot in Jizzak over economic problems, and in February, 400 workers in the Ferghana province who had economic complaints went on a hunger strike that only ended in early May. Around the same time, on 3 May, members of a family from Kashkadarya province staged a protest in front of the US embassy in Tashkent, demanding the return of a farm confiscated by Uzbek authorities in 2001. Late at night on 4 May, Interior Ministry troops dislodged the protesters by force and transported the women and children back to Kashkadarya by bus. The men were taken away separately and have not been heard from since. The US embassy issued a statement defending the demonstrators, saying they were exercising the right to freedom of speech as recognized by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and posed no threat to the embassy's security. That did not prompt Uzbekistan's law enforcement agencies to free the male protesters. The Andijan demonstrations Like the protests that originated in Kashkadarya, the Andijan demonstrations began as a local, family/clan issue. The causes were similar, involving complaints about the government appropriating the property of successful individuals. In this case, 23 Andijan entrepreneurs, who owned or worked for 15-20 companies that had done well and employed some 2,000 people in the city, were arrested and their properties and assets seized. Those individuals, reportedly family- and community-oriented men who had noted the lack of services provided by the central government, had opened a charitable foundation that legally gave some 20 million soms (US$20,000) to schools, orphanages, and similar institutions. The 23 were respected locally for providing jobs and their charitable contributions. Despite such upstanding credentials, they were arrested and charged with membership in an illegal Islamic group called Akramiya. Their supporters stated that none of the men belonged to any such group or had even heard of the organization. By most accounts, Akramiya can be described as a flash in the pan. It was founded in 1996 by Akram Yuldashev after he split with the better known Hizb-ut-Tahrir, arguing that rather than focusing on establishing a region-wide caliphate, the group needed to focus on power at the local level in order to end corruption and provide better public services. Yuldashov was arrested in 1999 and sentenced to 17 years in prison. State piracy Talib Yaqubov, chairman of the independent Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, does not believe there has been any activity by Akramiya since the arrest of its leader. He suggests an alternative explanation for the arrests and confiscation of property - state piracy. Yaqubov believes that the 23 businessmen attracted the attention of the Uzbek government by their success and the generosity of their foundation, which the state then sought to acquire to meet budget shortfalls. He said that practice had been used before. Other residents were reported as saying that the 23 had refused to pay bribes to officials, who then had them arrested - a real possibility in a country where extortion by officials is essentially institutionalized. Still others claimed that the 23 were seen as potential future political rivals due to their influence in their community and their relative wealth. Might makes right The trial of the 23 began in February. Human rights groups noted that the defendants looked beaten, and several of the accused claimed they had been tortured into signing confessions of membership in Akramiya, which they had not even heard of. As the trial was drawing to a close on 10 May, some 4,000 family members, employees, friends, and clansmen of the 23 gathered to protest and hold a vigil. That crowd swelled over the next few days to 10,000-30,000 demonstrators. Around midnight on 12 May, a group of 100 supporters stormed a military garrison and the prison where the 23 were held, freeing them and 3,000-4,000 other prisoners. They proceeded to take the regional administration building while thousands more flocked to the area to voice their frustration with the regime. President Karimov himself traveled to Andijan to deal with the crisis, but did not engage in any discussions or negotiations. True to his style of "might makes right", he ordered the Interior Ministry and security forces to deal with the demonstrators and returned to Tashkent. On the evening of 13 May, the police and security forces opened fire on the crowds, by most accounts shooting indiscriminately. Only nine people were officially reported killed and 34 wounded, but unofficial reports estimated the toll to be much higher, possible as high as 500 dead. That prompted a small exodus of 500-1,000 Uzbeks to the Kyrgyz border at Karasuu, seeking asylum and protection in Kyrgyzstan. Only 15 years ago, many Uzbeks fled Kyrgyzstan for the safety of Uzbekistan after interethnic violence erupted in the Kyrgyz towns of Osh and Jalalabad. Karimov blames deaths on `extremists' Upon his return to Tashkent, Karimov issued a statement blaming the demonstrators for the loss of lives, claiming they had used women and children as hostages and human shields. He blamed Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and claimed that the same individuals who had organized the protest demonstration in Kyrgyzstan in March that toppled President Askar Akaev were also responsible for events in Andijan. Hizb-ut-Tahrir denied having anything to do with the violence. In fact, since all legal opposition parties have been banned since the 1990s, Karimov has increasingly become concerned with