What’s next for al-Qaida 3.0? 
Experts say terror organization is morphing, waiting for opportunity
By Robert Windrem
Investigative producer
NBC News
Updated: 6:58 a.m. PT May 23, 2007

NEW YORK - There is a saying in the tribal areas that span the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border lands, one that is usually expressed with a sly
smile: “The Americans have the watches. We have the time.”

The underlying message, of course, is quite clear: Al-Qaida and the Taliban
have the patience they need to reconstitute and refocus their operations,
using different models than those they used prior to Sept. 11, 2001, and
working perhaps on different targets.

And things certainly seem to be changing. Roger Cressey, former deputy
director of counterterrorism at the National Security Council and now an NBC
News analyst, points out that, once again, al-Qaida has morphed into what
another analyst, Peter Bergin, calls "al-Qaida 3.0."

The first version was a hierarchal organization; the second was more
inspirational, meant to spur a series of loosely affiliated groups allied
around a central idea. 

“We are now dealing with a hybrid phenomenon,” Cressey says. “Al-Qaida the
organization has reconstituted in a way that they can reach out to the
jihadi movement and provide homegrown terrorists with facilities and
empowerment, particularly through links in Pakistan.”

But have the terrorists lost anything in that morphing? Are they as capable
worldwide? And are the changes — with their accompanying lack of major
support mechanisms and reliance on simpler and more local organizational
structures — forcing it to postpone attacks on the United States and other
Western targets? That would be the ultimate act of patience.

Four NBC News military and counter-terrorism analysts, including Cressey,
along with other experts, disagree on the many of the answers. Some point to
a number of events the last several months that could indicate a resurgence
of the al-Qaida threat across the world. But others believe that those same
events show al-Qaida has made a conscious decision to think smaller — to
focus on moderate Sunni Muslim regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco and
Algeria, as well as weak states like Iraq — rather than trying to mount
attacks on the United States. 

For these analysts, al-Qaida is doing what other terrorist groups do on a
smaller scale: Avoid the hard target and focus more on the soft. 

Success on Pakistan border
One thing is clear: Everyone consulted agrees that the organization is doing
well along that Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a position Bush administration
officials have, reluctantly, come to accept. 

On May 8, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before Senate
Appropriations Committee on the issue, becoming the first high-level
official to state what has been circulating in the upper levels of the
administration for some time now.


“Al-Qaida has expanded in organization and capabilities” said Gates, adding
that it “reestablished itself in western Pakistan [and is] training new
recruits.”

A senior U.S. intelligence official says that Gates’ comments are reflected
in what has been circulating inside the intelligence community.

“The tribal areas in northwest Pakistan are a growing problem,” the official
said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “We’re not talking about the kind
of stuff we saw before 9/11 in Afghanistan, where thousands were trained.”
Rather, it’s now a case of “training the trainer,” who returns home to teach
his comrades. 


“A very sophisticated strategy,” the official added. 

“The truce arrangements the Pakistanis have made with tribal leaders in
those areas are a problem,” the official continued. “The sense is that
al-Qaida does feel a greater degree of freedom to operate. ... The
Pakistanis move with caution and they are not doing all they can do.”

Upside to tribal region situation
A White House official, trying to put a positive spin on the truce
arrangements, recently said there is an upside to the al-Qaida resurgence in
the tribal regions: that the newfound freedom can lead to mistakes in
operational security and exposure.

And the intelligence official said that indeed “when they mass and have
facilities that we can identify, the Pakistanis take some advantage ... but
not enough.”

In this regard, Gates suggested the United States may have to take more of a
role in Waziristan, the Pakistani province where the first truce agreement
was made and where most of the new al-Qaida training takes place.

In fact, Gates shocked some when, in a hearing in the which he was asked by
senators what the U.S. military is going to do to kill or capture al-Qaida
leadership, he responded with the announcement that, “We have plans to go
after al-Qaida leadership in Waziristan Province.” The surprise is that
Gates would admit this, knowing how sensitive the Pakistani government is
regarding the presence of U.S. troops on its soil. 

This new candor comes with the reality that al-Qaida-linked operations in
countries such as Iraq, North Africa, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon have been
very busy. In the past month, for instance, al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq and
Algeria have used suicide bombings to attack national parliaments, killing
more than 40. Meanwhile, in Morocco police were able to thwart a series of
bombings planned for government facilities and tourist sites. Both the
Algerian and Moroccan attacks were organized by al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb, a group formed only in January from disparate jihadi elements and
sworn to bring down the regimes in that region.

