tschle/sslh/blob/v2.2.1/common.c#L516
[21]:
https://github.com/yrutschle/sslh/commit/ad1f5d68e96eec389668d1139cb281b1f3f13725
[22]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork_bomb
[23]: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224800
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www
Hi,
On Fri, May 30, 2025 at 10:11:51AM +0200, Matthias Gerstner wrote:
> > Default ACLs to the rescue!
> >
> > $ chmod a+x ~
> > $ mkdir -m 777 ~/.Private
> > $ setfacl -d -m u:$LOGNAME:rwx ~/.Private/
> > $ curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/
Hi,
On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 08:23:25PM +0200, Jakub Wilk wrote:
> * Matthias Gerstner , 2025-05-28 19:21:
> >By leveraging issue 3.2), the Kea services can be instructed to create
> >`_kea` owned files in the attacker's `$HOME/.Private`. The content of
> >the created f
/src/lib/http/basic_auth_config.cc?ref_type=tags#L365
[7]:
https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/blob/97a36b466ba1420210294f0a1dd7002054ba3b7e/libstdc%2B%2B-v3/libsupc%2B%2B/hash_bytes.cc#L74
[8]:
https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/blob/97a36b466ba1420210294f0a1dd7002054ba3b7e/libstdc%2B%2B-v3/include/bits/fun
Hello,
On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 11:01:53AM -0400, Jan Schaumann wrote:
> Matthias Gerstner wrote:
> > we were surprised to find a local root exploit in
> > the Screen 5.0.0 major version update affecting distributions that ship
> > it as setuid-root (Arch Linux and NetBS
Hi,
On Thu, May 15, 2025 at 04:09:51PM +0100, Stuart Henderson wrote:
> On 2025/05/14 13:26, Matthias Gerstner wrote:
> > Indeed, this is the bugfix release announced by upstream here:
> >
> > https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/screen-users/2025-05/msg5.html
>
&
Hello Thomas,
On Tue, May 13, 2025 at 06:21:06PM +0200, Dr. Thomas Orgis wrote:
> Are you sure the safe default wins? I also read configure.ac as such,
> at a first glance … but running plain configure results in
>
> $ grep PTYMODE config.h
> * define PTYMODE if you do not like the default of 06
v5&id=2bdebfc9837cfd3cea0645030e626b08bb6bc2d0
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/security
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev, Andrew McDonald, Werner Knoblich
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
n.h?h=v.5.0.0#n148
[26]: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/screen-users/2024-12/msg0.html
[27]: https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Security_disclosure_policy
[28]: https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
[29]: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1227243#c8
[30]: https://savanna
cda145e1a83
[14]: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1236109
[15]: https://bugbounty.meta.com
[16]: https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/security
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
25/01/22/2
[31]: https://sourceforge.net/p/opensc/mailman/message/58838740/
[32]: https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam
[33]: https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/security
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev, Andrew McDonald, Werner Knoblich
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
0c86fa2cbaaa7c130088fda8315c01
[8]: https://github.com/linuxdeepin/dde-api-proxy/releases/tag/1.0.19
[9]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/03/24/2
[10]:
https://www.deepin.org/index/en/docs/wiki/en/About_Deepin/Contact-the-deepin-Officials
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias G
gt;Type of comment: Issue
>
> "Request type: Other" items are read every day.
Additionally Mitre expressed that they are working on improvements to
prevent such situations in the future.
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/
Matthias
[1]: https://cveform.mitre.org/
[2]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/08/06/3
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/security
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev, And
Hi Jacob,
On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 11:58:00PM -0600, Jacob Bachmeyer wrote:
> On 1/15/25 06:03, Matthias Gerstner wrote:
> > There exist utility modules that don't
> > actually authenticate but perform helper functions or enforce policy. An
> > example is the pam_failloc
ww.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2025-01/
Best Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/security
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev, Andrew McDonald, Werner Knoblich
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
che.c#L247
[5]: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/releases/tag/2.10.1
[6]: https://github.com/samba-team/samba/blob/master/lib/ldb/common/ldb.c#L94
[7]: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/0562646cc261
[8]: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/pull/7764
[9]:
https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/blob/2.10.0/src/provid
rottlectl.sh#L13
[6]:
https://gitlab.com/rt-linux-tools/stalld/-/blob/v1.19.6/src/utils.c?ref_type=tags#L54
[7]:
https://gitlab.com/rt-linux-tools/stalld/-/blob/v1.19.6/src/utils.c?ref_type=tags#L355
[7]:
https://gitlab.com/rt-linux-tools/stalld/-/blob/v1.19.6/src/stalld.h?ref_type=ta
valent of SO_PEERCRED on various non-Linux OSs.)
thanks for the hint! Relying on D-Bus and kernel features is surely the
cleanest way to implement this.
Cheers
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Security Engineer
https://www.suse.com/security
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
SUSE Software Solution
/redhat-performance/tuned/commit/cddcd2336944a56e313324c699dd739fe8f1f85d
[6]: https://github.com/redhat-performance/tuned/releases/tag/v2.24.1
[7]:
https://github.com/redhat-performance/tuned/commit/90c24eea037c7a5e9414c93f8fb3e549ed4a7b06
Regards
Matthias
--
Matthias Gerstner
Secur
4]:
https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/blob/fd1d252d44a010fad558bed2d315577a9d8d1f2b/authentik/root/monitoring.py#L27
[5]:
https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/security/advisories/GHSA-2xrw-5f2x-m56j
[6]:
https://documentation.suse.com/smart/security/html/systemd-securing/index.html
When only supporting the simple scenario of the usersfile
being located directly beneath the to-be-authenticated user's home
directory, then a lot of things become simpler, as it has been done
in the upstream approach in a couple of aspects.
Best Regards
Matthias
From 345ae06e0f698bdb1e9b4529e5
Hi,
thanks for bringing up the potential problems with the patch we (SUSE)
suggested. The missing drop of the ancillary group list has indeed been
overlooked and will result in a lack of protection, since the
"unprivileged" process will likely still be a member of the root group.
I will adjust th
Hello list,
please find below a report about recently fixed security issues in PCP.
You can also find a rendered HTML version of this report on our blog [13].
Best Regards
Matthias
1) Introduction
===
Earlier this year we already reported a local symlink attack in
Performance Co-
e-remote-desktop-system-dbus.html
[4]:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/commit/9fbaae1aaa0b821e4a859f22bad17979225af058
[5]:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/commit/663ad63172e0bfc8bd50a475ede753583bc3c99a
[6]: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/issues/180
Best
25 matches
Mail list logo