opposition stemming from religious groups. As Uzbeks are relatively conservative and consider Islam to be part of their national identity, Karimov cannot simply ban religion without alienating most of the country. Instead, he has actively hounded particular religious groups (both real and imaginary) in an effort to prevent them from becoming focal points for rallying against his regime. The Wahhabi `conspiracy' In the late 1990s, the Uzbek media was full of denunciations of Wahhabis - a sect that is almost nonexistent in Uzbekistan. After railing against them for a couple of years and not uncovering any actual Wahhabi conspiratorial groups, the attacks shifted to Hizb-ut-Tahrir around 2000. That group rejects violence and espouses peaceful means to turn the Islamic world into one big happy caliphate and replace Central Asia's corrupt, secular politicians. For a short while in 1999-2000, there were concerns that a ragtag militant guerrilla group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), was attempting to take control of the country, or parts of it, by force. But that movement, with its relatively small fighting force of some 900, based itself in Tajikistan and never made its way past Kyrgyzstan in its incursions against Karimov. Eventually, the IMU was forced out of Tajikistan into Afghanistan by authorities in Dushanbe and appears to have been annihilated when the US and coalition forces attacked the Taliban regime. As a result of the authorities' attempt to emasculate potential religious opposition groups, membership in banned religious groups is a considered serious offense and can carry a prison term of 20 years. An example of how tenuous the charge that the Andijan protests were linked to Islamic extremist groups was pointed out by Ferghana.ru, which said a protester appealed to the news group to ask Russian President Vladimir Putin to intervene on their behalf. Given Putin's hostility to militant Muslim groups, fueled by Russia's ongoing war in Chechnya, it is highly unlikely a Muslim militant would turn to Putin for support. The public tells a different story The general public does not see religious militant groups as fomenting discontent, and claim that it is Karimov's economic policies and poverty, as well as the oppressive tactics of law enforcement agencies, that drive people to protest. In an effort to collect more taxes, the government had begun imposing restrictions on imported goods, demanding new registrations that cost money, and introducing new tariffs that are making it increasingly difficult for traders to make a living selling their cheap wares at local markets. As state salaries are very low, and there is little large-scale private enterprise, many people depend on the local markets to earn additional income or even to fully support themselves. Last September, in Chorsu, women gathered to protest the regulations and appealed to Karimov to repeal the resolutions and free the markets so they could earn some income. Not only do official regulations make it hard to make a living, but police - which there are plenty of in Uzbekistan - and other law enforcement agencies and official institutions are noted for expecting payments from individuals in return for not harassing them. Falling afoul of Uzbek law enforcement agents, whether they are tax collectors, police, or judges, can be a serious matter in a country where those organs consistently rank as one of the world's most noted human rights abusers. That, too, has led many to be driven to despair, with some claiming police arrest people over personal vendettas, or simply to extract a bribe. At the very least, it adds to the daily stress of making a living. For the unfortunates who actually do cross paths with Uzbekistan's law enforcement agencies, the consequences range from some bruises and minor financial setbacks to death. Institutional brutality and corruption As a country, Uzbekistan can be characterized as calm, stable, and law abiding. The same cannot be said of its law enforcement structures, which are characterized as brutal and corrupt. For years now the US State Department's reports on human rights practices have condemned Uzbekistan for its poor human rights record and blamed law enforcement agencies for grossly infringing on civil liberties. It has never blamed the public for lawless behavior. Last year's report even stated that two individuals who died while in police detention in 2002 appeared to have been boiled to death. Uzbek police countered that the two had fatally injured themselves with boiling water while throwing hot tea at each other. Despite a number of programs run by the US, the OSCE, and some Western European states to reform the Uzbek police and judiciary, the human rights records of those agencies has not improved. In part, this is an institutional problem. Like much of the former Soviet Union, Uzbekistan inherited an institutional system based on a system of patronage. To be hired into the judiciary, police, or security organs, one had to kowtow and invariably pay an appropriate bribe. As his career progressed, those lower down paid homage to him, while he continued to kowtow to the higher ups. By the time an individual reached the top echelons of his agency, he had paid so many bribes and kowtowed so much, he was not inclined to shake up the system, since it was now paying him off. Without the political will at the top it is difficult to implement reform. Long-time loyalties Another factor that must be taken into consideration when assessing why Uzbekistan's police are so loyal to the authorities is the relationship