In addition, more than 170 men were arrested by Saudi authorities, including
many from Nigeria, Mauritania, Yemen, Syria and Morocco. The group had
already been organized into seven cells, with the target being the Saudi
government. Perhaps more important in establishing their seriousness of
purpose, they had already buried more than $5 million in the desert. 


Now this week, Lebanese security forces are battling an al Qaida-linked
group, Fatah al-Islam, on the outskirts of Tripoli. 

‘Reading what it means’
Still, according to NBC News military analyst William M. Arkin, the question
remains whether this “is hair on fire or the world on fire?” (“Hair on fire”
is a term former CIA Director George Tenet used to describe the agency’s
warnings of an attack against the U.S. before 9/11.)  

“On any given day, we can come up with 20 attack plots around the world. The
real challenge is reading what it means,” Arkin adds. “We have been told all
about the dots.”

Arkin believes that what we are seeing is mostly a campaign against the
Sunni-dominated governments of those countries, from Morocco to Pakistan,
who have been our allies in the war on terror.


“What it connotes is anti-Western terrorism and insurgency ... focused on
undermining the West and its proxies,” Arkin adds, “undermining Western
culture and its proxies in the Sunni world.”

Michael Sheehan, who is both a former coordinator for State Department
counterterrorism efforts and an ex-deputy police commissioner in New York,
suggests that al-Qaida is doing well only in war-torn areas. 

“I think al-Qaida is a dying organization except in a few areas of the
Islamic world, like Iraq, like Afghanistan, like North Africa,” he said.
“They have shown a lack of capability in their main goal, attacking the
United States.

“This (going after Sunni states) is not a strategy of choice — just what’s
left for them.  Can they make stuff happen in Afghanistan? Yes. But can they
make stuff happen in the West? They haven’t attacked in the United States in
nearly six years and in July, it will be two years since there has been any
attack in the West (the London Underground bombings).”

Sheehan dismisses the idea that al-Qaida is “waiting” for the right
opportunity. “This is not a strategic choice for them. They’re not waiting.
Anyone who knows anything about terrorism will tell you they don’t wait.
When they’re ready, they go!”

He contends that suicide bombings are the result of long-simmering
conflicts, where frustration and a lack of alternatives make for easier
recruiting: “Sri Lanka, Palestine, Iraq, Algeria — countries that have been
at war for most of the last 20, 30, 40 years.”

Jihadis are targeting Sunni leaders, he says, but he does not believe that
al-Qaida, even “resurgent,” is capable of attacking the United States and
certainly not at the level of 9/11. 

“This frustration with Sunni Islam — and projecting that against Israel and
the United States — has legs. Can you take that to an operation against the
United States? Quite frankly, they haven’t been able to do it. It’s
comprehensive failure.” 

‘They had to clean up the rest of the world’
Lt. Col. Rick Francona, a retired U.S. Air Force officer who served as a
defense attaché in Baghdad, Damascus and Dubai, agrees with Sheehan.

“Two, three years ago, I believe, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who runs al-Qaida on a
day-to-day basis, made a decision that going against the U.S. is too hard to
do,” said Francona, an NBC News and CNBC analyst. “They had to clean up the
rest of the world.” 

Francona also cites reasoning similar to that of Sheehan. “They’re not
having a lot of success lately in the West. They need a success ... some
successes. If their goal, their basis is attacking the U.S., they are losing
their basis.”

Instead, according to Francona, people should think of this more as a
realignment, reorganization and refocus rather than a reconstitution or
resurgence. 

Where does Francona think al-Qaida will move next?  


Certainly Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and probably Jordan. The problem for
al-Qaida is that Saudi Arabia and Jordan have excellent internal security
apparatuses, he said. As for Iraq, Francona thinks al-Qaida there is not
likely to emerge triumphant even if the U.S. leaves.

“Sunni insurgency is more than one insurgency,” he said. “It is multiple
insurgencies and the only thing they have in common is that they hate us. If
they survive, they will turn on each other,” he adds.