between President Karimov and the heads of the Interior Ministry and security service, Zokirjon Almatov and Rustam Inoyatov, respectively. Both Almatov and Inoyatov have held their posts from the early days of Uzbekistan's independence. In other former Soviet republics, there has generally been a turnover in those posts so that those institutions have not become overly powerful in their own right. In Uzbekistan, it appears Karimov, Almatov, and Inoyatov make up a type of triumvirate, where one could not displace either of the other two because they are in such control of their own powerful apparat, and they all depend on each other for their political survival. Other republic presidents have made a point of reshuffling the heads of their power ministries to prevent anyone from becoming too entrenched and a power in his own right. In Uzbekistan, there is a strange co-dependency between the three. As all three - Karimov, Almatov, and Inoyatov - sincerely believe that force and ruthlessness is an effective method for dealing with dissent, they cannot be relied on to curb the excesses of their law enforcement agencies. International influence There had been hopes that the international community could serve to curb Uzbekistan's lousy human rights record, but that has not been the case. In the 1990s, Karimov was anxious for Western support as a way of protecting the country from any encroachment by Russia on its sovereignty. As a staunch Uzbek nationalist, he went as far as to drop out of the Commonwealth of Independent Sates' (CIS) Collective Security Part - the group's military dimension - and join GUAM, renamed GUUAM afterwards, a subgroup within the CIS that worked largely to block Russian initiatives that went against Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, or Moldova's interests. Nonetheless, the continual criticism heaped on Karimov's regime by the Western international community antagonized the Uzbek president. Karimov was also disillusioned with Western aid. Aid that went to support independent media, independent NGOs, political party development, and so forth was not welcome. Even the aid that went towards police, military, and security forces did not please the president. Much of the military aid was aimed at securing any chemical or biological materials left over from the Soviet era and did not go towards developing Uzbekistan's armed forces. The police aid included training on how not to torture prisoners during interrogation. Again, Karimov did not see the need for that. Aid for economic development meant little to Karimov, since most was geared at fostering independent enterprise, while Karimov's regime was reluctant to privatize large enterprises, or open the country's considerable gold resources for investment, which would mean loosening control over those assets. The new post-9/11 game By 2001, Karimov was feeling the pinch in regards to international allies. Rejecting Russia had antagonized Moscow, but had not gained strong Western support for his regime. Then came the 11September 2001 attacks on the US, which the Uzbek leader saw as a godsend opportunity in bind the US to his side. Within days of the attack, Karmiov offered the US use of a military base on Uzbek soil. As the country borders Afghanistan, that offer was a logistical boon for the US. It also worked to redirect US interest to the country. However, the forthcoming aid continued to target independent enterprise, media, and political parties, rather than Karimov's priorities. In addition, the criticism of Uzbekistan's human rights record did not abate. Western aid was seen as a contributing factor for the success of the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan - revolutions that Karimov regarded with dread. By 2005, Karimov was again feeling isolated. In May, Uzbekistan formally dropped out of GUUAM, and relations with the US were on a downhill course. Prospects for change Unlike the Rose, Orange, and Tulip Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, any popular uprising in Uzbekistan will probably be bloody. Law enforcement agencies have a vested interest in the current system and are unlikely to calmly stand by and watch it crumble. Police did shoot at demonstrators in Aksy in Kyrgyzstan in 2002, but that had more to do with disorganization and no clear understanding of how to behave than a desire by the police to uphold Akaev. After the deaths at Aksy, the Kyrgyz regime made efforts to insure that such an event would not happen again, and Akaev's cabinet resigned. When demonstrations began last March over a questionable parliamentary election, police stood back. Recruits were reluctant to use force and the country's leaders knew that using force could unleash a violent public reaction that would not just drive Akaev into exile, but would demand his scalp. Given Uzbekistan's history under Karimov, should his regime fall, people will demand his scalp - even in the event of a bloodless coup. Thus, unlike Akaev, Karimov has nothing to lose by resorting to force, and everything to lose if he should fall. Ustina Markus is a Washington, DC-based international affairs analyst specializing in security issues. She was based in Osh, Kyrgyzstan for two years as a senior field analyst for the International Crisis Group (ICG). ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> DonorsChoose. A simple way to provide underprivileged children resources often lacking in public schools. Fund a student project in NYC/NC today! http://us.click.yahoo.com/EHLuJD/.WnJAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