The Lebanon situation fits the model Sheehan and Francona describe. Although
it is described as “linked to al-Qaida,” U.S. intelligence says those links
are not to core al-Qaida, but to al-Qaida in Iraq or “al-Qaida once
removed,” as one intelligence analyst describes it. And, the same analyst
notes, in spite of its leaders’ anti-U.S. and anti-Western rhetoric, “Its
organizing principle is not global jihad, it’s Israel.”


It’s typical in other ways, as well, says the analyst. “It’s not
particularly large, it links to al-Qaida, even al-Qaida in Iraq, are hard to
tell and its fighters were recruited and trained in refugee camps. We are
seeing a lot of that.”

‘Right now intent exceeds capability’
Cressey is not so optimistic about the chances of the United States being
spared an attack in spite of al-Qaida’s interest in Sunni regimes.

The current model, he says, is the aforementioned 2005 London Underground
bombing, which we now know was not purely home grown. “They received
training in Pakistan. This reconstituted infrastructure is now directly
supporting individuals and groups. 

“That model is what you’re going to be seeing,” says Cressey. “Al-Qaida
looking for these groups [and] these groups looking for al-Qaida.”

Cressey says the one plot that should make people wary — and has indeed made
many U.S. officials very anxious — was the thwarted London airliner plot
from last August. 

“What you saw was a template you have got to look for regarding possible
attacks on the U.S..” he said. “A lot of things went right for us in
disrupting this, but as long as they live and breathe, they are going to
plot and plan for an attack on the U.S. 

“It’s intent vs. capability. Right now intent exceeds capability.”

Asked if this new al-Qaida is going to focus more on the United States or
instead on friendly Sunni governments, Cressey says, “It’s both!  Getting
both of us. They can’t effect action inside the U.S., but they can within
the Sunni regimes. They believe any attack within the U.S.-allied Sunni
regimes is an attack on us.

“At the risk of sounding hysterical, I think we are overdue for an attempt
against U.S. interests,” added Cressey. “We have done a good job at
hardening overseas government targets — embassies and military —  but there
are other targets.”

‘What’s in for me?’
Many experts contend that this refocus on Islamic regimes will cause Sunni
leaders to rearrange their foreign policy priorities — as a defense
mechanism. They point to recent comments by the Saudi king, Abdullah,
criticizing the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq, as evidence of Sunni fear of
rising Islamic fundamentalism.

“He (Abdullah) knows how unpopular (President) Bush and the United States
are in his country ... and the region,” says the official. “So he looks at
the public opinion in his country and then takes a look at the calendar and
thinks, ‘What’s in for me to keep supporting Bush when I have a lot of
fundamentalism sentiment in the kingdom?’”

Pakistan is taking a similar, if lower-key, position, says Barnett Rubin of
New York University and an NBC News analyst on South Asia. The country’s
leadership is being judicious in going after Islamists. 


“The government of Pakistan has definitely gone after the foreigners and
al-Qaida — that is to say the people from Arab world or the former Soviet
Union,” says Rubin. “But they have not shown any of that determination in
going after the Taliban from Afghanistan or the Taliban from Pakistan who
have now taken over significant portions of Pakistani territory in those
areas.”

The United States is not without recent success in the war on al-Qaida. The
Saudi raid was helped by U.S. intelligence. So, reportedly, were the
Moroccan raids that thwarted terror in Casablanca. 

And a man believed to be at least top five and possibly top three — Abdul al
Hadi al Iraqi — was quietly picked up a few weeks ago and is now in
Guantanamo Bay. Al Iraqi has long been described as the man who brokered the
agreement between bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi that resulted in the
Iraqi terrorist leader pledging “bayat” — personal loyalty — to bin Laden
and the renaming of his organization as al-Qaida in Iraq. 


But the question remains: Does any of this matter?  Thousands of jihadis
have been arrested or killed in various Muslim states from North Africa to
Southeast Asia, including four men once viewed as al-Qaida’s No. 3. 

The lack of attacks against the U.S. homeland — and even U.S. interests
overseas — can be attributed at least in part to the vigilance and
aggressiveness of the Bush administration.

Few doubt the Iraq war and stalemate between the Israelis and the
Palestinians are breeding more extremists, more terrorists. If they can
destabilize moderate Muslim states, toppling even one, the threat grows
exponentially and whatever the hands on those watches are reading, it’s hard
to imagine time not being on their side.

© 2007 MSNBC Interactive© 2007 MSNBC InteractiveRobert Windrem is an
investigative producer with NBC News.

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18817546/

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